









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Steenvoorde, R. A. J. (2008). Regulatory transformations in international economic relations. Wolf Legal
Publishers (WLP).
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







Regulatory Transformations in International Economic Relations
R.A.j. Steenvoorde
ISBN 978-90-5850-351-0
Uitgever: Willem-Jan van derWolf
Ren6 van der Wolf
Opmaak: Jook van der Snel






Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden vermenigvuldigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd
gegevensbestand of openbaar worden gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzi j
elektronisch, door fotokopieen, opnamen of op enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande
toestemming van de auteur en de uitgever.
Voor het opnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere
compilatiewerken (artikel 16 Auteurswet 1912) dient men zich tot de uitgever te wenden.
© 2008 RLP/ R.A.J. Steenvoorde





ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Tilburg
op gezag van de rector magnificus,
prof. dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten,
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan
van een door het college voor promoties
aangewezen commissie
in de aula van de Universiteit
op maandag 21 april 2008 om 16.15 uur
door
Richard Albertus Johannes Steenvoorde
geboren op 18 november 1973
te Alkemade
Promotores: Prof. dr. W.B.H.j. van de Donk





1.      International Law and New Regulatory Arrangements                        7
2.     Dimensions of Change and Continuity in the History                     13
of International Law
3.      Dimensions of Change and Continuity in the Context                      43
of Economic Globalisation
4.     Preparing the Empirical Research                                                 71
5.    The Kyoto Protocol Negotiations                                        87
6.     The Fair Labor Association 107
7.     The Global Compact 125
8. Comparative Analysis 149




AG 13 Ad-hoc group on article 13, established by COP-1, fi n. june 1998
AGBM Ad-hoc group on the Berlin Mandate, established by COP-1,
concluded work in Kyoto, December 1997
All Activities Implemented Jointly
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States (42 states from the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic
Oceans)
ATC Anti-terrorism Coalition
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFC Chlorofluorocarbons are both ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases.
COP Conference ofthe Parties to the 1992 UN FCCC on Climate Change
D.C. District of Columbia
EC European Community
EU European Union
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992
FLA Fair Labor Association
G77 Developing countries + China C in reality 120 countries)
GEF Global Environment Facility
GC Global Compact
GHGs Greenhouse gases
ICI                  Statute of the International Court of justice
ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1988)
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC/FCCC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1991)
11 Joint Implementation
LUCF Land Use Change and Forestry
MIT Massachusetts Institute for Technology
MOP Meeting ofthe Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (in other words a COP of
the FCCC serving as MOP to the Protocol
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
QUELRO Binding emission reduction target
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund
SBSTA Subsidiary Body of Scientific and Technological Advice
UK United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
US United States ofAmerica
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Developrnent Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WCP World Climate Programme
WEF World Economic Forum
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WTO World Trade Organisation
Acknowledgements
"Living is the constant adjustment of thought to life, and life to thought in
such a way that we are always growing, always experiencing new things in the
old and old things in the new. Thus life is always new."
Thomas Merton
Merton is right. And the process of writing this manuscript has taught me the
deeper truth of his words. Adjustments were constantly needed to navigate through
unfamiliar and uncharted terrains. But even more than that this journey has made
me aware of the need to make adjustments  not only rationally,  but also within  my
own heart.
I have been blessed by many sojourners who accompanied me during this journey.
They deserve to be mentioned here.
First of all, my two supervisors Professor Dr. Wim van de Donk and Professor Dr
Ernst Hirsch Ballin. Even within the turmoil of day-to-day politics they managed to
find time to accompany me on my journey.
But their help would have been to no avail if not a solid groundwork had been laid
during my time as a student at Tilburg University by professor Dr. F.A.M. Alting von
Geusau, professor Dr. Victor Bekkers and Dr. Erik janse de Jonge who jointly
examined my master thesis. Also important to mention here are former colleagues
during my tenure in The Hague and return to Tilburg, the late professor Dr. Kees
Klop, professor Paul Frissen, professor Willem van Genugten, professor R.F.M.
Ruud Lubbers, and professor Dr. Randall Lesaffer.
A special word of thanks also to  Dr Theo Brinkel and Jeroen Denkers with whom  I
have shared an office during my years at the university. And of course, senator Dr.
Sophie van Bijsterveld who was always ready to read drafts, offer balanced critiques,
and helpful suggestions for further reading. Furthermore, 1 should mention here
Prof. Dr. Sjef van Erp and Prof. Dr. Trix van Erp-Jacobs whose friendship I highly
value ever since our infamous study trip to the United States in 1995!
My colleagues at the Katholiek Network deserve praise for their patience and help
during the final stages ofwriting: Hein Pieper, Dr. Ton Duffues, Wies Goossens and
Anneke van der Weijde. Also a big thanks to Piet Kuijper, Hans de jong, Karin Melis
and Rick van der Woud, all of whom have shown great interest and support during
this journey.
Over these years I have found a home away from home in England. So much so, that
I feel that an important part of my life and work had not been possible without the
warm friendships of the Sarum College 'crew' in Salisbury: Nick Townsend, Fiona
Hulbert, Dr. Tim Macquiban, Linda Cooper, Helen Tandy, the reverend (!) john
Plows and Dr Scott Thomas. To this list may be added the friends and (more
recently) colleagues at the Von HOgel Institute, St. Edmunds College, Cambridge:
Francis Davis, Liz Paulhus, Kate Crofts and the scholars ofthe International Young
Leaders Network. Last, but not least, in this line-up are Jonathan and Anna Cox
whose friendship, encouragement, and hospitality mean more to me than I can ever
make up for.
Back home, I could rely on many friends who have been extremely patient - indeed
beyond rational endurance - with me. So a big thanks to jan Brouwers, Sander and
Florence Diks-Van Weelderen, Stephan van der Kleij, Arthur Krebbers, Jerry Korsmit,
Maurits van der Lande, the Van der Meulen family, Jan Quartel, Esther van der WeI,
Yves Wesselman, Jan and Ilse Willems, Marsha Buuron and Anton de Wit.
And, because writing is a spiritual process as well, some of my 'spiritual sojourners'
deserve to be mentioned here: Fr. Remco Babijn, Professor Dr. Wil Derkse and his wife
Anne, canon Bruce Duncan, Dr Mathieu Ham, Fr. Lukas Rodiger OCist, Mons. Dr Tiny
Muskens and Giny van der Korput (1 am looking forward to our next working-lunch!).
Music has been a great inspiration and comfort over these years, so a big thanks to
all the members of Koninklijke Harmonie de Eendracht, the Young Stage Band, the
parish choir YRDV and Brasso Continuo. Specially mentioned here should be their
extraordinary trombone sections and the brave trumpeter jeroen de Wit.
But it all starts with family. So a big thanks to my grandparents, my uncles, aunts,
and cousins for keeping me firmly with my two feet on the ground. Supporting me
during literally every step of this process have been my parents, my sister in law, and
my godson Kevin. To describe their inspiration, love and care would take up another
book.




For giving me the privilege of being my brother and best friends!
Geertruidenberg, lanuary 28th 2008
Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas
Richard Steenvoorde
Prologue
"In recent weeks, the speculators have been waging an all-out war on the
American Dollar. The strength of a nation's currency is based on the strength
of that nation's economy, and the American economy is by far the strongest in
the world. Accordingly,  I have directed the Secretary of the Treasury to take the
action necessary to defend the dollar against the speculators. I have directed
Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into
gold or other reserve assets, except in amounts and conditions determined"'
Introduction
These words were spoken by US President Nixon to the American public on August
15th,  1971. The suspension of the Gold Exchange Standard, which meant that US
Dollars could no longer be converted to gold at a standard  rate of $35 to the ounce,
affected worldwide dollar stocks, especially the large stocks held by OPEC countries.
In order to compensate for their losses, and in the wake ofthe political emotions of
the 1973 Yum Kippur War, the OPEC countries announced on October 16th 1973 to
raise the price of a barrel of crude oil by 17%. They also announced an embargo of
oil exportation to the United States and the Netherlands. This resulted in a global
recession that lasted for many years. The standard convertibility ofthe US Dollar to
gold was never restored:
In the meantime, OPEC dollars were deposited in Western banks. In order to
avert the pending international economic crisis, the banks started to lend out
money fast to developing countries regardless whether these recipients had the
capacity to repay these loans.1
By the mid 19705 the developing countries realised that they were not making
enough money to repay their debts. But there were more problems on the hori-
zon. In this volatile macroeconomic environment there was a serious possibility
that some industrialising countries were at risk of being unable to honour their
own debts which in turn affected public confidence in domestic and international
financial markets. Public confidence plummeted further in 1974 as a result of sev-
eral well published bank failures that had international repercussions.4
It dawned on bank regulators that international cooperation was needed to fill a
growing supervisory vacuum in the field of international banking supervision.5
Thus, under the auspices of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Basel
Committee was created consisting of the central bank governors of the G-10
' President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The
Challenge of Peace", August 15'. 1971. accessed at www.presidency.uscb.edu.
2    More on the 'Oil Shocks': Goldstein 2001, p. 503
www.Jubileeusa.org
4    Reinicke 1998. p. 104-105
s    Reinicke 1998, p. 104, www.jubileeusa.org, and Evans 1998
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countries plus Luxembourg. This committee was not constituted by a treaty, it did
not have legal standing, nor did it have any official headquarters: It also lacked
serious means of enforcing its agreements other than through monitoring and
peer pressure. Yet, in 1988 the members ofthe committee reached an agreement,
the 1988 Basel Accord, that was heralded as the first major breakthrough in inter-
national regulatory cooperation.7 This agreement helped to close the supervisory
vacuum in the field of international banking supervision.
The prologue as introduction to this study
In 1973, the Dutch Government announced petrol-rationing and car-free Sundays
(Autoloze zondagen), to deal with the oil-embargo and the higher prices per bar-
rel oil. Although  I  was  born on the first car-free Sunday of that year, November
18th 1973, that is not the main reason why I recall this case in the international po-
litical economy here. What is interesting, is that in order to overcome an emerg-
ing regulatory need in the wake of a global economic crisis, non-state actors, i.e.
bank governors, developed a regulatory mechanism that became an international
regulatory standard without state-involvement. Thereby this prologue offers a first
impression of one of the many recent emerging regulatory arrangements in Inter-
national Relations which are not always based on the traditional body of Interna-
tional Law.
The Committee's regulatory solution: the 1988 Basel Accord
In the aftermath ofthe economic crisis of the early 197os, central bankers realised
the need for international capital standards. Without these standards the emerg-
ing global financial system would become very unstable. The divergent capital
standards would have adverse prudential effects. Weaker standards in one coun-
try would force other countries to intervene offensively, lowering their standards
in order to protect their own banks. This would result in a negative cycle of com-
petitive deregulation, with a great risk of losing public confidence in the financial
system.8
At that time, national banking systems9 were predominantly domestically orien-
tated. Banking systems were conceived as a key symbol of a state's operational
sovereignty and economic well-being.'° This can illustrated by the following words
spoken in 1977 bythe then governor ofthe Bank of England, George Blunden:
6    Slaughter 2004. P. 43
7    Reinicke 1998, p. 105
8    Reinicke 1998, p. 104-105·
9   The phrase "Banking system" might sound ambiguous. When the American Comptroller of
the Currency speaks about the "National banking system", it refers to 2.000 nationa| banks
in the United States, their branches and other facilities (www.occ.treas. gov.). However, in
general the usage seems to refer to whole network of national and commercial banks within
a country: i.e. the Japanese banking system (Mansbach 2000, p. 419). See also: 'Banks wei-
come changes to the system', www. news.bbc.co. uk, 22 September 2007
10
Although 'national' banks and 'central' banks started out with strong direct government in-
volvement, this direct involvement has become significantly less. For example. on May 6th.
1997. the newly elected Chancellor Gordon Brown, gave the Bank of England independence
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The banking system of a country is central to the management and efficiency of
its economy; its supervision will inevitably be a jealously guarded prerogative.
Its subordination to an international authority is a highly unlikely development,
which would require a degree of political commitment which neither exists nor
is conceivable in the near future."
Given this kind of attitudes, it is hardly surprising to note that it took the regula-
tors a very long time, ten years, in a frustrating and slow process to harmonise
their capital standards. Reinicke has argued that an unique set of domestic politi-
cal circumstances and economic forces within the United States' political and
economic system eventually drove the negotiations to a conclusion."
In 1982, the Latin American debt crisis erupted. Many Latin American countries
had borrowed heavily at North-American banks. Thus, North-American banks
were especially hard hit by this news and some came close to facing bankruptcy.
Calls for an IMF intervention became stronger by the day. But the IMF needed ex-
tra funds in order to be able to start intervening. The IMF depended heavily on ex-
tra US-contributions. As US-contributions require Congressional approval, this
development propelled the American Congress into a powerful position with re-
gard to both the banks and the regulators.
The U.S. policymakers in Congress soon realised that strengthening their domes-
tic regulatory powers would be insufficient to safeguard the American financial
system from another international financial crisis. By the early 19805, the eco-
nomic geography of the financial services industry had become decoupled from
the political geography of U.S. bank regulation. High standards within the U.S.
could not prevent a crisis from occurring elsewhere. Congress realised that any
future financial crisis outside U.S. jurisdiction could easily harm the domestic
banking system.'1 International standards were needed.
The central bankers ofthe Basel Committee, however, concluded in 1986 that it
was still unlikely standard capital requirements would be introduced. Most regula-
tors faced considerable opposition from the entrenched interests oftheir national
banking industries. But not all, and the U.S. regulators decided to take a lead out
of the impasse. They argued that there was a huge competitive disadvantage for
U.S. banks with high standards, as opposed to other banks. This argument was
well received domestically, and from that moment on, the issue of competitive
inequality became so important that it became impossible to conceive of a policy
solution that would separate the domestic regulation of U.S. capital standards
from the ongoing regulatory efforts ofthe Basel Committee.'4
The U.S. regulators sought an ally that would support this call for global action,
and found it in the Bank of England. Together they reached an agreement, to
from political control. This in effect gave the bank freedom to control monetary policy.
11
Quoted in Reinicke 1998. p. 105
12 Reinicke 1998. p. 105.
13 Reinicke 1998, p. 107.
14 Reinicke 1998, p 109.
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which they invited others to join. Reinicke makes clear that this invitation was not
as benign as it might seem, declining it would have had serious consequences:
In essence, the United States threatened to project its definition of its own in-
ternal sovereignty onto other countries by calculating the capital standards of
foreign banks in the United States on a consolidated basis and deciding
whether they met U.S. standards and were thus eligible to acquire U.S. banking
institutions. 15
This threat of retaliatory action forced the Basel Committee into action. Failure to
reach an agreement would undermine the reputation and the role of the Basel
Committee. The committee tried to regain the initiative and imposed a deadline
for the end of 1987, usingthe U.S.-U.K.-agreement as the basis.
The committee reached an agreement in December 1987, which, not surprisingly,
was received critically in the domestic 'constituencies' of the central bank regula-
tors. Even the US-Congress and banking world were not content. They had sud-
denly come to realise that the domestic competitive concerns of a few (politically)
important banks could, under this new agreement, no longer be taken seriously
by the other members of the Basel Committee. Any unilateral manoeuvring would
be criticised by other regulators on the committee, but also by strong private sec-
tor opposition worldwide. Thus, the final version ofthe 1988 accord meant:
...the recognition that the world's finance is no longer carried on by separate
national banking systems dealing with each other at arms 'length. It is domi-
nated by multinational institutions that will soon have grown entirely beyond
the reach of country-by-country regulation, unless the world's regulators can
get together to enforce these kinds of rules.
16
In the case of the Basel Committee, state based International Law practices have
not provided the foundations upon which the Basel Accord has been built. Al-
though created under the auspices of the  Bank of International Settlements, the
committee itself has no direct involvement of state representatives, nor has it
been constituted by a treaty, and, finally, it does not have any legal standing.
Actors within the committee represented the national banks of the G-10 coun-
tries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany (BRD), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The only other representa-
tive came from the national bank of Luxemburg. In theory each representative
would have had the same capacities to influence the negotiations. However, given
the fact that they had no mandate from their governments, they would have to
negotiate not only with the other representatives, but also with their domestic po-
litical and economic constituencies. This made the process slow and tedious. The
only change in the actor's capacities could therefore come from a change in the
domestic political and economic situation. This happened when first the U.S.
'5   Reinicke 1998, 9 110.
16
Reinicke 1998, P. 112.
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domestic climate changed, followed by the climate in the United Kingdom. Sud-
denly, the representatives ofthe U.S. and the U.K. were able to put the rest ofthe
committee under pressure, and thus force an agreement.
The arena of the Basel Committee has been accessible to the representatives
from the regulating domestic banks of G-io countries and Luxemburg only. There
has been no participation by other interest groups in the policy formulation stage,
although they were affected by the policy outcome. According to Reinicke, the ab-
sence of other interest groups reflects the state of domestic policymaking in the
arena of banking and finance.'7 The outcomes of the agreement were not exposed
to the usual domestic public policy processes in the United States or elsewhere.
This loss of accountability at the domestic level was not compensated for at the
international level either.'8 Reinicke argues that this was not done on purpose:
...the post-war international institutional structure was built to accommodate
an international economic system based on economic interdependence, which,
from a public policy perspective, is best accommodated by facilitating inter-
governmental relations and therefore did not have to be particularly concerned
about its democratic attributes. The issue of the democratic deficit was rarely
relevant, since most public policymaking remained within the boundaries of
the national political economy.'9
Reinicke holds that the presence of a democratic deficit, combined with the ab-
stractness ofthe issue and the lack of transparency of the negotiations, helped to
reach an agreement:
This is not to say that the absence of accountability and transparency in global
decision-making is necessarily a welcome development, but only that the pres-
ence of a democratic deficit contributed significantly to the timely conclusion
of an agreement, and consequentially to the prevention of what many officials
believed could have become a global financial crisis.'°
The influence ofthe Basel Agreement soon began to spread beyond the original
G-10 countries and Luxemburg to other financial markets. First, other countries,
especially those with emerging financial markets, began to adopt the standards
and to integrate them into their domestic regulatory and supervisory practices.
This was followed by other financial institutions outside the G-10 who were
pressured by their existing or potential customers to do so.21 Thereby, and de-
spite the democratic deficit and lack of nation-state based international legal
foundations, the 1988 Basel Accord has become an effective new international
regulatory arrangement.
'i   Reinicke 1998, p. 113
18 Reinicke 1998, p. 114
19 Reinicke 1998, p. 114.
20 Reinicke 1998, p. 114.
21 Reinicke 1998, p. 117
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Conclusion
This reconstruction of the developments resulting into the 1988 Basel accord has
offered a first taste of the exploratory research conducted  in this study.  We have
seen how under the auspices of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the
central bank governors of the G-10 countries created the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision in 1974· This committee and the network of organisations
and regulations that have been developed in relation to it, is not composed of
states or constituted by a treaty, it does not have legal standing and it does not
have a central headquarters. The committee has no means of actually making
their agreements binding other than monitoring and peer pressure. Despite those
'handicaps' the Committee has been able to set regulatory standards for interna-
tional finance which has had a profound impact on the availability of credit in the
world's most important economies.22
What does the emergence of this, and other new arrangements for regulating In-
ternational Relations, mean for the traditional body of International Law? In other
words: what is the interaction between new arrangements for regulating Interna-
tional Relations and the traditional body of International Law?
22   Slaughter 2004· P· 42.43
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The transformation we are living through is a complex architecture with many
distinct working elements, only some of which can easily be coded as global-
ization. Both self-evidently global and denationalizing dynamics destabilize ex-
isting meanings and systems. This raises questions about the future of crucial
frameworks through which modern societies, economies, and politics (under
the rule of law) operated: the social contract of liberal states, social democracy
as we have come to understand it, modern citizenship, and the formal mecha-
nisms that render some claims legitimate and others illegitimate in liberal de-
mocracies. The future of these and other familiar frameworks is rendered du-
bious by the unbundling, even if very partial, of these basic organizational and
normative architectures through which we have operated, especially over the
last century.'
1.1 Introduction
The American government could not solve the political and economic problems
following the devaluation of the dollar in 1971. The impact of the decision to drop
the Gold Standard was too large, too complex and too widespread. In fact, no
government could have hoped to adopt adequate policies avoiding the ensuing
global economic crisis that developed after this decision and the subsequent 'Oil
Shock' of,973· Within the financial world, especially within the banking world, the
outlook was still very much a domestic outlook. But the birth-pangs of a global
economy in the early 19705 meant that borders, and also financial borders, had
become a little more permeable than they used to be. Coordination of banking
practices was urgently needed in order to avoid the economic crisis to worsen. As
states seemed unable, or unwilling to act, some banking supervisors did step up
to the challenge and acted. The new committee's 1988 accord subsequently be-
came a regulatory breakthrough in the coordination of international financial rela-
tions.
Changes like these are inevitable, but not always as radical. Sometimes there is a
revolution, but most transformations are incremental. It is only when we look
back that we realise that something has changed.2 Most of the time, the outcome
of change is harder to describe. This is certainly true in the field of International
Relations. International Relations are infinitely complex and interconnected,
changing one part affects every other part and may do so in any number of un-
foreseen ways. Thus we are not always able to present a clear picture of changes
and their implications. The complexity of changes is often too large and we are
left with some fuzzy notions of the implications, especially with regard to the
regulation of International Relations.
' Sassen 2006, p. 2-3.
2   Sassen 2006, P. 11.
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In addition, the context in which these changes are taking place has transformed
significantly during the last two decades. Before the collapse of the totalitarian
systems East and Central Europe in 1989 and the disintegration ofthe Soviet Un-
ion in 1991, the 'Order of Yalta' provided the context of our thinking about inter-
national law and international relations. Main characteristic of the Order of Yalta
was the aim to maintain bipolar 'stability' between the two superpowers and their
spheres of'influence'. Initially, it was not quite clear what the dominant feature of
the new reality of a post-Cold War world would be.3 However, by the mid 19905
this new reality was identified as 'globalisation'. The concept itself reflected a
widespread perception that the world was rapidly being moulded into a shared
space by economic and technical forces and that developments in one region of
the world could have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals
and communities on the other side ofthe globe.4
In this new reality, alternative arrangements for regulating International Relations
have emerged in addition to the existing body of International Law. These alterna-
tive arrangements seem to occur especially in policy-areas that are mostly affected
by socio-economic globalisation processes.5 Apparently these new arrangements,
like the Basel Committee before, are providing a regulatory response to a regula-
tory need that was not being met by existing International Law. This relatively
'new' reality of globalisation provides the present context in which this study will
set out to develop an understanding of the interaction between International Law
and alternative regulatory arrangements in international economic relations.
1.2      Transformations and increasing complexities in International Relations
Generally speaking, International Relations refers to all interactions between
state-based actors across state boundaries.6 From the 19705 onwards there has
been a more than exponential growth of non-state actor involvement in the field
of International Relations that hitherto had been the almost exclusive domain of
sovereign nation-states.7 This can be illustrated by some figures. For example, in
1972 less then 300 NGOs attended the Stockholm Conference on the Human En-
vironment, whereas in 1992,1.400 NGOs registered with the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio. At the same time, more
than 18,000 NGOs attended the parallel forum:
During this period of more than exponential growth, non-state actors have also
been able to increase their capacities to influence the process and content of In-
ternational Relations.9 Non-state actors have been able to expand their political
3    A good example of the initial responses to and possibilities for a world beyond containment
and division can be found in Alting von Geusau 1992
4   Held 1999, p. 1
s     See more: Chapter 3.
6    Evans 1998. p. 274
7   Held and McGrew 1999, Nye and Donahue 2000, losselin and Wallace 2001, Slaughter
2004, Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005, Held and McGrew 2007, Sassen 2007
8 Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005, P· 36
9   AIV 2006, P. 7-8
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repertoire, from the traditional lobbying of state-delegations at international con-
ferences, to networking with state-delegations (occasionally resulting in NGO-
representatives becoming part of state-delegations); and mobilising global public
and political support through modern information and communication technolo-
gies. This broadening and intensifying of the political repertoire of NGOs, but
also of multinationals,'° has enabled non-state actors to occasionally set the in-
ternational agenda and contribute to the creation of non-state dominated regula-
tory arrangements in International Relations. Sometimes NGOs are able to force
other non-state actors, such as multinationals, to change their behaviour with re-
gard to human rights or protecting the environment without any involvement of
states or invocation of International Law mechanisms.
Take for example 'smart mob governance' as identified by Brugmann and Praha-
lad. In India, local NGOs attacked the Coca-Cola Company over its use ofwater in
the village of Plachimada in Kerala. As accounts spread from Web site to Web
site, the dispute grew into a worldwide battle over the brand's presence in univer-
sities and schools. The escalation of the campaign from market to market and
from issue to issue has, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, cost Coca-
Cola "millions of dollars in lost sales and legal fees in India, and growing damage
to its reputation elsewhere." By publicly inflicting harm to a market leader's repu-
tation, which eventually forced the entire industry to change its practices, civil so-
ciety is often successful in getting multinationals to conform to its norms."
This is not to say that states seem to have become powerless in the wake of grow-
ing non-state capacities. Sometimes, an economically powerful state (such as the
United States) or a conglomerate of states (such as the European Union) can en-
force their national or internal rules on others without having any formal agree-
ment or international treaty. They are in a position to 'export' their rules.
Slaughter offers a clear example of this method of regulatory export. The US Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has aimed for many years to disseminate
the 'regulatory gospel' of US securities law. This included strict insider trading
rules, mandatory regulation with a governmental agency of public securities is-
sues; a mandatory disclosure system; issuer liability regarding registration state-
ments and offering documents; broad antifraud provisions and government over-
sight. From the 19805 onwards the SEC actively pursued policies that reached out
to foreign agencies to influence their national policies. According to a former SEC
commissioner "The trick will be to encourage the securities regulators of the
other major trading nations to develop arrangements that provide protections to
investors substantially similar to those provided in this country." This was done
through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that were concluded between the
SEC and their foreign counterparts. Through these MOUs a framework of coop-
eration and technical support was created that deliberately has set out to trans-
plant features of U.S. securities regulation abroad. Every year hundreds of securi-
ties regulators from around the world are trained in the US, which, not
10 Herz 2002.
11 Brugmann and Prahalad (Rheingold) 2007
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surprisingly, provides them with a 'grounding in the basic principles and ap-
proaches employed by the SEC':2
When it comes to the regulation of International Relations, we first and foremost
tend to look towards International Law. International Law consists of those gen-
eral applicable rules and principles that states and international organisations
apply in their mutual relations and in their relations with natural or juridical per-
sons.'3 These mutual relations consist of interactions in the political economy,
law, and culture taking place between state-governments, their organisational and
personal representatives, and the international institutions they have helped to
create and maintain.'4 In other words, International Law is supposed to regulate
the International Relations between sovereign states.
However, the emerging patterns of state and non-state interaction in Interna-
tional Relations are not always being regulated through existing International Law
mechanisms. Occasionally, alternative regulatory mechanisms have been created,
such as the Basel Accord. These new, at times fuzzy, regulatory mechanisms are
often captured under the term 'Global Governance'.
Governance, according to the UN Commission on Global Governance, is the sum
of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their
common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and co- operative action may be taken. It in-
cludes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well
as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or
perceive to be in their interest.'5 The term 'Global Governance' refers to specific
multilateral arrangements of regulation and methods of management that en-
courage global interdependence and sustainable development.'6 It consists of
those new emerging (alternative) regulatory arrangements that are not automati-
cally part of the existing body of International Law.
This need to foster the growth of multilateral arrangements of regulation can be
found across a wide spectrum ofworld-wide political challenges. When we focus
ourselves on the socio-economic sphere, we find regulatory arrangements on a
wide range of issues: from the regulation of international banking; to global
warming, corporate social responsibility for the protection of human rights, and
labour conditions in sweatshops. Apparently, each regulatory need has led to a
different regulatory solution: the Basel Committee; the Kyoto-protocol; the Global
Compact; the Fair Labor Association. Precisely the growth of alternative regulatory
arrangements gives rise to questions concerning the relationship between those
new regulatory arrangements in International Relations and the existing body of
International Law.
'2 Slaughter (Raustiala) 2005
13 Restatement (1987), para. 101.
14 Evans 1998, p. 274
15 UN Commission on Global Governance 1995, accessed online at www.itcilo.it.
16
Evans 1998, P. 199
10
|NTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEW REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS
1.3 Main question
The dynamics of International Relations continuously give rise to demands for
new regulatory solutions. In this context, International Law has demonstrated an
impressive capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and corresponding regu-
latory needs in International Relations. For example, when -in the wake of the
Second World War- two superpowers had developed the capacities to wage an all
out nuclear war, new international legal instruments were created trying to pre-
vent such a war.17 At the end ofthe Cold War, these instrument and systems of In-
ternational  Law had to function  in a new context. The characteristics of this new
context are that it is almost self-evidently global and thereby denationalises exist-
ing state-oriented meanings and systems:8 At the same time, alternative regula-
tory mechanisms, of which the Basel Committee is only an early example, have
been developed. In this context, the central question of this study focuses on the
relationship between emerging (alternative) regulatory arrangements and the tra-
ditional body of International Law:
What  is  the  nature  of the  interaction  between  new  arrangements  regulating  Interna-
tional  Economic Relations and the traditional  body of International Law?
1.4      Sub-questions and further outline ofthis study
Sassen has argued that the transformation we are living through is a complex ar-
chitecture with many distinct working elements. As mentioned above, the dynam-
ics of globalisation and denationalisation destabilise existing meanings and ar-
rangements. But not every new development arises ad nuovo, there is always
some connection between a new architecture and what came directly before.'9
This study begins by looking at the historical development of International Law.
How has International Law in the past responded to emerging regulatory chal-
lenges? What elements are important for understanding new regulatory develop-
ments today? Secondly, as Sassen is keen to point out, there is not one specific
response to new regulatory challenges, but a complex architecture of responses
with many elements old and new:
Foundational change in complex systems is a complicated matter. Such
change is only partially legible and hence interpretation becomes critical in the
account ofthat change.2°
In order to explore this emerging complexity we will conduct some in-depth case-
studies that might help to provide the necessary details for the interpretation of
the otherwise fuzzy interactions between new arrangements for regulating Inter-
national Relations and the traditional body of International Law. As a conse-
17 See chapter 2.
18 Sassen 2006. p. 2
19 Sassen 2006, p. 11
20 Sassen 2006, p. 401.
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quence, the main question has been broken down into 4 sub-questions that pro-
vide the further outline ofthis study.
1. What dimensions of the relationship between International Economic Rela-
tions and International Law have been important in the past during the crea-
tion of regulatory responses to emerging regulatory needs, and how can these
dimensions help us to observe continuity and change? (Chapter 2)
2. What are the changing regulatory demands in International Economic Rela-
tions in the context of socio-economic globalisation, and how have these de-
mands affected important of the relationship between International  Law and
International Economic Relations? (Chapter 3)
3.   How can the important dimensions of the interaction between International
Economic Relations and the traditional body of International Law be used to
develop a conceptual framework to explore the developments and changes be-
tween emerging arrangements for regulating International Economic Relations
and the traditional body of International Law in three specific case-studies?
(Chapter 4,5,6 and 7).
4. What conclusions with regard to the interaction between new arrangements
for regulating International Economic Relations and the traditional body of In-
ternational Law between can be drawn based on an evaluation of the out-
comes ofthe analysis ofthe three case-studies (Chapter 8)
Chapter 9 will present a summary ofthis study and its main conclusions on nature
ofthe interaction between new arrangements for regulating International Economic
Relations and the existing body of International  Law.
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2. Dimensions ofChange and Continuity in the History of
International Law
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out to uncover which dimensions of the interaction between In-
ternational Relations and International Law have been important in the creation of
regulatory responses to changing demands in the past. These dimensions will
help us to create a framework to observe movement and change in current devel-
opments in the interaction between globalising International Relations and Inter-
national Law.
There are many ways in which one can tell the story ofthe historical development
of International Law. One of today's leading legal scholars, Antonio Cassese, dis-
tinguishes four stages plus a pre-stage. He locates the premise of International
Law, the rise of the modern Nation-State, around the discovery of the Americas
(1492) and the rise of Protestantism. He then proceeds to introduce four stages;
stage 1: from the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648) until the end of World War 1 (1918);
stage 2: from the end of World War 1 (1918) to World War 2 (1939); Stage 3: from
World War 2 (1939) until the end of the Cold War  (1989); and stage 4: from the
end of the Cold War (1989) until the present.' Another leading legal scholar, Mal-
colm N. Shaw, traces the early origins of International Law back to ancient Meso-
potamia, and locates the rise of Modern International Law in 5 stages: stage 1:
Middle Ages and Renaissance; stage 2: Westphalia (1648) as the start of Modern
International Law; stage 3: 17th and 18th century; stage 4: igth century; stage 5:
2oth century: Charles de Visscher, on the contrary, located the beginning of the
new legal order in the plural legal system of the Middle Ages and especially with
the beginning of the modern state under the Norman Kings of England after the
Norman Conquest of 1066.3
However, the main concern of this chapter is not to describe the historic evolu-
tion of International Law, but to develop key dimensions for observing change
and continuity using the history of International Law.4 According to Sassen, the
scholarship of earlier periods, with all its debates, produces a far more complex
landscape than indicated by current models of social change:
Detailed historical accounts and debates open up the range of possibilities.
Looking at this earlier phase is a way of raising the level of complexity in the in-
quiry about current transformations. I am after a finely graded lens that allows
me to disassemble what we have come to see as necessary aggregations...5
' Cassese 2005. Compare: Akehurst 1997
2    Shaw 2005·
3    De Visscher 1968.
4    Sassen 2006, P. 28.
5    Sassen 2006, p. 11.
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In order to observe movement and change, and thereby identify key dimensions
that determine International Law's regulatory response to changing regulatory
needs in International Relations, this chapter will focus on 'tipping points' in the
historical development of International Law. Tipping points concern 'events', par-
ticular dynamics that led to practical or theoretical changes in International Law.
There are two advantages to using 'tipping points'. The first advantage is that it
keeps us from having to posit that the ascendance of new developments means
the necessary end of the old order. The second advantage is that it keeps us from
having to accept that International Law is still doing what it always has done and
that not much has changed.6
This chapter will set out to explore the historical development of International
Law at specific historical intervals.  It will look at some of the political and eco-
nomic dynamics at those intervals that demanded new international regulatory
mechanisms, and the tipping point that subsequently occurred in practical re-
sponses of (or theoretical thinking about) International Law. The subsequent
analysis of these tipping points in the second half of this chapter tries to identify
key dimensions that can serve, using Sassen's metaphor, as 'graded lenses' to
observe the developments in the interaction between International Law and alter-
native regulatory mechanisms in International Relations today.
2.2        Change and Continuity in the History of International  Law
2.2.1 Introduction
There exists a strong tradition in International Law history that locates the origins
of Modern International Law in the legal debates that started after signing the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. However, even within this tradition there is no de-
nial of the fact that Roman  Law is  one of the pillars of West-European legal  his-
tory. However, there is no simple line of direct inheritance between the legal tradi-
tions of ancient Rome and modern international law.7 Some have argued that
'Roman' elements have been derived from Roman private law: This is supposed
to have happened during the formative years of Modern International Law in the
17th century. Others have argued that Roman elements have reached us through
the heritage of medieval Canon law. There is at least some continuity between
medieval doctrines ofthe lus Gentium and the early law of nations, although the
medieval doctrines were a mixture of private law, Canon Law and Roman Law .9
We will begin by looking at the - sometimes confusing'° - meanings of'/us Gen-
tium' in Roman law. The reason for this confusion is that most Roman laws fell
6 Compare Sassen 2006, p. 9
7     Bobbitt 2002, P. 357·
8    See for instance Shaw 2005, P· 412. Lauterpacht advocated this idea in 1927 with the publi-
cation 'Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (With special reference to
International Arbitration).
9     Lesaffer 2002,2005· P· 34
10
Lesaffer 2005, P· 35·
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into disuse with the disintegration of the Roman empire and were 'rediscovered'
in the Middle Ages."
One of the most important Roman authors for the European legal tradition is
Marcus Tullius Cicero (103-43 BC). At the time of the Late Republic, the strong
army legions ofthe Roman Republic were subduing Gaul (58-50 BC) and finishing
the conquest of the Mediterranean. It is in this specific context that Cicero speaks
of International Law as 'ius be//i atque pocis',  the law of war and peace.'2 War was
considered to be a legitimate way of conducting state relations.'3 This specific link
between law and war has led later philosophers and historians to argue that In-
ternational Law is, by definition, founded on the constitutionalisation of vio-
lence.14 In Cicero's time, the words '/us Gentium' were used to refer to a system of
'universal private law'. Within this /us Gentium, was a /us Civile, namely the civil
law in so far as Roman citizens had to deal with foreigners, i.e. non-Roman citi-
zens.15
During the last hundred years of the Roman Republic, foreign campaigns of con-
quest became entangled in a series of 'domestic' civil wars. Successful generals
sought to control the central government of Rome:6 With the end of the Republic
looming on the horizon, a new understanding of Rome and its conquered territo-
ries was born: the Roman Empire.
This  idea of empire called  for new understandings  of the regulation  of the  rela-
tions between the citizens of Rome and the conquered nations. The writings of
the historian Sallust (86-34 BC) reveal a glimpse ofthe changing understanding of
Roman Law with regard to its subjects. Sallust started to use the concept of '/us
Gentium' when referring to laws governing the economic relations between organ-
ised peoples.'7 This empire of the 'popu/us Romanus' came into being in 31  BC
when Octavianus defeated the last Mediterranean opposition to Roman rule,
Egypt, and assumed the title of 'Augustus.'
Two hundred years later, Gaius (130-180 AD) introduced a new systematisation of
the technical highly sophisticated but very complex body of law of the Roman
Empire: the Institutiones:8 Gaius defined lus Gentium thus:
The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar
to itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules established by a given state
for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called lus Civile: the rules
constituted by natural reason for all are observed by all nations alike, and are
11
Davies 1997, P· 173 However, Canon Law was largely founded on Roman Legal traditions.
12
Kaser 1993, P· 25· Ziegler 1994, P· 61.
13   Kaser 1993• P· 29
14    Bobbitt 2002.
15    Lesaffer 2005. PP· 35-36
16
Davies 1997. P· 155-156
17   Kaser 1993. PP· 23-24
18 Mi||er 2000, p. 447
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called lus Gentium. So the laws of Rome are partly peculiar to itself, partly
common to all nations...'9
However, when in AD 212 a|| free inhabitants of the Roman Empire became citi-
zens, the distinction between the /us Civile and the lus Gentium lost its practical
importance and the two systems became increasingly intermingled:° This 'new'
lus Gentium became the common law of the Roman Empire and was deemed to
be of universal application:'
It is from this Roman heritage that St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Isidiore of
Seville developed some of their understandings of 'the law of nations' which
helped to inform medieval debates on International Law. These medieval debates,
in their turn, provided some ofthe foundations for Modern International Law.
2.2.2 The Concept of lus Gentium in the Early Middle Ages
In the time following the definitive East-West division of the Roman Empire after
the death of emperor Theodosius (395), and the fall of Rome in 410, St. Augustine
(354-430) formulated some initial, and largely implicit, ideas on International Law.
Living in politically and military unstable times, he sought ways to limit both the
resort to war, and the conduct ofwar itself.22
A century later, the emperor Justinian (r. 527-65) tried to restore the imperial rule
over the lost Western provinces of the Roman Empire. The Emperor also set out
to codify Roman Law. Yet, this restoration was not to last. Soon after his death,
Italy fell prey to a new wave of invaders, the Lombards:' Yet, during that diffuse
and political unstable period, St. Isidore of Seville (560-636) used the phrase "the
law of nations"24 to describe the common customs of peoples relating to relations
among nations in an international order:
It is called the Right of Nations since all nations,25 more or less, observe it...26
19   Gaius cf Wittuck 1904. §1, p. 1.
20
Lesaffer 2005. P· 36.
21   Shaw 2005. P. 17
22 For an example of this implicitness,  see Book 22 of the C» of God, where St. Augustine
discusses just and unjust wars.
23 Davies 1997, P· 244
24 This interpretation of 'lus Gentium' differed from the use of in earlier Roman Law when it
was used to describe the institutions of civil law which they supposed all peoples naturally
respected Kelly, 1999, p. 111.
25 The nation St. Isidore spoke of can not be compared to modern-day nation-states. It seems
more likely he referred to a community of people, aware of themselves as history has made
them. See section 4 ofthis chapter.
26 There is a problem with this translation of "lus Gentium" by O'Donovan and O'Donovan.
Whereas this term in theories of International Law is being translated as "law of nations",
the translation quoted here, based on a classical reprint edited by W.M. Lindsay (Oxford
Classical Text) 1911 uses the term "right of nations" which is highly unusual. The Latin Text
reads: 'lus Gentium est sedium occupatio, aedificatio, munitio, bella, captivitates, servi-
tutes, postliminia, foedera pacis, indutiae, legatorum non violandorum religio, conubia inter
alienigenas prohibita. Et inde lus Gentium, quia eo iure ornnes fere gentes utuntur.' The au-
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The Right of Nations is: the occupation of sites, the construction of buildings,
armament, war, captivity, enslavement, the right to return to one's home, peace
treaties, truces, the sacrosanct inviolability of ambassadors...'27
According to Kelly, this list contains 'a series of matters which in fact are more or
less the scattered timbers out of which the Renaissance world and ultimately
Grotius constructed modern International Law'.28
During the subsequent centuries, until the end of the Viking invasions in Western
Europe, each nation/tribe carried its own law system, while some clung to a dis-
tant dream of 'one Europe' that could carry on the legacy of the Roman Empire
(including a shared concept of law).29 On the one hand there was the notion that
belonging to a specific tribe determined the law that one could be judged under,
on the other hand there were clear attempts to formulate a law common to all
tribes, a /us Gentium.
With the end of the Viking Age, a new dynamic was brought into Western  Euro-
pean society and its regulatory needs. Merchants established in Baltic and North
Sea ports started working closely together to ensure protection and continuing
trade. The first commercial association, called a 'hansa', was established at Wisby
on the island of Gotland in 1161 under the name 'United Gotland Travellers ofthe
Holy Roman Empire'. Within a century, an extensive confederated network of
'free-cities' had been developed that stretched from the Atlantic to the Gulf of
Finland. The Hanseatic League comprised a series of constituent leagues, whose
delegates met regularly to co-ordinate policy. It reached the peak of its influence
in the 14th century.30
Yet, we should not forget that at the same time important aspects of international
relations that were discussed by jurists involved arguments from both Roman law
and canon law:
Canon lawyers more often addressed subjects relevant to the law of nations
that Roman Law did. Canon Law had a greater impact than Roman law be-
cause it was the applicable law of the ecclesiastical courts, which - ratione pec-
31cati - held jurisdiction in many disputes between princes and body politics.
As a consequence, we can detect the influence of these emerging international
trade regulatory mechanisms and Canon law in medieval thinking about the law
thors of the translation used here, use the phrase law of nations when referring to this pas-
sage and somehow do not seem to notice that  "law" and "right" are different.
27   Seville 630. P· 210.
28 Kelly, 1999, p. 111. He seems to forget the importance ofthe Early Spanish School here.
29 Van Caenegem points out that the Carolingian empire of Charlemagne was clearly an at-
tempt, and also perceived as such, to build once again a vast supranational home for the
peoples ofthe European continent. As such the project, although short-lived, tried to break
with the tribal outlook and law systems of the Franks and other peoples (Van Canegem
1995• P' 44)
30 Davies 1997· P· 340
31 Lesaffer 2005, P· 36
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of nations. When Rufinus the Canonist (1150-1191) wrote about the scope of /us
Gentium, he included trade as an important element. He observed that people
consulted each other on matters of mutual interest such as trade and war. Eco-
nomic consultations were included because:
they are used by almost all peoples in that there are sales, contracts of letting,
and hiring, exchanges and other such things.32
The need to regulate international trade, in addition to the regulation ofwar and
peace, completed the medieval understandings of lus Gentium. It is a list that is
still recognisable today.
2.2.3 The Concept of lus Gentium and St. Thomas Aquinas
The late 13th and the early 14th century provided the breeding ground for numer-
ous municipal blood-feuds on the one hand, and for Europe's first merchant
bankers on the other hand. At that time international politics in Europe revolved
round the triangle of rivalries between the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and
the kingdom of France.13 Meanwhile, the new bankers' methods of double-entry
book-keeping laid the foundations for modern accountancy and modern capital-
ism.34
It was in this turbulent context of feuds, wars, overlapping jurisdictions and
emerging capitalism that St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was born at the family
castle at Roccasecca. His studies and work took him to Naples, Cologne, Paris,
Rome, Orvieto, Viterbo, Paris and Naples again, before dying at the age of 49 at
the monastery of Fossanova (only 20 kilometres from Roccasecca).8 While teach-
ing at the Dominican Studium at Santa Sabina in Rome in 1268, Aquinas started
to work on the Summa Theologice. It is in this work that we find some important
insights into St. Thomas' understandings of lus Gentium.
In his discussion of the division of human laws, Aquinas engages with the work of
St. Isidore of Seville. In Thomas' understanding /us Gentium36 was a category of
law to be inserted somewhere between the underlying precepts of natural law and
any given body of positive law: Natural law gave the universal bonum et vquum,
civil law the rules for one community, the /us Gentium the laws generally ob-
served:
Those precepts belong to the lus Gentium which are drawn like conclusions
form the premises of natural law, such as those requiring justice in buying and
selling and so forth; without which men cannot live sociably together; this last
32 Canonist 1159, P· 299
33 Davies 1997
34 Davies 1997, P· 402.
35 Mclnery 2004. P· 3
36 In the authorative Blackfriars translation of the Summa, Gilby warns that Thomas' use of
'lus Gentium' should "better be not translated 'the law of nations." But Gilby does not give
specific reasons why this should not be done. Gilby 1963, P· 110.
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is a condition of natural law, since, as it is shown in the Politics, man is by na-
ture a sociable animal. Constructions, however, put upon natural law are
proper to civil law, and here each political community decides for itself what is
fitting.17
lus Gentium in Thomas' opinion should be distinguished from natural law. More
importantly, /us Gentium should be reasonable:
The lus Gentium is indeed natural to man in the sense that he is reasonable,
and it is reasoned out like a conclusion from principles, without being far-
fetched, hence men may reasonably agree about it. Nevertheless it is distin-
guished from natural law, very much so from the natural law which is common
to all animals.18
Despite the apparent practical content of /us Centium, on which St. Thomas
seems to agree with earlier writers, his remarks on the origins of /us Gentium
open up a new dimension in the historic development of International Law. It
seems that some laws, those that are part of the /us Gentium, do not derive there
authority from a tribe, empire or contacts between nations, but they derive their
authority as a reasonable conclusion of principles.19 This use of 'reasonableness'
needs some explanation, because it should not be confused by later appeals to
'Reason' during the era ofthe Enlightenment.
Aquinas holds that decisions, choices (electio) are essential to human action.
These choices spring from deliberations Icons#ium) by people over what is to be
done. To describe these choices and decisions is to state what our choices or de-
cisions have amounted to. Particular choices or decisions are the result of moral
reflections on concrete experiences by persons.4° Human action, including law
making, thus becomes 'a doing in light of alternatives'.4, As a consequence, there
exists a close interaction between law and its socio-political and socio-economical
context, because '[human] law exists derivatively in the behaviour it regulates.'42 In
this way law, lus Gentium, is the result of moral reflections on concrete experi-
ences by persons.
In conclusion, the writings of St. Thomas added another dimension to the medie-
val understandings of '/us Gentium: It introduced 'reasonableness', based on
moral reflection on practical experiences, as a founding element of law. It was
from the this legacy of writings of St. Augustine, St. Isidore, and St. Thomas, that
lawyers during the Renaissance were able to lay the foundations for modern In-
ternational Law.
37 Aquinas, ST. la2ae, 95·4·
38  Aquinas, ST. la2ae, 95,4
39 In Thomas' time these would have been the principles of the Christian Gospel
4o
ST. I a2ae 97· 3· See also: Alting von Geusau 2000. Compare this approach also to the ap-
proach of Charles de Visscher in section 2.3.3
41 Davies 2002, pp 122-123.
42  ST. 1.901
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2.2.4 The Concept of lus Gentium at the Beginning ofthe Renaissance
There are several reasons to mark the end of the fifteenth century as a significant
turning point for the concept of International Law. In 1480, without a warning, the
Ottoman Empire landed troops near the city of Otranto in Italy and sacked it. It
was a clear warning that an empire outside Christendom was looking for political
dominion of substantial parts of Europe. The discovery ofthe Americas in 1492
and the dealings of Western colonisers with non-Christian cultures, presented
also new problems that resulted in reasoning about the universal rights of peo-
ples. The French invasion of Italy in 1494 marked another historic turning point
from which nations like Spain, France and England for the first time stand forth as
full-grown personalities.43 The rise of these nations characterised the process of
the creation ofterritorially-consolidated independent units in theory, doctrine, and
fact.44 The Siege of Vienna in 1529 by the Ottoman Empire ensured not only the
awareness of a world outside Europe, but also that this world would not be nec-
essarily subjected to European, Christian, rulers.
Meanwhile significant religious upheavals were taking place within European
Christendom. In 1517, Martin Luther nailed a copy of the 95 Theses to the door of
the Castle Church at Wittenberg, thereby starting the protestant Reformation. This
was followed in 1534, by the conflict of the English King Henry VIll and his subse-
quent break away from the Catholic Church in 1534 through the Act of Supremacy.
By 1541 the followers of the reformed theologian Calvin were ruling Geneva. In
1566, poor and hungry Dutch farmers started the first of a series of rebellions
against Spanish rule by plundering the church of Steenvoorde.
In this dynamic context, old concepts and authorities were rapidly loosing their
control and political significance. New concepts and regulatory solutions were
needed.45
Lawyers from the Early Spanish School like Vitoria (1483-1546) and Suarez (1548-
1617) developed their ideas in reaction to the Spanish conquest of the Americas.
Vitoria, writing for the Spanish Inquisition,46 introduced the notion of ius inter
gentes, which then enabled Suarez to write that lus Centium was not imposed by
the natural law (although it could be deduced from it) but by universal positive
law, from the 'habitual conduct of nations' within a global moral juridical com-
munity and thus a ius inter gentes in which all nations are part of a 'Corpus Mysti-
cum under God'.47
Thomas Hobbes (i 588-i679) did not agree with the existence ofthis corpus mysti-
cum, and held that International Law, maintaining peace or a status quo, was the
41   Kelly 1999, p. 200.
44   Shaw 2002. p. 18
45  See for instance the intense debates over the justifications for the Franco-Spanish War of
1635 when traditional doctrines seemed no longer applicable and the traditional authority of
the Pope to deal with such issues was no longer accepted. More on this: Lesaffer 2006.
46 Shaw 2002. p. 20.
47 Suarez 1612.
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only way to prevent states preparing for or going to war, of all against all in which
life would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'48 In relation to the absence
ofa common power in International Law, like the 'Corpus Mysticum' ofVitoria, or
the teachings of the Church before the Reformation, Hobbes doubted that one
could find common understandings ofjustice or International Law.
In this case, the historical animosities between Roman Catholic Spain and Tudor/
Elizabethan Protestant England prevented the exchange of ideas between the
Spanish School and the British philosophers. In fact, they would have perceived
each other as mortal enemies. Thomas Hobbes was born on April 5th 1588, pre-
maturely, supposedly precipitated by his mother's hearing about the Spanish Ar-
mada. His patrons throughout his life where the Cavendish family who fostered a
Venetian anti-Spanish interest in England. While in exile in the 16404 he became
disenchanted with the Church of England and wrote Leviathan, which set out the
secular ruler's independent authority in civil matters.49
In Spain, Francisco Suarez was the leading political philosopher of the Counter
Reformation. He closely followed in the footsteps of Francisco Vitoria (1483?-
1546), reviving the Aquinas legacy that prevailed during the Council of Trent, and
subsequently Roman-Catholic philosophy in general. In 1612 Suarez published A
Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith against the errors of the Anglican Sect, in
which he argued that the English people, as a corporate body, and led by their
constituted authorities, had a right to resist the heretical king James 1.50
Hobbes, however, despite his critique of the monarchy, became more committed
to uphold the crown's authority against its critics from the 16305 onwards. He
would therefore have opposed any argument by an enemy of England against the
rights of the crown, or any Spanish argument on any other matter, such as Inter-
national Law:
Considering the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended
in that law, which is commonly called the law of nations, I need not to say any-
thing in this place; because the law of nations, and the law of nature is the
same thing. And every sovereign hath the same right, in procuring the safety of
his people, that any man particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his
own body. And the same law that dictateth to men that have no civil govern-
ment, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dic-
tateth the same to commonwealths, that is, to the consciences of sovereign
princes and sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but
in conscience only, where not man; but God reigneth...51
48   Hobbes 1651. p. 143
49 Miller 2000, p. 210-211.
50   Miller 2000, PP· 508.509
51   Hobbes 7651, p. 309
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In this transition period from medieval to modern thought on International Law,
the 'international'52 problems did not change much. But the shared Christian ethi-
cal understanding between nations, that could have enabled them to address is-
sues within a shared framework of understanding, had been lost. And the territo-
rial scope ofthe law had changed through the discovery of new parts ofthe world.
Finally, there had been a change in the subjects: the development of the first
'generation' of nation states, meant that 'nation' became more and more a politi-
cal definition, referring to government and territory. At the same time, Interna-
tional Law remained confined to the small group of European Christian nations. 53
But, the notion of 'peoples' now also had to account for non-Christian peoples as
well (Vitoria).
2.2.5   Grotius and the Foundations of Modern International Law
It was the Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583-1646) who set out a concept of Interna-
tional Law that seems to dominate our understandings of the law today. Although
his doctrine is still influential, it should not be forgotten that Grotius argued first
and foremost to support the interests of the young Dutch Republic. For instance,
Grotius opposed the 'closed' seas concept of the Portuguese. Shaw remarks,
'parenthetically', that Grotius theory happened to accord nicely with prevailing
Dutch ideas as to free trade and the needs of an expanding commercial empire.54
In a way, Grotius paved the way for the idea that the acceptance of a shared Chris-
tian heritage was no longer needed for states in order to be bound by Interna-
tional Law. Grotius held that International Law did apply to those who held that
God did not exist, and to those who 'based on natural reflection and unbroken
tradition', like Grotius himself, believed in the opposite.5 Grotius words on the
hypothetical absence of God: etiamsi daremus Deum non esse, were taken up by
younger intellectuals who aspired to found a moral science that would be valid
independently from God, leading the way for a philosophy that became known as
'Positivism:K
The start ofthe modern period of International Law, did not create a great change
in the sort of problems that needed international regulation, only the scale
changed: from Europe, to the Americas, Africa and Asia. The subjects of Interna-
tional Law became limited because of the rise of the nation-state. International
Law became the law between nation-states. Individuals and peoples were now
considered to be subject to the king/prince, who represented them, and the rest
52 One must bear in mind that 'International Law' still remained largely a West.European af-
fair.
53 Reling 1964, P· 178
54   Shaw 2002. p. 21.
55
Grotius 1615, P· 794
56 O'Donovan 1999, p. 788. This makes Grotius in some interpretations, based on this as.
sumption, the father of modern secular International Law. However, that interpretation
does not seem to do justice to Grotius' works. Reading Prolegomena,t looks like it is more
appropriate to speak of Grotius as being the last writer who wrote in the theological and ra-
tionalist traditions ofthe previous centuries.
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of the community, on behalf ofthe nation-state. The expansion ofthe scale ofthe
law thus brought a limitation of the subjects of International Law.
In conclusion, the roots of modern concepts of International Law, which still sup-
port contemporary understandings of International Law, developed in response to
practical challenges of regulating International Relations. It seems that actual ca-
pacities to physically determine the borders of states (technological invention),
the scale ofwarfare (The Religious wars of the 16th century that spanned almost
all of Europe) and the discovery of, and trade with, the Americas (enhanced by
better technologies for navigating and mapping) significantly affected the devel-
opment trajectory of International Law. On the one hand this development dem-
onstrated the law's ability to enlarge the scope to address international issues. On
the other hand, the number of participants, subjects, had been narrowed down to
sovereign kings and princes, which might have lessened the decision-making
processes.
2.2.6 The Expanding Law ofNations
The pre-modern era formulated a law of nations without the existence of nation
states. The Modern era started with the conception that the law of nations was
created by the free consent of a few nation states in Europe.
Between 1648 (Westphalia) and 1815 (The Congress ofVienna), International Law
extended towards all Christian nation states in Europe and beyond, including
Russia and the newly founded United States of America.57 In this period, the Sov-
ereign as a Person slowly moved behind the image ofthe Sovereign State. One of
the reasons for this move seems to have been the development of accurate tech-
nical tools that enabled better navigation and better map-making.58 A new, more
accurate, picture of the world emerged, which included the precise definition of
the borders between the various states.59
In the meantime, the developing international community was faced by the "Ori-
ental" question, which refers to the question of whether non-Christian nation-
states, such as the Ottoman Empire and China, could enter the hitherto Christian
International Law system P The practice of nation-states answered this question af-
firmatively with regard to the Ottoman Empire, starting with the Ottoman-
Austrian Treaty (1771) and the Ottoman-British Treaty (1799). According to
Ziegler, the Ottomans became fully accepted as part of the European Interna-
tional Law system after the end of the Crimean wars. China, on the other hand,
was less inclined to join this, as far as Chinese leadership was concerned, bar-
baric system. 60
57   Ziegler 1994. P· 181.
58 On the importance of map-making and other inventions for the success of nations see:
Landes 1998.
59 Ziegler 1994, P· 181.
6o Ziegler 1994, P· 209 Although China had some trade relations, notably with the Dutch.
since the 17th century. After losing the Opium wars with Great Britain in 1842, China had to
surrender the city of Hong Kong and accept the establishment of diplomatic relations with
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After the French Revolution, the French Empire, and the battle of Waterloo lead-
ing to the downfall of Napoleon, the nations of Europe signed the Treaties of
Paris (1815) in which a Holy Alliance was created of 'Christian nations' that sought
to prevent the future need for an all-out European war. Furthermore, it created an
anti-revolutionary military alliance between some members that would intervene
against liberal and nationalist uprisings that could pose a threat to the estab-
lished European order.61 International Law thus responded to the fears of a power
imbalance on the European continent and the threat of popular uprisings. But
there were more problems that needed regulation.
By the mid 19th century, the industrialisation of organised warfare was beginning
to show in the large numbers of casualties. The international concern over this
growing number of casualties needed a political answer. The 1864 Convention of
the International Committee ofthe Red Cross, founded by Henri Dunant as a pri-
vate law association under the laws ofthe Canton of Geneva in 1863, came as a
response to the experiences of the Crimean war (1853-1856), the battle of Solferino
in 1859, and the lessons from the first 'modern' war: the American Civil War. The
number of casualties during this war was enormous on both sides: Union losses
were 359,528 dead and 275,175 wounded; Confederate losses were estimated at
258,000 dead and 225,000 wounded.62 Given the scale of the wars and their dis-
astrous effects, limits came to be formulated with regard to the use of force. In
the first place to protect civilians, and, in the second place, to limit or camouflage
the dehumanising character of modern warfare.63 Humanitarian laws of war, be-
came the first stepping stones for the recognition of human dignity in Interna-
tional Law.64 In fact, this recognition of human dignity in International Law be-
came the necessary pre-condition for the recognition of individuals as subject of
International Law that developed in the wake ofthe First and Second World War.65
2.2.7   Developments in International Law during the First Half of the 2oth
Century
By 1919, at the end of the First World War (1914-1918), the failure of the old peace
and security systems of the 'Christian nations' had become evident. New institu-
tions to preserve and secure peace were necessary. Furthermore, the First World
War had united the world, in a sinister way. For the first time in history, a Euro-
pean conflict assumed such a magnitude that it involved all major members of
the international community, it became difficult for states to keep aloof from what
was happening in other areas of the world.66 In the aftermath of the war, the
the West through the exchange ofdiplomats (Ziegler,994, P· 219)
6i
Malanczuck 1997. P. 11-12.
62
Malanczuck 1997• P. 21.
63 Hirsch Ballin 1995, P· 10.
64 Hirsch Ballin 1995, P· 11
65 In 1868 the first convention on the prohibition of light projectiles that explode after entry
into the body of a victim was signed. The Hague Peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 pro-
hibited the use of dum-dum bullets and the use of poison gas during the First World War
led to a prohibition through a protocol in 1925 (Hirsch Ballin 1997)
66 Cassese 2001, p. 30
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League of Nations was formed. The first purpose of the League of Nations was
the promotion of international cooperation and the achievement of peace and se-
curity by the acceptance of the parties, in principle, of'obligations not to resort to
war' (the absolute right of states to go to war was not intended to be excluded all
together). The other purposes of the League included promoting disarmament
and open diplomacy to abolish the practice of secret treaties, the mandate system
and responsibilities with social matters, such as health and fair labour stan-
dards.67 The number of recognised subjects of International  Law was extended to
include non-European and non-Christian nations as well. The League of Nations
was open to countries from all continents of the world. The subjects of the
League were considered to be 'civilised nations'.68
That same year, the International Labour Organisation was created by the mem-
bers of the League of Nations in response to political and ideological pressure of
socialist doctrines, and also because it came to be believed that the condition of
workers was growing worse, and that therefore the lot ofworkers deserved greater
international concern.69 Finally, in 1921, the Permanent International Court ofJUS-
tice was created as a result ofthe belief among states that arbitration was the best
means of settling disputes and preventing the outbreak of wars.70
At the same time, important steps for the recognition of individuals as subjects of
International Law were taken. Religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities could
submit petitions to the Council of the League of Nations. Trade union associa-
tions could file complaints with the ILO governing body.,1 Non-state actors, like
unions and minorities, started to play a small role in International Relations.
However, these newly-created institutions could not prevent the outbreak of the
Second World War, and some ofthem, like the League of Nations, would not sur-
vive the war. In 1945, the failing League was succeeded by the United Nations Or-
ganisation, which tried to remedy many of the defects of its predecessor. Initially,
its members were described as the 'peace loving nations', but this criterion was
soon dropped.72 Currently, the UN General Assembly consists of 191 member
states. Furthermore, the horrors of the Holocaust were to prove instrumental for
a stronger recognition of the individual as subjects of International Law. First of
all, the Neurenberg and Tokyo trials expanded the obligation of states to include
not only the human treatment of enemy soldiers and civilians, but also the hu-
man treatment of a state's own population.71 These trials recognised individual
responsibility under International Law without the usual interposition of the
67   Malanauck 1997, P· 23-2468 R6ling 1964. P· 178. Not all nations became part, and the scope remained limited to the
European continent and its colonies. Significantly, the United States abstained from joining
the League.
69 Cassese 2001, p. 15-16.
70 Cassese 2001, p. 34
71 Cassese 2001, p. 35
72   Raling 1964, P· 178
73 Hirsch Ballin 1995, P· 12.
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state.74 Secondly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set out the shared
intention of states to defend, protect and preserve human dignity. The next steps
for the recognition of individuals as subject of International Law can be found in
the accessibility to civilians of supervisory procedures at the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Euro-
pean Court for Human Rights, and the Committee mentioned in the optional pro-
tocol ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.7S
2.2.8 Conc|usion
In this first part of the chapter we explored some of the tipping points in the his-
torical development of International Law. We have encountered tipping points
with regard to the theory of International Law and to the practices of International
Law.
It seems that much of the interpretation of what International Law is depends on
specific historical conditions in International Relations. During politically unstable
times much of the focus of International Law is on the conduct ofwarfare and the
treatment of prisoners, combatants, and civilians. In more stable times, the focus
shifts to diplomatic and economic relations. Later on we see that economic con-
cerns and military concerns are seen in a more integral way. Thus the League of
Nations and the ILO were created at the same time to address the challenge of
peace after the First World War. Or new developments are the result of a massive
shock to the public mind: hence the creation of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights in the wake ofthe Second World War.
The focus of International Law furthermore depended very much on the specific
position of the author at that specific time. Thomas Hobbes could not, and would
not, build on the Spanish School ofthought because of the political animosities
between Catholic Spain and protestant England. Grotius argued very much in the
trading interests ofthe Dutch Republic.
At the same time we have seen how medieval legal thinking identified many of the
concerns of International Law that we can still recognise today. In that respect,
the rise of the nation state was less influential on the content of International Law
(War, Diplomacy and Trade) than on the specific political and regulatory organi-
sation (Westphalia 1648, Concert ofVienna 1815, United Nations 1946)of Interna-
tional Relations.
Over time the number of entities of International Law has not just expanded hori-
zontally to embrace all states as subjects; it has also extended itself towards indi-
viduals, groups, and international organisations. However, this latter movement
did not bring these participants in International Relations to the same 'subject'
74   Shaw 2002, P. 38
75 Hirsch Ballin 1995. P· 14.
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level as the states, because they could not take part in processes through which
states would bind themselves to international rules.76
The second half of this chapter will now begin by trying to identify some ofthe key
dimensions of International Law that we can use to observe movement, change
and continuity.
2.3 Historical Assessments
The study of tipping points in the historical development of International Law re-
vealed close connections and interactions between (international) political devel-
opments and movement and changes in International Law. The following analysis
of change and continuity in International  Law is based on historic works by lead-
ing legal scholars oftheir day. All three share, contrary to Hans Kelsen, that there
is no such a thing as a pure theory of (International) Law, but that the study of In-
ternational Law theory should always take into account the politics of Interna-
tional Relations.77
Two scholars wrote their assessments while occupying chairs in International Law
and International Relations at the London School of Economics, Lauterpacht and
Schwarzenberger; while De Visscher at the time of publishing his book was the
leading French-speaking Belgian scholar on International Law, having served on
as President of the Institute for International Law and as judge of the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice.
All three authors have identified dimensions for observing movement, change,
and continuity in International Law. This particular section will identify for each
author those key dimensions. The next section, 2.4, will analyse all dimensions
mentioned in this section in order to identify a list of key dimensions that could
be used to create a framework for observing movement, change, and continuity in
the interaction between emerging regulatory arrangements in International Rela-
tions and the existing body of state-based International Law.
2.3.1    Lauterpacht: The Function of International Law in the Community
After the First World War, the study of International Law and International Rela-
tions initially became influenced by the strong utopianism of Woodrow Wilson
and the creation of the League of Nations. This utopianism (also called Wilson-
ianism) relied heavy on concepts of social analysis rooted  in the tradition of the
Enlightenment. It argued that one should always look for reason-based substi-
tutes for war. One of its claims was that the First World War could have been pre-
76 Meijknecht notices that these new entities, whose existence in the international realm could
not be wished away, were labelled 'beneficiaries' or 'objects' of International Law
(Meijknecht 2001, p. 47)· This has led to an unhelpful dichotomy between subjects and ob-
jects of law in theory, which does not capture the complexities and nuances of International
Relations.
77 Green 1992, Knutsen 1997, Dupuy 2000
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vented if only a forum had existed in which the grievances before the Balkan con-
flict had been discussed by the national leaders of each party involved. 78
However,  by the beginning of the 193os, scholars started to transcend this  "or-
thodoxy of legal idealism" and proposed to study international events in the light
of history and interstate relations.79 It is within this specific context that Hersch
Lauterpacht sets out his careful argument that although law is essential for a
peaceful world, it is no panacea. In "The Function of Law in the International
Community" (1933), he writes:
Just as positivism in the domain of International Law has become unscientific
by being driven through its own exaggerations, to disregard the very practice of
States which it professes to regard as the only source of law, so the desire of
generations of lawyers to confine their activity to a registration of the practice
of States has discouraged any determined attempt at relating it to higher legal
principle, or the conception of International Law as a whole.8o
Unlike municipal law which is based on subordination of persons to a legal rule,
there is in International Law no superior which imposes law. So what gives Inter-
national Law its legal nature? In Lauterpachts time, the popular answer to that
question was to refer to the doctrine of co-ordination: starting with all sorts of
conventional so-called social and conventional rules between States, only sanc-
tioned by social compulsion, these rules grow - in the long run - into general cus-
tomary International Law. What could have provided for the basis of co-ordinated
customary International  Law or ensured the binding force of this customary In-
ternational Law? Lauterpacht answered that, while within the State the relation of
the law to the individual is one of command imposed regardless of the will of the
person, in international society it is based on the voluntary acceptance of legal ob-
ligations.8, From this doctrine two theories could be developed with regard to the
basis of international obligation. One is the doctrine of auto-limitation; the other,
the theory of law-making agreement as a source of International Law.
Lauterpacht noted that the branch of doctrine of auto-limitation in the end could
lead to the clear repudiation of International Law.82 The reason for this being that
this theory treats the observance of rules of International Law not as a matter of
legal obligation, but as the result of calculation - which may or may not take the
long view - of the compatibility of the observance of the obligation with the inter-
ests of the State.81 The other branch, the theory of law making-agreement finds
the basis of International Law in the "common will" of States, which by means of
'agreement', not a contract, constitutes a 'common will' resulting from a combi-
nation of wills. This merger of individual wills of State constitutes a binding rule
78 Knutsen 1997. P· 217
79   Knutsen 1997, P· 21780 Lauterpacht 1933, P· 438
8i Lauterpacht 1933, P· 408.
82 Lauterpacht 1933, P· 415
83 Lauterpacht 1933, P· 411
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of law, because the common will of States cannot without violation of the law be
changed by a single State:
Thus: although the will of State is essential for the creation of the common will,
it is the latter, and not the will of the individual State, which is the source of in-
ternational obligations.84
This doctrine, first developed by the German jurist Triepel provided the Positivist
writers with their main argument to answer questions with regard to the legally
binding nature oflnternational Law.
Lauterpacht then sets out to answer the main concern of his book, whether States
should accept the work of international tribunals. From the rule that obligations
of International Law owe their origin to the will of States, it follows that new obli-
gations cannot be imposed upon an unwilling State by any international legisla-
ture. From the principle that a State is objectively bound by an obligation once
undertaken, follows the juridical postulate ofthe obligatory rule of law through the
instrumentability of courts. According to Lauterpacht international tribunals do
not impose new obligations, they only ascertain existing law. They give effect and
expression to the will of State by ascertaining what obligations it has undertaken
by way of express or implied consent.85
Following Grotius, Westlake, and Wolfe, Lauterpacht suggested a hypothesis of
both lines of argument. It is not possible either to lean on only rational argument
or only on ethical arguments to answer the question of whether International Law
has a binding nature.86 There exists an international community beyond Interna-
tional Law, which provides it with its true basis. This international community in-
teracts with International Law and vice versa:
Undoubtedly the effectiveness of law depends to a large extent upon the preva-
lent practice and the general level of morality, but the very fact of the reign of
law is, and tends to become increasingly, part of common practice and moral-
ity-87
International Law is not perfect and depends on the international community to
function. Its future development, according to Lauterpacht, would depend on its
incorporation into general principles and conceptions as developed by civilised
communities without reference to the 'state of nature' existing among States:
States are not primitive communities and there is a patent contradiction in any
attempt to construe relations between States of today as governed  by a  law of
primitive peoples...Only the current personification by the questionable doc-
trine of the metaphysical State, supported by the questionable doctrine of
States as the sole objects of International Law enables writers to assert and
84 Lauterpacht 1933, P· 415
85 Lauterpacht 1933· P· 420.
86 Lauterpacht 1933, P· 422.
87 Lauterpacht,933· P· 437
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justify the possibility of human beings - for States and Governments are made
up of human beings - adopting differing standards of order and justice in dif-
ferent spheres of action.88
In conclusion, according to Lauterpacht there are four relevant dimensions for
understanding International Law's responses to emerging regulatory challenges
in International Relations. First, International Law actively interacts with the inter-
national community and vice versa. Second, in this system nation-states are the
key-actors of International Law. Thirdly, if states perceive of an issue to be in need
of international regulation, they can act to reach an agreement, based on a com-
mon will of states. This agreement will be legally binding, precisely because it is
based on the common will of states, and not on the sovereign will of one individ-
ual state. Finally, Lauterpacht holds that part of the effectiveness and legitimacy of
International Law depends on the common practices and morality of 'civilised
communities.' States will act when developments go against these common prac-
tices and morality.
2.12 Schwarzenberger: Power Politics
Georg Schwarzenberger belonged to the school of Realism rooted in Conservative
philosophy, although he deemed 'so-called' realists too pessimistic, and pre-
sented his approach as 'primary empirical:89 In the United States this school is
represented by Kennan, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau.9° In Europe this school of
thought is often associated with the work ofAron and Bull.9'
The first edition of Schwarzenberger's Power Politics was published during the
Second World War. Its aim was to provide a working theory of International Rela-
tions which fitted the facts and main trends of International Relations, past and
present, and which would put the proper emphasis on the real driving forces of a
turbulent society.92 The following discussion is based on the second, revised, edi-
tion of 1951.
Schwarzenberger argued that law and society are correlative terms.91 Schwarzen-
berger distinguished between three functions of law: the law of power, the law of
reciprocity and the law of co-ordination. The key to understanding the functions of
the international legal system lies in the structure of its social background.94 The
law of power makes co-existence possible, the law of reciprocity introduces fair-
ness and co-operation, while the law of co-ordination integrates the international
community.
88 Lauterpacht 1933· P· 434· In that respect, it is hard to see why human beings when serving
governments should adhere to International Law, whereas when working for a multinational
corporation would render them outside the concern of International Law.
89 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 5
90 See chapter 9.
9,   Knutsen 1997. P· 244
92 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. xvi.
93 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 28.
94 Schwarzenberger 1951. p. 202.
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The primary function of International Law is maintaining the supremacy of force
and the hierarchies established on the basis of power and to lend to such a sys-
tem the respectability and sanctity of law.95 Beyond the sustaining of the suprem-
acy of force in International Relations and serving practically any ofthe strategies
and tactics of individuals states, International Law helps keep intact the monopoly
ofthe aristocracy of sovereign states in international society:
International Law fulfils the functions of extreme society law: it gives authority
and sanctity of law to power and brute force; without seriously restraining the
mighty; it serves as a handy ideology with which to distinguish some of the
brutalities which are inherent in any system of power politics.96
Schwarzenberger takes care not to rest content with such a bleak description of
International Law as a pious fraud. International Law also serves as a law of recip-
rocity and as a law ofco-ordination.
Once Schwarzenberger starts to talk about the second function of International
Law, the law of reciprocity, we enter more familiar terrain. He recognises the law
of reciprocity in the establishment of international treaties. Treaties are a concrete
expression of the principle of reciprocity in spheres in which, on the basis of mu-
tuality, states desire to limit the exercise of their 'unfettered national sover-
eignty:97 If states wish to behave in any rational manner in the realm of political
issues, they can meet on the common denominator of reciprocity.
Theoretically, the law of reciprocity seems to assume that all states are more or
less the same. Indeed, it has been argued that a certain degree of homogeneity of
states is essential for the survival and development of International Law, although
by the time Schwarzenberger wrote his book, this seemed to have become of al-
most no importance:
International Law was originally only applicable between Christian nations, and
was later extended to non-European States on the assumption that the stan-
dards of value underlying the Christian law of nations were accepted by the
Near and Far Eastern States at least in a modified form, i.e. as the standards
common to all civilised nations. But even this element of homogeneity was
thrown overboard when the last barrier to heterogeneity was broken down in
favour of an International Law that was to apply between all sovereign States. 98
Schwarzenberger is more worried by something else, namely a development
whereby some activities which before the First World War had belonged to the ini-
tiative of individuals, had become politicised, and thus rendered over to the do-
main of power politics:
95 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 203
96 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 206.
97   Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 208.
98 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 210.
31
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Economic, financial and social International Relations, as well as education
and culture, are becoming increasingly involved in the turmoil of power poli-
tics, where law serves predominantly as an ideology.99
Schwarzenberger fostered some hope that, in domains far away from power poli-
tics, International Law was beginning to show traces of a community law. He dis-
cusses the example of the gradual limitation and abolition of the slave trade as
the most impressive contribution  so far (1951). In the face of formidable vested
interests, public opinion gradually forced a reluctant Parliament into action. 100
Britain then induced the other great powers during the Congress ofVienna in 1815
to agree to the principle ofthe abolition ofthe slave trade on the basis of reciproc-
ity. Other hopeful examples in 1951 were the law of international rivers and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which introduced the
standard ofeconomic good neighbourliness. The contracting parties were under a
legal obligation to consult with the other signatories who would be directly af-
fected by any unilateral decision on their part. And, in addition, the agreement
endowed the contracting parties acting jointly with far-reaching functions.'°'
What makes International Law binding? In the case of power politics, the answer
is relatively simple: the threat to resort to force and/or ultimately war. In the case
of the law of reciprocity, the advantages of conformity to International  Law are so
great that it would not be worthwhile, even for a powerful actor, to break these
rules, since the observance could hardly be as irksome as the inconveniences of
not having them or of exclusion of their benefits. But there is more to this, the
role and interests of non-state actors:
Within a State, vested interests anxious to preserve stability in the international
society, such as export industries, banks or transport and trade establishments
can be depended upon to exert their influence to maintain and extend these re-
ciprocal relations, subject to the limitations imposed upon them by any over-
riding exigencies of power politics. 102
But is there, as Lauterpacht had argued, any place for ethics in this otherwise very
calculated account of reciprocal cooperation in the international community?
Schwarzenberger sees two functions for international ethics. First, it can offer op-
tional standards of a higher ethical value than those accepted as legally binding by
states. Second, international morality can serve as an agency of growth and de-
velopment ofexisting International Law:
International Law sets minimum standards which are enforced by external
sanctions. International morality enables States tentatively to apply higher
standards in their relations with each other. If such higher standards are ap-
plied over prolonged periods, they tend to crystallise into legal rules.'03
99 Schwarzenberger 1951, P· 211.
100 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 211.
101 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 213
102 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 216.
103 Schwarzenberger 1951, p. 230.
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In conclusion, in Schwarzenberger's approach there are again four relevant di-
mensions for understanding International Law's responses to emerging regula-
tory challenges in International Relations. First, sovereign-states are the prime ac-
tors (the aristocracy) in International Law. Secondly, if states are willing to apply
practical high standards in their interactions over prolonged periods, these can
become international legal rules. Thirdly, public opinion is being recognised as a
force that can change International Laws or morally uphold them, because of
vested interests or profound moral outrage. Finally, International Law can be used
to limit the exercise of 'unlimited sovereignty' by states through rationally reach-
ing agreements based on the law of reciprocity. Schwarzenberger's greatest worry
rose over the fact that economic, financial and social International Relations were
becoming infiltrated by the turmoil of power politics, where International Law was
serving predominantly as an ideology.
2.3 3    De Visscher Theory and Reality in Public International Law
According to De Visscher, International Law, entrenched in formal positions, long
evaded a direct confrontation with international politics. On the one hand, it tried
to do so by favouring the sociological positivism which led to the utopian notion
that wanted to eliminate power as a source of law. On the other hand, it tried a
flight into a pure science of law, isolated from social realities.'04 His work, Theory
and Reality in Public International Law (1957) explores the question whether there
is such a thing as the international community which precedes International
Law.'05
Relations between states cannot be separated from the relations between man
and power within the State. The dualistic separation of the internal and external
orders led International Law initially to take no interest in man, which was re-
garded as a mere object of International Relations, except insofar as his treatment
abroad might influence relations between States:06 Thus International Law was
powerless when human dignity was violated on a large and systematic scale dur-
ing the two World Wars of the twentieth century.
There can be no international community as long as the political ends ofthe State
overshadow the human ends of power. In order to understand De Visscher's
point, one has to look at his definition of politics.
From a neutral and purely formal point of view, politics may be defined as the
pursuit of the common good, understood as that which in a community
should ensure the good of each in the good of the collectivity.'07
'04  De Visscher 1969. p. 70, with a devastating critique of the theories of Hans Kelsen, p. 67-68.
105 The edition used here is the 2nd revised translation in English by Corbett published in 1969
106 De Visscher 1965 p. 181.
'07  De Vischer 1969. p. 71
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The common good is an accepted and not a decreed good, and it will become a
living reality only when one ceases to regard the State as the highest form of so-
cial organisation. 108
Bearing this in mind, De Visscher sets out to explain why there is such a thing as
the international community. He asserts that every society rests at once upon ma-
terial and upon moral factors. It is the result of solidarities active enough to call
for an organisation of power, and sufficiently conscious of a common good, to
engender the idea of law and the sense of obligation.'°9 In other words, the legal
obligatory nature of International Law depends on something that rests, at least
partially, outside its own sphere: morals.
It is by a return to man, by linking the conception of the State, organization
and means, to the person who is its end, that we can find, on the plane of an
impersonal but not extra-personal common good, the sole and moral justifica-
tion ofthe obligatory character ofthe common good. 110
Whereas in the 19th century, the human person became the end of every public
establishment, as identified by the various national constitutions of that time, a
profound moral and spiritual crisis developed after the First World War, bringing
with it 'an unheard of displacement of weight from the individual to the State'."'
De Visscher worried that when the notion of the common good was no longer
harnessed to human ends, deterioration would set in, further enhanced by tech-
nological depersonalisation:
But depersonalisation has as deeper cause: in large measure it results from the
transformation of economic activities, from the State's need to coordinate
them, and from the phenomena of concentration that call for the State's inter-
vention. It grows with the inertia of opinion which cannot grasp the complexi-
ties of the directed or planned economy and is still less capable of discerning
'the immeasurable potentialities for evil, inherent in the state in this age of sci-
ence and organisation.' It is clear that the chief beneficiary of this technological
depersonalisation is today the State in its political action.
112
De Visscher noted that the transformation of the economic system had fuelled
the State's need to coordinate them, and from the phenomena of concentration,
the State had called for more intervention. This was helped by the inertia of public
opinion, which had been unable to grasp the complexities of modern society. This
was, in the eyes of De Visscher, the deeper meaning of the Second World War:
The key to the problem lies in men's idea of power, in the relations that a re-
gime establishes between the person and the State, in those spiritual and insti-
tutional checks and balances which in the true democratic countries resist ex-
108 De Visscher 1969, p. 71
'09  De Visscher 1969, p. 90
110 De Visscher 1965 P. 101.
111 De Visscher 1969, p. 124
112 De Visscher 1969, p. 125
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tra-personal conceptions of the common good. There is no foundation for the
international order ifthe internal order does not provide it."3
When it comes to positive International Law, human values are the reason behind
the legal rule."4 De Visscher maintains that there is a direct indissoluble connec-
tion between respect for human values in the internal order and the effectiveness
of International Law.
In conclusion, De Visscher's approach offers five dimensions for understanding
International Law's responses to emerging regulatory challenges in International
Relations. First, the perception and willingness of states to create international
regulatory mechanisms should depend on the protection of human dignity and
the promotion ofthe common good. Second, the capacities of states to act in In-
ternational Relations are based on an unprecedented"5 concentration of state
power and policies. Third, this concentration of state powers led to an exclusion
of human persons from the scope of International Law, which in turn led to the
atrocities against human dignity during the two World Wars. Fourth, there can be
no legitimate and effective international order, if the internal order of states does
not provide for one. Finally, human values are the reasonable basis of positive in-
ternational regulatory mechanisms.
2.3.4 Potential Dimensions for Observation
In the previous section we studies eight 'tipping points' in the historical develop-
ment of International  Law. In this section, three interpretations of those historic
tipping points were introduced. All three authors have identified relevant dimen-
sions for understanding International Law's responses to emerging regulatory
challenges in International Relations.
"1  De Visscher 1969, p. 128.
i,4  De Visscher 1966 P  180.
115 De Visscher uses 'unheard'.
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Relevant dimensions ofthe Interaction between
International Law and International Relations
Lauterpacht Schwarzenberger De Visscher
International Law actively Sovereign states are the The perception and will-
interacts with the interna- prime actors in Interna- ingness of states to create
tional community and tional law international regulatory
vice-versa mechanisms should de-
pend on the protection of
human dignity and the
promotion ofthe com-
mon good.
Nation-states are the key- If states are willing to ap- The capacities ofstates to
actors of international law ply practical high stan- act in International Rela-
dards in their interactions tions are based on an un-
over prolonged periods, heard concentration of
these can become interna- state power and policies
tional rules.
I f states perceive of an is- Public opinion is being This concentration of
sue to be in need of inter- recognised as a force that state power and policies
national regulation they can change International led to an exclusion of hu-
can act to reach an Laws or morally uphold man persons from the
agreement based on the them, because ofvested scope of international law
common will ofstates, interests or profound and atrocities against
which will be binding moral outrage, human dignity.
Part ofthe effectiveness International law can be There can be no legitimate
and legitimacy of Interna- used to limit the exercise and effective legal order, if
tional Law depends on the of unlimited sovereignty the internal order of states
common practices and by states through ration- does not provide for one.
morality ofcivilised com- ally reaching agreements
munities. based on the law of recip-
rocity.
Human values are the
reasonable basis of posi-
tive international regula-
tory mechanisms.
The question now before us, is whether we can distil from these relevant dimen-
sions and from analysing the historical 'tipping points' in Section 2.2 those key
dimensions that could help us to observe the developments (movement, change
and continuity) in the interaction between International Law and alternative regu-
latory mechanisms in International Relations today.
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2.4 Analysis
During the 19th century, International Law became, first and foremost, an affair of
sovereign nation states. Other actors did start to participate and contribute to In-
ternational Law, but were not recognised as having the same status as states. The
concept of sovereignty was used to prevent other possible participants from gain-
ing a full status in the international political arena. The concept of sovereignty de-
pends heavily on the idea ofthe impermeability of legal orders.
The idea ofthe impermeability of legal orders was based on the Westphalian prin-
ciple 'cuius regio, eius religio'. This principle meant that the prince (and later the
government) was internally free to organise his government and laws, and only
externally bound by international treaties."6 John Austin (1790-1859) defined law
as the general commands of a sovereign, supported by a threat of sanctions.'17 As
a sovereign could only rule his or her own territory, it seemed obvious that the le-
gal order, could not be larger than the sovereign's territory. Whatever happened
within that sovereign legal order, could not be influenced from outside. A judge,
or a sovereign, could not exercise any jurisdiction beyond their own territories.
The national legal order was considered to be impermeable:18 Yet, in practice, the
borders between nations were more permeable and their laws more intertwined
then official theories were willing to admit.
De Visscher argued that the state is not one 'person' but consists of various ac-
tors and organisations. For a long time, based on the idea of the impermeability
of legal orders, these non-state actors were hidden from the view of International
Law and international relation. This situation is changing, as the following discus-
sion of State-sovereignty by Wendt illustrates:
[thel "physiological" structure [of sovereignty] relates the various individuals
and bureaucracies which make up a state actor to each other, assigning func-
tional, territorial, or issue-area sovereignties within a framework of rules and
procedures for settling jurisdictional conflicts and ensuring harmonious opera-
tion...In this light we can see why it is difficult to find sovereignty in the mod-
ern state, since structures do not have a single location. The sovereignty of a
state actor only becomes apparent when we look at the structure through
which its parts become a corporate whole."9
The sovereignty ofthe state thus has many dimensions: internal, external, and is
fragmented along the organisations that make up a state. Therefore, Slaughter'20
has argued that the 'fictitious' concept of state sovereignty itself should be disag-
gregated in order to reflect the reality of modern governance:
116 Malanczuk has even argued that the study of sovereignty began as an attempt to analyse
the internal structure. ofthe state (Malanczuk 1997, P· 17)
117 Quoted in: Malanczuk 1997. P· 17.
118 Today, this idea is changing, see: the continuation ofthis discussion in chapter 3, section 4.
119 Wendt 2001, p. 207-208. Sovereignty seems no longer bound to one person or institution.
120  Slaughter 2004, P· 32.35·
37
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS
..suppose individual national government institutions could become bearers
of rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in the global arena. Suppose sover-
eignty itself could be disaggregated, that it attached to specific government in-
stitutions such as courts, regulatory agencies, and legislators or legislative
committees. But as exercised by these institutions, the core characteristic of
sovereignty would shift from autonomy from outside interference to the capac-
ity to participate in transgovernmental networks of all types. This concept of
sovereignty as participation, or status, means that disaggregated sovereignty
would empower government institutions around the world to engage with
eachother in networks that strengthen them and improve their ability to per-
form their designated government tasks individually and collectively.
121
This brings into question the original concepts of sovereignty that have been
based on Bodin's philosophy, and that Slaughter has sought to amend. Sover-
eignty seems not to be a good, that can be possessed; but a right, or, as Slaughter
identifies, a 'status to participate'.'22 The concept of sovereignty functions as an
'entry ticket' to International Relations. But is this 'status' necessarily restricted to
states, and their institutions? Not so, according to Maritain, who voiced a strong
critique of all'Bodin'-like concepts of state sovereignty:
Here we are confronted with the basic wrong of the concept of Sovereignty,
and the original error of the theorists of Sovereignty. They [the advocates of
Bodin-like concepts, RS] knew that the right to self-government is naturally
possessed by the people. But for the consideration of this right they substi-
tuted that of total power of the commonwealth. They knew that the "prince"
receives from the people the authority with which he is vested. But they had
overlooked and forgotten the concept of vicariousness stressed by medieval
authors. And they replaced it with the concept of physical transformation and
donation.'21
According to Maritain, Bodin and his followers discussed sovereignty in terms of
goods or material power that can be held in ownership or trusteeship: the state
'owns' sovereignty; the prince is 'entrusted' with sovereignty. However, Maritain
thought that the philosophers should have been discussing sovereignty in terms
of rights possessed by essence or participation:'24
...a right can be possessed by the one as belonging to his nature, and by the
other as participated in by him. God is possessed by essence of the right to
command; the people are possessed of this right both by participation in the
divine right; and by essence insofar as it is a human right. The 'vicars' of the
people or deputies ofthe people are possessed (really possessed) of this right
only by participation in the people's right.'25
121 Slaughter 2004, P· 34
122  Or, a 'Property of structure' in a Weberian sense.
123  Maritain 1951, p· 35·
'24  Compare the point made by Slaughter above.
125  Maritain 1951, p. 35
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Notably, a few other actors have been recognised as sovereign actors in Interna-
tional Relations, most notably the Holy See. However, when states 'own' sover-
eignty in International Relations, then other actors, international organisations,
multinationals, non-governmental organisations, persons, cannot participate on
an equal footing in international political games of sovereign actors. But when it
is recognised that the sovereignty of the state depends on its participation in the
sovereignty of these other actors, 'the people', a different perspective on Interna-
tional Relations and International Law becomes possible.
Following Maritain's argument, we can see how non-state entities (various ways
in which 'the people' have organised themselves) are the original bearers of state
sovereignty, and should therefore be able to be entrusted with a status to partici-
pate as sovereign actors in International Relations. That is not to say that the
state is no longer sovereign, or that the state no longer plays a role. The state may
not be the only actor in the international system concerned with International
Law, but it is still an important actor.'26 In conclusion, a state-focused concept of
sovereignty does not fully incorporate the realities of state organisation today, or
in the past.'27
As a result, we can draw the following three conclusions with regard to position,
capacity and accessibility of International Relations. Firstly, it seems that sover-
eign states are important actors in International Relations and, according to the
authors, also in International Law. They are, as the historical development has re-
vealed, not the only actors. There are other actors as well. The first dimension
should therefore focus on which actors are holding the key positions in the (alter-
native) regulatory mechanisms that are being created today.
Secondly, De Visscher wrote that the capacity of states to act in International Re-
lations is based upon an 'unheard' concentration of state power and policies.
Schwarzenberger speaks about the development whereby states can create inter-
national regulation ifthey are willing to apply practical high standards in their in-
teractions over prolonged periods. Lauterpacht noticed that if states perceive of
an issue to be in need of international regulation they can act to reach an agree-
ment. Thus, apparently, one has to make a distinction between formal position
and  de facto willingness and capacity of key actors to act.
Thirdly, there is the issue of interaction. Lauterpacht wrote that International Law
actively interacts with the international community and vice-versa. De Visscher
noted that the concentration of state power and policies had led to an exclusion
of human persons from the scope ofthe international community. However, sov-
ereignty can also be understood as a status to participate in International Rela-
tions, which is not necessarily restricted to nation-states. Therefore, the third
element for observing the more recent regulatory developments in International
126  Slaughter 2004, P· 18.
127  See for a similar observation section 3·3. PP· 44-46 of a report by the Dutch Scientific Coun-
cil for Government Policy on the future ofthe national constitutional state (WRR 2002).
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Relations should focus on the accessibility of ('the entry-ticket to') International
Relations, specifically with regard to non-state actors.
2.342 Legitimacy and El[ectiveness
In conclusion, the fourth key dimension for observation of new developments in
the regulation of International Relations should focus on the legitimacy of these
alternative mechanisms. The fifth dimension should focus on the question of
whether these alternative mechanisms work - in other words: whether these alter-
native mechanisms are effeaive.
2·5 Conclusion
This chapter specifically looked at eight stages in the historical development of In-
ternational Law, and reflected on the some of the important concepts in Interna-
tional Law theory. It seems that throughout the development of International Law,
specific historical circumstances influenced the direction of that development.
The primitive early medieval understanding of International Law, geared towards
kings, gave way to a more sophisticated understanding that coincided with the
rise of large kingdoms, and the organisation of trade relations between kingdoms
and cities and new continents. After the wars of religion, a whole new organisa-
tional concept of society emerged, the nation-state, which immediately was in
need of a system for regulating the interactions between nation-states: the Treaty
of Westphalia. In this system, the nation state emerged as the sole subject of In-
ternational Law. 128
Growing trade and growing fears for disrupting the power balance in Europe, led
to a further sophistication of International Law, while the mechanisation of war-
fare led to a widening of the principles and participants. The new participants be-
came recognised as objects of International Law, while the sovereign nation state
remained the subject ofthe law. The end ofthe Second World War marks another
important watershed in International Law when, among other things, the United
Nations organisation was created, and the idea of universal human rights was
formally introduced in International Law. The result of these developments was
that International Law not only regulated the International Relations between
states, but more and more developed its own body of material rules which ap-
plied to state subjects and non-state objects of International Law alike.
The scope of International Law broadened considerably to include almost every-
thing from war and peace questions, to international trade, and poverty reduction.
With regard to its participants, International Law accommodated for nation-
states, international organisations, private initiatives, groups and individuals. As
for its practices, they have become more and more complex with regard to the
128 See for a critique of the understanding of International Law containing only 'subjects' and
'objects': Higgins 1994. PP· 49-50· More on this debate can be found in section 4.2.1, 'SOV-
ereignty as position'.
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creation of law, implementation of law and addressing the participants through
law.
In conclusion, this chapter tried to answer the question of which dimensions of
International Relations have been important in the creation of regulatory re-
sponses of International Law to changing demands in the past. Analysing the
growing complexity of the interaction between International Law and Interna-
tional Relations in the past, we have been able to distil five key dimensions for
observing change and movement: position; capacity; accessibility; legitimacy
and effectiveness. These dimensions could serve as the graded lenses to ob-
serve continuity and change in the regulation of International Relations today.
The next chapter will provide an introduction to the current complexities of the
interaction between International Law and International Relations in the context
of today's socio-economic globalisation processes. At the end of that chapter,
we will evaluate the 'key dimensions for observation' found in this chapter. Can
these key dimensions provide the building blocks for a framework for observing
the interactions between new arrangements for regulating international rela-
tions and the traditional body of International Law?
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3.     Dimensions of Change and Continuity in the Context
of Economic Globalisation.
3.1 Introduction
States today confront new geographies of power.' One ofthese new geographies
is socio-economic globalisation. Socio-economic globalisation2 consists of the
structural changes in the global political economy, in which two particular fea-
tures stand out: the liberalisation of national economies and the rapid innova-
tions in information technologies.3 This process has brought with it strong pres-
sures for the deregulation of a broad range of markets, economic sectors, and
national borders; and for the privatisation of public sector firms and operations.
Sassen has argued that the new conditions of the global political economy carry
consequences for the role and content of International Law: its scope, exclusivity,
normative power, and its organisational architecture.4 Thus, one entry into the
question of the relationship between new arrangements for regulating Interna-
tional Economic Relations and the traditional body of International Law is through
the study ofthe particular features of the global political economy.5
This particular chapter will begin by looking at the changing regulatory demands
in International Economic Relations in the context of socio-economic globalisa-
tion. It will then set out to analyse how these demands might have affected the
five dimensions for observing change and continuity in the interaction between
International Law and International Economic Relations.
The first part ofthis chapter, containing sections 2 and 3, will discuss and analyse
the changing demands of economic globalisation to the regulation of Interna-
tional Economic Relations. The second part ofthis chapter, section 4, will discuss
and analyse some ofthe initial studies that have been made into the question of
how these changing demands in the regulation of International Economic Rela-
tions may have affected the traditional body of International Law. It will turn out
that the transformative processes occurring in the global political economy are far
more differentiated processes than notions of an overall decline in the signifi-
cance of the regulatory capacities of states or International Law.6 The conclusion
of the second part of this chapter will be that we need more detailed studies of re-
cent developments in the regulation of International Economic Relations.
Therefore, the final part of this chapter, beginning at section 5, will return to the
five dimensions identified in the previous chapter that provide the lenses for ob-
servation of change and continuity in the interaction between International Law
1
Castells 1997 (2004), Reinicke 1998. Held 1999, Sassen 2000,2007
2 Socio-economic globalisation and economic globalisation are both being used to acknowl-
edge the same developments occurring in today's political economy.
3    0'Brien 2000, Todaro 2003, Mos|ey. 2007.
4    Sassen 2000, P. 109.
5 Compare: Sassen 2006. p. 74
6 Compare: Sassen 2000, p. 109
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and International Economic Relations. How are these particular dimensions af-
fected by economic globalisationP The answer to that question is important, as
the five dimensions are intended to become the central building blocks of the
empirical framework for observation that will be created in chapter 4 to conduct
the exploratory case-studies in chapters 5,6, and 7 into the interactions between
new arrangements regulating International Economic Relations and the tradi-
tional body of International Law.
3.2 Globalisation as the Rise ofGIobal Free Markets
This section will explore the changing demands in the regulation of International
Economic Relations caused by the liberalisation of national economies. This
process has been called the rise of the global free market. We will discuss three
studies. The first, historical, study by Schwartz analyses the historical processes
that gave rise to the idea that the State is losing its capacity to regulate the global
political economy. The second study, by Friedman, goes beyond this point and
argues that states have not only have lost their capacity to regulate the global po-
litical economy, but that the global political economy is now dictating state behav-
iour and its internal regulations. By contrast, the third study by Legrain offers a
counterpoint arguing that the state has not become as powerless as argued by
Schwartz, Friedman, and others.
Example: Numerical growth ofactors in the Global Economy
In 1993, it was estimated that 37,000 transnational corporations were active in
the global economy, operating through 170,000 foreign affiliates. Ten years
later, the estimates had risen to 64,000 transnational corporations, operating
through 870,000 foreign affiliates.
Sources: (UNCTAD 1993, 2003)·
3.2.1    Schwartz: The State is losing its Capacity to Regulate the Global Free
Market
In the empirical studies of'States versus Markets', Schwartz describes how mar-
kets created distinct spatial patterns in national production and how states at-
tempted to influence that distribution of production first through national, and
subsequently through international regulation. Schwartz argues that there is a
symbiosis between states and economic markets. Globalisation, understood by
Schwartz as pervasive global price pressures on all market actors, should not be
seen as something new, and neither are the persuasive and often successful ef-
forts by states to contain those price pressures. Modern states and modern mar-
kets cannot exist without each other: states selectively created and enforced the
property rights that maintain markets, property rights sustain the accumulation of
capital and growth, and this has enabled a faster redistribution of economic ac-
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tivities over a global space.' Therefore, this study might help to make an assess-
ment with regard to how the free market has influenced the state's capacity to
participate in and regulate international economic relations.
From 1500 to the First World War, states consciously created markets for the ex-
port of goods. Within that period, roughly from 1500 to 1800, states created mar-
kets for their agricultural goods and slowly extended those markets into all agri-
cultural production. In the 19th century the global market was extended to
industrial goods and this, in the end, extended to agriculture with disastrous re-
suits in the 19305. The domestic conclusion that states drew from the Great De-
pression, was that to allow the international market untrammelled ability to influ-
ence domestic production and employment was a recipe for disaster.8 The trauma
ofthe Great Depression led to very strict regulatory mechanisms as laid out in the
Bretton Woods system, which, in turn, gave rise to the GATT /WTO system, and
the international monetary system under the IMF.
These global trade rules subordinated trade flows to full employment and social
protection. However, the uses of those rules created new material interests  and
goals which undermined both these goals. Politically, states have now come full
circle trying to re-create markets for goods and services in which they were com-
petitive, but whose markets had been suppressed under the Bretton Woods sys-
tem. At the same time, multinationals have dispersed their operations into new
transnational production networks, pressing the states for stable political regula-
tion of flows between the various countries in which production is taking place.
As a result new rules regulating trade at the global and regional level were intro-
duced which could no longer guarantee full employment and removed large parts
of social protection.9 As a consequence, the current phase of accelerating global-
isation is the planned result by market actors (multinationals) and states that
stood to benefit from the destruction or reconfiguration of various forms of social
protection created in the 'golden era' of the Keynesian welfare state.'° Two shifts
seem to be occurring at the same time.
Firstly, with regard to international monetary flows, Schwartz concludes that the
policies pursued in Western societies in the 19805, characterised by the removal
of capital controls and the privatisation of publicly owned public sector services,
created a shift that essentially ended states' capacities to orchestrate economic
growth. With the exception of the United States, states can no longer regulate
monetary policies and control direct investments to secure economic growth. 11
Secondly, with regard to international trade, Schwartz concludes that, after the
unravelling of the controlled capital system of Bretton Woods, multinationals be-
gan to shift labour-intensive production in stages to low-wage zones. This trans-
nationalisation of production created continental or hemispheric production
7    Schwartz 2000, p. 1
8    Schwartz 2000, p. 192
9    Schwartz 2000, p. 279-280.
10 Scwartz 2000, p. 317-318.
11 Schwartz 2000, p. 217.
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complexes, which are not all based within one country, and not subject to one set
of (national) rules. One of the direct effects of the dispersal of production was the
rapid growth of intrafirm transfers (by 1996 alreadY 33% of the total world ex-
ports). These intrafirm transfers are not subject to international state-based regu-
latory mechanisms.12 On the other hand, and despite the flexible production
across the world, multinationals remained firmly rooted in the political and insti-
tutional structures oftheir home economies.
In conclusion, Schwartz thinks that the United States would have been the only
country capable of balancing this system if it had not been undermined by the in-
ternational and macro-economic imbalances created by the financial crises of the
19905. As a consequence, Schwartz argues that markets rule, and that the driving
force behind international regulation is the conflict between states worried about
their global market shares, reacting to shifts in their relative ability to generate ex-
port systems and attract capital investments. This self-interest to benefit from the
global free market, and therefore the political unwillingness to suppress the po-
tential benefits of this global market explain, in Schwartz's analysis, the steady
erosion of the state's capacity to regulate international economic relations.'1
3.2.2   Friedman: The Global Free Market as a Golden Straitjacket for the State
The challenge of the free market to the state is hardly a challenge at all according
to Thomas Friedman in the "Lexus and the Olive tree"14. Friedman agrees, like
Schwartz above, that globalisation is not something new. Rather, this particular
phase of globalisation is new, having started when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.15
The Cold War state-system was followed by a new international system which he
labels "globalisation". The globalisation system has one overarching feature: inte-
gration. Led by the forces of free-market capitalism, the world is becoming an in-
creasingly interwoven place. And, regardless of whether you  are a company or  a
country, shifts, threats, and opportunities derive from those to whom you are
connected. 16
Within this situation the state is no longer in the position to see the global free
market as a challenge that it can take on. States will have to wear a straightjacket
in order to survive. States can either join the global free market by putting on the
"Golden Strait-Jacket", or risk a total failure of the economic welfare of their citi-
zens. This golden straitjacket comes with its own rules and logic:
To fit into the Golden Straitjacket a country must either adopt, or be seen as
moving forward, the following golden rules: making the private sector the pri-
mary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and
12 Which. in case of the United States, means that in the 19805, 80% of all US imports were
intrafirm, multinational controlled imports. staying outside the state-regulatory mecha-
nisms. Schwartz 2000, p. 237
11   Cf. Schwartz 2000. p. 318
14 Friedman 2000.
15   Friedman 2000, p. xvi.
16
Friedman 2000, P. 8.
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price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close
to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tar-
iffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting
rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-
owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its cur-
rency convertible, opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct for-
eign ownership and investment, deregulating its economy to promote as much
domestic competition as possible, eliminating government corruption, subsi-
dies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its banking and telecommu-
nication systems to private ownership and competition and allowing citizens
to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run pen-
sion and mutual funds. When you stitch all of these pieces together you have
to the Golden Strait-Jacket.'7
On the political front, the Golden Strait-Jacket narrows the political choices of
those in power to tight parameters. This leads more and more to the politics of
nuances within these parameters, rather than extremes between opposition and
ruling political parties. 18
Example: transformation ofpolitical comrnitments into legal obligations
With6ut any supranational bureaucracy, the commitment made by the
states par-ticipating in the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
not only to open their markets, but equally importantly, to enforce their do-
mestic laws: "necessarily forces a wide range of national bureaucracies to
work together in the day to day running ofthe system. It not only brings to-
gether national trade authorities but labour, transportation and agriculture
departments, securities, banking and other regulators offinancial services,
anti-trust authorities and more."
Source: Slaughter (Swann) 2004
What are the consequences of the Golden Strait-Jacket with regard to the state's
capacity to regulate international economic relations? First of all, Friedman sees
that states are more and more synchronising their policies. Within this effort of
synchronisation, the exchange-rate policies ofthe United States determined many
states' policies, including their fiscal policies. An Indian minister of finance re-
marks on the practical implications ofthe restriction of states' fiscal capacities:
In a world, in which capital is internationally mobile, you cannot adopt rates of
taxation that are far from the rates that prevail in other countries and when la-
19bour is mobile you also can't be out of line with others' wages.
17 Friedman 2000, p. 105
18 Friedman 2000, p. 106.
19 Friedman 2000, p. 108.
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The Golden Strait-Jacket also functions as a 'partial-protection' to a new interna-
tional power that is threatening the states and nations: the Electronic Herd.20
According to Friedman, the Electronic Herd consists of all the stock, bond and
currency traders sitting behind computer screens all over the globe, moving their
money around from mutual funds to pension funds to emerging market funds, or
trading on the Internet from their basements. And it also consists of big multina-
tional corporations who spread their factories around the world, constantly shift-
ing them to the most efficient low cost producers:
This herd has grown exceptionally thanks to the democratizations of finance,
technology and information - so much so that today it is beginning to replace
governments as the primary source of capital for both companies and coun-
tries to grow.
21
Governments' policies will aim not to offend the herd, because if it gets into a
panic-stricken stampede, it will leave a country's economy in ruins. Actually, it
seems that there is no government, let alone a global government, that can con-
trol the herd that comes with the global strait-jacket. It leaves the student of state-
based International Law with a big problem though. If individual states and their
international institutions are not in control ofthe herd, then how can one protect
human beings and their communities?
Friedman argues that, instead ofthe state system, the new era of globalisation en-
tails a world of networks, in which individuals, communities, consumers, activist
groups and governments all have the powers to shape human value chains.22 A
big challenge when studying International Economic Relations today is that what
is new - the pressures, incentives and complexities of the globalisation system -
is interacting with what is old - which is the nation-state based system of Interna-
tional Law.23
In conclusion, Friedman's arguments seem to suggest that it is not that the state
is unwilling as much as unable to regulate the global free market. Its only means
of survival seem to be adapting to the global free market, and synchronising its
policies with the rest ofthe world in order to accommodate the economic powers
of the electronic herd. The original powers of states that enabled the protection of
human value chains, individuals, and communities, have now been dispersed
among many non-state actors. Protecting individuals and their communities calls
for new networking governance strategies, the outcome and success ofwhich are
quite uncertain.
20 Friedman 2000, p. 109
21 Friedman 2000, p. 109.
22 Friedman 2000, p. 206. Compare also to the trilogy by M. Castells ,The Information Age:
Economy, Society and Culture (beginning with the 2· revised edition of june 2000)
23 Compare Friedman 2000, p. 271. See also Cassese 2005. P· 21.
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3.2.3    Legrain: A Reappraisal ofthe Role ofthe State
In "Open World:/The Truth about Globalisation", Legrain argues that, despite the
rhetoric of academics and politicians, there is no empirical evidence to back up
the claim that the state is losing its control to deal with gaps in the economic
realm of International Relations,4 According to Legrain Globalisation is primarily a
political choice.
Whereas governments, by creating nation-states divided people geographically,
globalisation is bringing people together again. Secondly, globalisation benefits
both the rich and poor countries. Thirdly, globalisation is much better than what
came before.25
With regard to the position of the state, Legrain is not convinced that the rise of
the global free market has made the state powerless, or has constrained state
policies to a large extent. His argument is that multinationals, people, and money
are more or less tied to the political and institutional structures of their home
economies, so governments can still influence them. Legrain gives four examples,
with regard to trade barriers, capital markets, the labour market and the role of
government, to make his point.
Firstly, many trade barriers remain in agriculture and services, making up two-
thirds ofthe global economy. Furthermore, new barriers keep cropping up, even
in cyberspace, like the EU data-privacy directive. And even if all barriers were to be
removed, different accounting rules, legal systems, languages and cultures would
segment the markets. 26
Secondly, capital markets are not genuinely global either. For instance, foreign
ownership of US stock in 2001 amounted to $1.5 trillion in shares out of a total
stock market value of $i3.6 trillion.27
Thirdly, due to all kind of migration laws and restrictions, the labour market, on a
global scale, is not free either. The role of government is not diminishing. The av-
erage taxes, affecting also the labour market, in OECD countries rose from 32.1%
in 1980 to 37·3% in 1999.28
Finally, multinationals are physically rooted in places; they need an infrastructure
of roads, telecommunication services, skills-teaching, and a supplier network.29
Without them multinationals cannot function, and organising them falls mainly
within the domain ofthe nation-state.
24 International financial markets do make life difficult for the governance of many
developing countries, but rich countries have enough scope to borrow money if
they want to. Legrain 2002, p. 164.
25 Legrain 2002, p. 322.
26 Legrain 2002, p. 156-157
27 Legrain 2002, p. 157
28 Legrain 2002, p. 161.
29   Legrain 2002, p. 159, Compare: Sassen 1999
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So where does the rhetoric that the state is loosing control over the global free
market come from? Legrain thinks that part of it rises from a genuine misunder-
standing of globalisation processes, and part of it seems to stem from political
opportunism:
The belief that globalisation limits governments' options is so persuasive that
many politicians have doubtless come to believe it. But there is a large element
of deception. When politicians tell you that 'in a global economy' this or that
policy has to change, take it with a bowl of salt. Like the EU or the WTO, global-
isation is a helpful scapegoat for changes that are politically controversial.
'Whatever you do, blame globalisation' is the maxim of modern government.'°
Contrary to the expectations of Schwartz and Friedman, Legrain expects that calls
for state policies to respond to gaps in international economic relations may be
growing. The reason being that when societies are exposed to 'the vagaries of
global economic forces, they may be keener on social spending to insure against
increased risk: 3, Legrain strongly believes that the traditional model of govern-
ance has many advantages over all other forms of global governance:
The lines of responsibility are clear: governments set the rules of the game,
companies the aim to make profits subject to those constraints. This is not
only democratic, it is also fair: laws are transparent, apply equally to all compa-
nies, and are impartially enforced by the courts. And it is flexible: laws can vary
according to local conditions and preferences. The best way to help workers
and the environment is generally through national laws drafted on the basis of
democratic participation and consultation. Governments are more than capa-
ble, either individually or collectively, of achieving social aims through legisla-
tion. 32
Whereas Schwartz and Friedman argued that the acceptance of the global free
market was inevitable for states to operate and survive in the global political
economy sphere of International Economic Relations, Legrain argues that it is
not, and that to argue otherwise is an intentional political act:
Once you take the crucial step and accept that we can still shape our destiny,
globalisation's opportunities are all the more apparent, its threats suddenly
seem less menacing. The future of our open world is in our hands. We are free
to make the best of it - or waste it.11
In conclusion, in Legrain's 'Open World', the state capacity to regulate interna-
tional political and economic relations depends on the political will of politicians,
and less on the (perceived) limitations of the global free market. The limitations
on state capacities to regulate the global free market are therefore based either on
a misunderstanding of globalisation processes or on political opportunism.
30   Legrain 2002, p. 172.
31 Legrain 2002, p. 171
32
Legrain 2002, p. 209-210.
33 Legrain 2002 . P. 334·
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3.2.4 Analysis
How might the emerging global free-market change the position and capacities of
the state to regulate international political, economic and cultural relations? The
review of three important works that touch upon that question reveals a range of
opinions. On the hand there is the idea that while states may have actively striven
for the spread of the global free market, they are no longer in control of the con-
sequences (Schwartz) or they are controlled by the consequences (Friedman). On
the other hand, there is the opinion, that the global free market has not really
challenged the state's position and capacities and that the perception that some-
thing has changed is either based on a misunderstanding of globalisation proc-
esses or on political opportunism.
If Schwartz and Friedman are right, we should find states that are very docile to
the demands of the global markets and (at least politically) no longer capable of
providing adequate regulation of international political, economic and cultural re-
lations. Interestingly, all three authors seem to agree that in this debate we should
expect a hefty dose of political opportunism in states' responses to requests for
the regulation of international, political, economic, and cultural relations.
In fact, what we are seeing according to Sassen is the repositioning of the state in
a broader field of power and a reconfiguration of the work of states in the regula-
tion ofthe political economy:
Whereas the state has historically had the capacity to encase its territory
through administrative and legal instruments it also has the capacity to change
that encasement - for instance, deregulate its borders and open up to foreign
firms and investment.34
In another study, Sassen made the point that when studying these developments
in International Economic Relations it is important to realise that the global and
the national are not mutually exclusive:
...we are [not] seeing the end of states, but, rather, that states are not the only
or the most strategic agents in the new configuration. ...states, including
dominant states, have undergone profound transformations as they become
the institutional home for the operations that are central to globalization. [The
question is] whether such change will weaken or alter the organizational archi-
tecture for the implementation of International Law insofar as the latter de-
pends on the institutional apparatus of national states.8
However, the global free market is not the only cause of shifts in the regulation of
International Relations.  Much of the rapid expanse of the global free market de-
pended on the availability and capacities of new information technologies.
34 Sassen 2006. p. 416
35 Sassen 2000, p. 111.
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3.3     Globalisation as an Information and Communications Revolution
This section will explore the changing demands in the regulation of International
Relations caused by the Information and Communications revolution. A discus-
36sion of studies by Sassen en Tehranian illustrates how these technologies have
enhanced the capacities of non-state actors to influence both the internal capaci-
ties of the state with regard to the protection of its own citizens, and the external
rules of International Relations.
3.3.1 Sassen: Sovereignty and the Digital Challenge to the State
Sassen has become well known for her work investigating the new geography of
power shaped by economic globalisation.37 In her work she recognises three cru-
cial elements of this new geography. Firstly, there is the territoriality of globalisa-
tion processes: globalisation can only function through specific institutions and
processes which are based somewhere. The second element consists of the
emerging new legal frameworks enabling and regulating cross-boundary eco-
nomic transactions. The third element, and the one that is of most interest in this
section on the impact of the ICT-revolution on the state's capacities, is the in-
creasing number of economic transactions that are taking place in the digital
space.18 In this section the implications ofthe digitalisation oftrade with regard to
the position and capacities of the state will be explored.
The digitalisation of an increasing number of economic transactions are a major
challenge, not only to the public-sector, but also to the private sector. Governance
problems are not occurring as a result of the extension of the economy beyond
national borders, but are the result of the digitalisation of financial transactions.
The digitalisation has not only increased the speed of the transactions, but also
the sheer size of the transactions. Sassen points to the international money-
market which, in the mid 19905, traded a billion dollars a day, an amount that no
central bank could ever influence through exchange-rate policies.39
General characteristic of the Internet are that it power has become decentralised,
open, has unlimited possibilities for expansion, no hierarchy, no centre, and no
specific conditions that could benefit an authoritarian or monopolistic "coup de
atat". Yet, at the same time, the Internet enables new sorts of power, or alterna-
tive power, through processes called 'cybernatic' segmentation. This process
started through the commercialisation of Internet access. The commercialisation
of Internet access has led to calls and lobbying for more deregulation. The second
element of the segmentation process comes from organisations that commer-
cially sort, select and filter information (think ofGoogle here).40
36 Sassen 1999, see also Sassen 2006 and Tehranian 1999
37 Most recently with her study on territory, authority and rights: Sassen 2006.
38 Sassen 1999. p. 18. See also the trilogy of M. Castells.
39 Sassen 1999, p. 32
40 Sassen 1999, p. 153
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These characteristics have the following empirical effects. First, the increasing
digitalisation and globalisation of the economic sectors has given an extra im-
pulse to the concentration of resources, infrastructure and central functions. Sec-
ondly, the growing economic interests of the digital space promoted the creation
of global alliances and high concentrations of capital and corporate power.
Thirdly, these factors have, in turn, led to new forms of segmentation in digital
space.4, These resulted in recurring clashes between corporate governance and
civil society.42 This is becoming more problematic as national governments seem
less and less capable of responding to these clashes. The ongoing integration of
national communication networks into global networks, has taken regulatory
power and control away from the nation-state. Furthermore, state governments
are put under pressure by companies which claim that they do not want to be left
behind in the new digital rat-race, and ask for more deregulatory measures and
privatisation.43
The spread ofthe Internet has, for example, enabled civil society organisations to
engage with the politics of the global age. For instance, there is some sort of de-
mocratic forum where Friends ofthe Earth can debate with the US Christian Coa-
lition, or Shell. Yet there are also, there are more violent criminal applications
(black web), that can undermine the politics, economy and culture of a state.44
In conclusion, the digitalisation of economic transactions, the commercialisation
of internet access, the growing pressures from multinationals to privatise and de-
regulate, and the more or less benign applications of the world wide web, serve as
powerful reminders that the ICT revolution is not a neutral revolution, but is influ-
encing traditional structures of national and international governance. This digi-
talisation is specifically challenging the state's position and capacities in regulat-
ing international political, economic, and cultural relations. The world wide web is
not a neutral instrument, but an embedded one. Therefore it can reflect many
things, from a benign application for the common good, to evil applications un-
dermining state authorities and upsetting (global) societies.
3·3·2 Tehranian: Global Communication and World Politics
The study Global Communication and World Politics,45 specifically focussed on,
what Tehranian sees as the latest phase of development of International Rela-
tions, 'informatic imperialism'. Although using different methods of analysing
current developments, and more ideologically-coloured, Tehranian's work seems
to confirm some ofthe points made by Sassen.
According to Tehranian, Informatic Imperialism is imperialism supported by de-
veloped countries, characterised by control of knowledge industries and informa-
41   Sassen 1999, p. 161.
42 Sassen 1999. p. 162.
43   Sassen 1999, p. 162.
44  Sassen 1999. p. 165.
45  Tehranian 1999
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tion channels, including science, technology, patents, copyright, data, ideas, and
images.46 Informatic Imperialism, according to Tehranian is the next stage of de-
velopment in International Relations, after "ideological purism" partially and
gradually gave way to the world wide penetration of global capitalism. Like Sas-
sen, he implies that the global information and communications revolution is not
merely a technical phenomenon:
Although each technology brings forth its own bias to the social scene by ex-
tending this or that human power...it is the social mediations, constructions,
and applications oftechnologies that ultimately determine their social effects.47
In this process there is a growing divide between rich and poor states. Poor states
cannot afford cheap new technologies because patent rights are being held by
multinationals based in rich countries. Furthermore, these new technologies are
capital intensive, not labour intensive. Even if poor states invested in new tech-
nologies, this would not necessarily lead to an improvement of their economic
fate. Thus, while the rich are integrating through the Internet, the poorer parts of
the world are more and more marginalised.48
How might this global communications revolution alter the position and capacity
of the state in International Relations? According to Tehranian, the global com-
munications revolution is challenging the position and capacity of states, because
it is undermining traditional state boundaries and thereby their sovereignty. On
the one hand, the international mass media are violating national borders by
broadcasting foreign news, entertainment, educational and advertising programs.
On the other hand, the micromedia of global communications are narrowcasting
their messages through audio and videocassette records, fax machines, and
computer disks and networks, including the Internet. This process has also em-
powered hitherto forgotten groups and voices in the international community:
Global communication...has created new moral spaces for exploring new
communities of affinity rather than vicinity. It is thus challenging the tradi-
tional, top-down economic, political, and cultural systems.49
The global communications revolution is not only challenging the internal capaci-
ties ofthe state, it is also profoundly changing the rules of International Relations.
These changes have at least two dimensions. On the one hand, the changes facili-
tate transfers of science, technology, information, and ideas from the centres of
power to the peripheries. While, on the other hand, the changes are imposing a
new cultural hegemony through the "soft" powerso ofglobal news, entertainment
and advertising:
46 Tehranian 1999, p. 5
47 Tehranian 1999, P. 81.
48 See also the arguments offered by Todaro and Smith 2003
49 Tehranian 1999, P. 60.
50 In Tehranian's work. "hard" power refers to material forces such as military and economic
leverage, and "soft power" suggests forces such as ideological, cultural and moral appeals.
Tehranian 1999. p. 61.
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Globalizing the local and localizing the global are the twin forces blurring tradi-
tional boundaries.5,
Tehranian argues that the new information and communication technologies are
contributing to changes in economic infrastructures, competitiveness, and trade
relations, as well as internal and external policies of states. It also affects issues of
national security, the conduct of war, the development of weapons and intelli-
gence collection.9
In his study, Tehranian makes the point several times that one ofthe most impor-
tant consequences of increasing global communication has been a global rise of
cultural and political resistance against globalist hegemonies, mobilising the pe-
ripheries of a globalising world against the new centres of power.53
In conclusion, like Sassen, the work of Tehranian suggests that the impact of the
new information and communications technologies on the position and regula-
tory capacities of the state in International Relations is ambiguous to say the
least. On the one hand it seems to lessen the state's capacities because tradi-
tional boundaries and notions of sovereignty are undermined. On the other hand
it strengthens the rich states' capacities versus the poor states' capacities in In-
ternational Relations, because of the availability and price-tag of the new tech-
nologies.
3·3.3 Analysis
According to Sassen and Tehranian, the new information and communication
technologies have had a significant impact on the position and capacities of the
state in International Relations.
Sassen emphasises the digitalisation ofthe economy and the limited state capaci-
ties to regulate the outcomes of that process as one of the most important chal-
lenges to the state. At times the digitalisation of the global economy has put the
state under heavy economic pressure from corporate global alliances and re-
guests for more deregulatory measures and privatisation. Furthermore, ICT has
been commercialised and can be used for better or for worse, even against the
state.
Tehranian has been highly sensitive to the fact that the introduction of new in-
formation and communications technologies has not only consisted of a mere
technical improvement of what went on before. He argues that ICT is both chal-
lenging the internal capacities of the state and the external rules of International
Relations.
51   Tehranian 1999, p. 61.
52 Tehranian 1999, p. 61.
51   Tehranian 1999, p· 7. 61, 81, 82.
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An important outcome of the information and communications revolution has
been that digital networks have enabled novel types of political actors and the rise
of global civil society networks:
The rise of civil society is indeed one of the landmarks of our times. Global
governance is no longer the sole domain of Governments. The growing par-
ticipation and influence of non-State actors is enhancing democracy and re-
shaping multilateralism. Civil society organizations are also the prime movers
of some of the most innovative initiatives to deal with emerging global
threats.54
The role of civil society organisations and their growing capacities to influence In-
ternational Relations and International Law is not new.55 What is new, however, is
the sheer growth of the number of non-state actors participating in International
Relations (from 1500 in the mid 19505, to 25,000 in 2001),56 and the wide range of
issues in which these organisations are getting involved.57 The specific impact of
this development with regard to international economic relations will be dis-
cussed more specifically in the next section.
In conclusion, any assessment on how the information and communications
revolution has altered the regulatory capacities of states in International Relations
is ambiguous to say the least. However, the ICT revolution has significantly en-
hanced the participation of non-state actors in International Relations. Seeing this
development in combination with the ambiguities found in the previous section
on the impact of the rise of the global free market, gives rise to the question how
one should assess the impact of both developments with regard to the regulation
of International Relations today.
3.4 Initial Assessments ofChange and Continuity
In the next section, two important reports on the initial responses ofthe interna-
tional system to the challenges of the global free market and the ICT revolution
will be discussed. The first study consists of a report, at the request of the UN
Secretary General, by a panel of eminent persons on the topic of United Nations-
civil society relations, which became known, after its Chairman, as the Cardoso
report.58 The second study focuses specifically on the social dimensions of global-
isation, and offers a wider perspective on the globalisation and its effects on the
existing International Law-system and emerging networks of global governance.
This report was issued by the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalization under the title 'A fair globalization. Creating opportunities for all'.59
54  A/58/817, P. 3
55   See the early studies by Haas (1964), and more specifically on the impact of American
NGOs on US policies and world politics: Haas (1969)
56   ILO 2004· P 125
57 Josselin and Wallace (2001), O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams (2002).
58   A/58/817.
59      1 LO  2004
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The two reports are followed by a discussion of an argument on International Law
and globalisation made by Schiff Berman, who has tried, based on recent devel-
opments as discussed in the Cardoso report and the report by the World Com-
mission, to sketch the contours ofwhat it might mean to emphasise law, instead
of International Law, and globalisation.60
3.4·1 The Cardoso Report: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global
Governance
The report by the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Rela-
tions, (henceforth the Cardoso report), starts by observing that politically active
citizens today are more inclined to express their concerns through civil society or-
ganisations than through the traditional instruments of democracy, especially
when it comes to issues with an international or global dimension. These civil so-
ciety organisations have managed to create global networks of well-informed ac-
tivists, parliamentarians, journalists, social movement leaders and others, which
give voice to a new phenomenon: global public opinion, shaping the international
political agenda and generating a cosmopolitan set of norms and citizen de-
mands that transcend national boundaries. 61
Growing civil society involvement and emerging global public opinion have not
diminished the relevance of the international state-based processes. Nor has it
lessened the authority ofgovernments within the state:
While civil society can help to put issues on the global agenda, only Govern-
ments have the power to decide on them. But it is true that many prominent
issues of our time have been advanced and shaped by civil society, propelled
by the power of public opinion. Consider gender relations, child soldiers, debt
reliefand landmines. 62
The Cardoso report presents the growing power of civil society as an enhance-
ment of the existing international system, and not a zero-sum game between
states and NGOs:
Governments alone cannot resolve today's global challenges. Effective strate-
gies must draw on the power of public opinion, the creativity and persuasive-
ness of civil society, the resources and skills of the private sector and the ca-
pacities of many other constituencies.63
The traditional intergovernmental process - with states negotiating a global
agreement that United Nations agencies and Member States then implement - is
being supplemented by a new approach in which likeminded parties come to-
gether in a joint initiative for action and policy analysis. The report identifies this
new approach as 'global policy networks', which refers to the work of Wolfgang
6°  Schiff Berman 2005
6,  A/58/817, P. 25
62  A/58/817, P· 26.
63  A/58/817. P· 28.
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Reinicke.64 Furthermore, it suggests the formation of global coalitions of con.
stituencies, which it calls networked governance, which could enhance the author-
ity and international stature ofthe actors involved in global policy making:
These global policy networks have significantly influenced policy, shaped public
opinion and helped to resolve disputes on such issues as crimes against hu-
manity, and involve Southern as well as Northern actors. They came together
mostly outside the formal organs of the United Nations, later entering the
United Nations fold once they had momentum.65
From the viewpoint ofthe United Nations system, the report gives two reasons to
motivate reaching out to and creating a larger role for civil society. Firstly, engag-
ing with civil society helps the United Nations to identify global priorities, thereby
becoming more responsive and accountable. Secondly, civil society organisations,
but also businesses and local governments, have first-hand information, experi-
ence and capacities to meet the challenges of the international community, from
local operations to global policy-making.66
The Cardoso report expects much from the multi-stakeholder policy networks. But
it warns the UN not to overstep its reach and influence. The UN should help to
ensure that all necessary parties are included, but it should not seek to own the
partnerships. Furthermore, the partnerships should be decentralised. They should
not be built upon a single central office, but on the relevant technical unities and
country offices. Central (UN) functions should be limited to guiding, monitoring,
assisting and ensuring activities. 67
The report concludes by advocating a paradigm shift in the United Nation system
whereby the UN should explicitly convene and foster multi-stakeholder partner-
ships and global policy networks reaching to constituencies beyond Member
States. The traditions of the formal intergovernmental UN process might offer
some barriers to that objective. But partnerships and policy networks are expected
to have stronger results orientation and providing a surer connection between the
organisation's local actions and its global values. 68
3.4.2   The ILO World Commission: Creating Opportunities for All?
The ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (hence-
forth 'the Commission'), starts by making the observation that global markets
have grown rapidly without the creation of parallel institutions necessary for their
equitable functioning. Furthermore, there has been a failure in current interna-
tional policies to respond adequately to globalisation's challenges, as market
opening measures and financial and economic considerations have triumphed
64 Reinicke 1998.
65  A/58/817, P. 33
66  A/58/817, P·27
67  A/58/817, P· 39
68  A/58/817. P· 72
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over social considerations.69 The responsibility for the urgently needed rules and
policies lies with powerful states and powerful 'players:70
Those powerful states and powerful players operate in a system of global govern-
ance. According to the Commission, global governance is not a lofty, disembod-
ied sphere away from International Relations. Global governance:
...is merely the apex of a web of governance that stretches from the local level
upwards. The behaviour of States as global actors is the essential determinant
of the quality of governance...At the same time, how they manage their internal
affairs influences the extent to which people benefit from globalization and are
protected from its negative effects.71
Subsequently, the Commission argues for an ethical network to underpin global
governance. This is seriously needed, as the Commission believes that globalisa-
tion has developed in an ethical vacuum where market success and failure have
tended to become 'the ultimate standard of behaviour' and have weakened the
fabric of communities and societies.72 The actors in this process - states, civil so-
ciety, business, trade unions, international organisations and individuals - must
be inspired by a common universal ethical standard in order to accept their own
responsibilities, and be publicly accountable for respecting them in all their trans-
actions.71
Having said that, the report then discusses the transition of the post-war (Second
World War), order based on the international community of nations, represented
by nation-states as their prime actors (although some others were represented in
the ILO). This post-war system has evolved into something far more complex to-
day:
Today, the myriad of actors, both state and non-state, play critically important
roles in shaping the evolution of globalization. In addition to the organizations
ofthe United Nations system, they include parliamentarians and local authori-
ties, multinational corporations, trade unions, business groups, cooperatives,
religious groups, academia, economic and social councils, foundations and
charities, community-based organizations and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and the media. Global networks bring together diverse groups
such as youth and consumer associations, farmers, scientists, teachers, law-
yers and physicians, women and indigenous peoples.74
The Commission highlights the continuing importance of the role of the State in
managing the process of integration in the global economy while protecting clas-
69   ILO 2004• P' Xi.
70   ILO 2004· P' xi.
7'    ILO 2004• P xi.
72   ILO 2004, P' 7
71   ILO 2004, P 8.9
74   ILO 2004, P· 9
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sical public goods.75 But, at the same time, the Commission strongly argues for
more decentralisation of state functions, as the decentralised level seems to be
more likely to act more effectively, has better knowledge of real situations and
constraints, and is closer to the needs and demands of people.76 This localisation
does not mean isolation, as it might create more opportunities for national and
cross-border networking, cooperation and exchange among local authorities.77
Beyond the state level of global governance, the Commission is highly critical of
the developments at the international level. The international response of both
state and non-state actors has been haphazard:
What has emerged to date is a fragmented and incoherent system consisting
of a patchwork of overlapping networks and agencies in the economic, social
and environmental fields. There is a wide range of diverse arrangements, in-
cluding laws, norms, informal arrangements and private self-regulation. In
some cases, private actors have created important de facto standards that gov-
ernments and markets cannot afford to ignore.78
The Commission illustrates this by referring to the harmonisation of accounting
standards and efforts by multinationals that focus on corporate social responsibil-
ity, partially in response to much-publicised NGO activism on these issues.79
Example international Accountancy Standards
US accountancy standards have become de facto International accountancy
standards American laws require of every multinational registered atthe Wall
Street Stock Erchange to comply specifically to American law  In this case any
foreign company wanting to register their stoct at Wall Street, will also have to
organise Its finances according to American standards The Dutch supermar-
lets multinational AHOLD found this out the hard way
In 2003, this multinational faced an accounting scandal Two legal investiga-
tions were started_ The first one was undertaten by the Dutch authorities con-
cerning any breaches In Dutch company law The second mvestigation was
undertaken by the American Securities and Et,change Commission (SECI  At
the same time two lawsuits were filed in the United States by law firms spe-
cialising in clawing back ,nvestor money after accounting scandals Within a
month the Dutch organisation had been served US subpoenas for company
documents A Dutch and an American law suit followed
Isource  BBC NEWS atbbc cout/newst
75   ILO 2004• P' 57
76   ILO 2004, P 68
77   1 LO 2004, P. 68.
78   ILO 2004. P. 76.
79   ILO 2004, P· 77·
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Furthermore, the state rules and policies that have been adopted to counter the
negative effects of globalisation  have been prejudicial to the interests of most de-
veloping countries.80 In some cases, policy guidelines have become defacto rules:
In strict logic, policy guidelines are distinct from formal rules that govern the
functioning of the international financial system. But this distinction is often
unclear in practice. For example, the policy guidelines of the International Fi-
nancial Institutions on issues such as capital account liberalization often oper-
ate as de facto rules for developing countries. This is because of the strong in-
fluence these institutions have over the policy choices of developing
countries. 8i
In conclusion, the Commission notices that, although globalisation has reduced
the power and autonomy of states in various ways, powerful states continue to
exercise important influence on global governance through their policies and be-
haviour and their decisions in intergovernmental agencies.82 But global govern-
ance has become too complicated to be managed by states alone. Amongst other
things, the Commission advocates a deeper involvement of the private sector in
international public policy, offering the greater potential of additional finance for
global programmes and expertise and access to business networks.81 Further-
more, the Commission does not expect that the current tensions in the interac-
tion between civil society, governments and multilateral organisations will go
away.84 Finally, like the Cardoso report above, the Commission ends by discuss-
ing the advantages of networked governance, which are multi-sectoral and take
many forms and may carry out a number of functions, such as setting interna-
tional practice, disseminating information or mobilising resources. 85
3.4.3 Schiff Berman: From International Law to Law and Globalisation
How can International Lawyers make sense of the developments described  in
both the Cardoso report and the report by the ILO Commission? Legal scholar
Schiff Berman argues that in order to understand the cross-border development
of legal norms, a move is needed beyond the limiting framework of International
Law. This framework was built upon two guiding principles. First, law was
deemed to reside only in the acts of official, state-sanctioned entities. Second, law
was seen as an exclusive function of state sovereignty.86 More recently, scholars
have started to recognise the myriad ways in which the prerogatives of nation-
states are being carried out by transnational and international actors. Although
this approach, called the 'transnational legal process', helped scholars to under-
stand the ways in which nation-states come to internalise international or trans-
80   ILO 2004· P 788,   ILO 2004, p. 90
82 ILO 2004·P' 119
81   1 LO 2004, P. 123·
84 i.e. The complex issue of reconciling participatory democracy with representative democ-
racy. ILO 2004, P. 126.
85   ILO 2004• P· 127
86 Schiff Berman 2005, P· 487
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national norms over time, it still seemed insufficient to describe the complexities
of law in the context of accelerating globalisation:7 Schiff Bernman wants to take
the interdisciplinary study of International Law one step further:
..scholars are coming to recognize that International Law itself needs an ex-
panded focus, one that situates cross-border norm development at the inter-
section of legal scholarship on conflict of laws, civil procedure, cyberlaw, com-
parative law, and the cultural analysis of law, as well as traditional International
Law.88
This new approach does not render traditional law irrelevant but does complicate
the picture significantly. Schiff Berman has set out to enlarge the focus of Interna-
tional Law in four different, but overlapping, dimensions. Firstly, he proposes to
study law beyond governmental institutions. The second proposal is to study law
beyond territorial borders. The third proposal is to study law beyond the Public
Law/Private Law Distinction. And, finally, he proposes to study law beyond sover-
eignty. In many ways, his proposals mirror those made by Sassen.89
All four proposals help us to realise that the emerging picture of the interaction
between developing arrangements for regulating International Economic Rela-
tions and the traditional body of International Law will be diverse, fragmented,
and very complicated.
Schiff Berman urges the debate about the changing nature of sovereignty in the
context of globalisation to move beyond the 'polarising question' of whether the
Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states is dying or not. The central prem-
ises of sovereignty - the internal capacity to supreme decision-making and having
supreme enforcement authority with regard to a particular territory and popula-
tion, and the external capacity, the independent position of the state in external
relations - need to be reconsidered according to Schiff Berman:
.an emphasis on legal consciousness, pluralism and law beyond official gov-
ernmental institutions exposes processes of normative development that are
not beholden to the edicts of nation-states. Likewise, the permeability of bor-
ders and the fluidity of community affiliations challenge ideas of inviolate na-
tion-state sovereignty. And the erosion of the distinction between public and
private International Law undermines the privileged place of the nation-states
as the only players in the public international arena.9°
While nation-states may not disappear, their sovereignty may well become dif-
fused in order to accommodate various international, transnational, or non-
territorial norms.9' However, the rubric sovereignty itself might be an obstacle.
The roots ofthe idea of sovereignty lie in the use of coercive power, writes Schiff
87 Schiff Berman 2005, P 488-z189.
88
Schiff Berman 2005. P· 489
89 Sassen 2006.
90 Schiff Berman 2005, P· 5249' Schiff Berman 2005, P· 527.
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Berman. Yet, the changing structures of norm development and inter-penetration
do not always rely on coercive power:
Rather, we see various forms of rhetorical persuasion, informal articulations of
legal norms, and networks of affiliation, that may not possess literal enforce-
ment power. As a result, the study of law and globalization invokes not only the
diffusion of norms across territorial borders, but also the fact that legal articu-
lations often cross the supposed conceptual border between "official" law on
the one hand, and political rhetoric or non-official legal pronouncements on
the other. Holding onto a fixed dividing line between the two may prevent us
from seeing broader ways in which legal norms develop and spread.9
Schiff Berman argues that without a broader understanding of law which ac-
knowledges non-sovereign (and even non-governmental) articulations of norms,
we are apt to ignore such articulations altogether or deny them the status of law
and thereby miss the real force these norms have and the way in which they inter-
pret official legal doctrine.91
3·5 Analysis
We have seen in the previous sections how the expansion of the global free trade
system and the ICT revolution have led to changing and emerging regulatory
needs among actors in International Relations and the transformation of regula-
tory mechanism of International Relations.
In the previous chapter we have seen how International Law developed as the
primary tool for nation states to regulate International Relations. However, argu-
ments have been found that seriously question state capacities with regard to
regulate the increasing complexities of globalising International Economic Rela-
tions. Schwarz and Friedman argued that the global free market system has pre-
sented states with a policy 'straitjacket' that has made them very docile to the
logic ofthe free market. Ifthis were true, then the states' capacities to regulate In-
ternational Relations in response to changing and/or emerging regulatory needs
in International Relations have been seriously compromised. Legrain argued
against this idea of docile states. He held that the perception ofthe dominance of
the free market and docile nation-states depends more on political opportunism
then on reality. He has found no hard evidence that the free market has signifi-
cantly altered state capacities to regulate International Relations.
The digitalisation of economic transactions, the commercialisation of internet ac-
cess and growing pressures from multinationals to privatise and deregulate has
had a profound influence on traditional structures of national and international
governance. The global communications revolution has influenced both the in-
ternal and external capacities of the state to regulate. Externally, with regard to In-
ternational Relations, national borders have become more transparent or seem
92 Schiff Berman 2005, P· 529.
93 Schiff Berman 2005, P· 556.
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almost non-existent (with the exception of China and North Korea) with regard to
the transfer of science, technology, information and ideas. On the other hand a
new, soft power, has developed which is based on global news, entertainment,
advertising and consumer behaviour. Furthermore, this revolution has enabled
the rise of cultural and political peripheries against new centres of political and
economic power. These cultural peripheries might influence through relatively
peaceful anti-globalist and conscious consumer movements or violently through
global terrorist networks.
However, whatever the viewpoint one takes with regard to the influence of the
global free market and the ICT revolution on states' international regulatory ca-
pacities through International Law, the fact is that some new arrangements for
regulating International Relations have emerged.
These new arrangements often begin life outside the existing formal organs of In-
ternational Law. They consist of global coalitions of concerned constituencies
(e.g. civil society organisations, multinationals, local governments). Or they con-
sist ofone type of actor, such as financial institutions. Within these new arrange-
ments, regulatory solutions are being created that may or may not enter into the
interaction with formal institutions of International Law. Furthermore, it seems
possible that economically powerful state-actors can practically enforce their in-
ternal rules to become globally accepted standards.
In conclusion, we have seen how in the past International Law was flexible
enough to cope with most emerging regulatory challenges in International Eco-
nomic Relations. Apparently we are now seeing something different. Next to exist-
ing International Law mechanisms, new arrangements are being created that try
to regulate International Economic Relations. These new arrangements are not
necessarily derived from existing International Law mechanisms, nor do they al-
ways seek recognition or cooperation with exiting international legal frameworks.
The picture seems to be far more complicated. Therefore, this study specifically
focuses on the complicated interactions between new arrangements for regulat-
ing International Relations and the traditional body of International Law. In order
to explore those interactions, we will revisit the dimensions of interaction between
International Law and International Economic Relations that could help us to ob-
serve change and continuity. How have these dimensions been affected by eco-
nomic globalisation, and can they still provide the necessary building blocks for
an empirical framework for conducting case-studiesP
3.6 Five Relevant Dimensions Revisited
Chapter two reflected briefly on five relevant dimensions of International Law that
helped to observe change and continuity in the interaction between International
Relations and International Law. In view ofthe preceding discussion of economic
globalisation, the question rises as to how helpful these five dimensions are for
understanding change and continuity in the interactions between emerging ar-
rangements for regulating International Relations and the existing traditional
body of International Law? Can these dimensions help us to develop a more ex-
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tensive understanding of state and non-state actions with regard to regulating In-
ternational Relations? Do the five dimensions offer an insight in the effectiveness
and legitimacy of emerging regulating networks and their interaction with the tra-
ditional body of International Law?
This section will revisit the five dimensions identified in chapter 2 and assess
them in view of the rise of the global free market and the information and com-
munications revolution. In the next chapter, these dimensions will be used to cre-
ate a framework for analysis.
3.6.1 First Dimension: Position
The first important dimension that enables us to observe change and continuity
in the interaction between International Law and International Economic Rela-
tions concerned the specific position which actors occupy in International Rela-
tions. What is their rank, status, the specific place they occupy on the stage of In-
ternational Relations? Is an actor a key actor or merely a marginal one?
In the previous chapter we have seen how the nation-state slowly became the key
actor in International Relations and in International Law. In this chapter recent
developments in the political economy were discussed and their likely impact on
state and non-state actors in International Relations. We will now try to discern
what the specific impact of economic globalisation has been with regard to the
first dimension: how has economic globalisation affected our understanding of
'position' in International Law and International Relations?
Firstly, we have seen a significant growth in the number of non-state actors, both
non-governmental organisations and multinationals, that operate across national
borders. The non-state actors have created new international networks and inter-
actions which cut across the multiple political geographies of existing state sover-
eignty and International Law.94 They occupy new positions in International Eco-
nomic Relations that did not exist before.
Secondly, despite this growth in the number of positions available in International
Economic Relations, the role and key position ofthe state should not be underes-
timated.  Even  in the context of the aggressive effects of global capitalism on the
political capacities ofthe state, it retains large capacities to influence public opin-
ion and international policies.95 It seems that the nation-state has drawn on the
institutional adaptation reserves of modern democracy, has developed new pol-
icy-instruments and has intelligently used international cooperation pressures to
innovate national policies and politics. 96
Traditionally, the key position ofthe nation-state in International Economic Rela-
tions and in International Law has been defined in terms of sovereignty. In view of
94 Compare Reinicke 1998: p. 7· See also the Cardoso Report A/58/817
95 Grande 2004· P· 389
96   Grande 2004, P 389-390.
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the growth in both number and activities of non-state actors in International Eco-
nomic Relations and (to a lesser extent) in International Law, Chayes and Chayes
have argued that a more adequate way of understanding sovereignty would be to
define in it in terms of 'status of an actor' in International Economic Relations:
The new sovereignty is status, membership, connection to the rest ofthe world
and the political ability to be an actor within it.97
In conclusion, the first dimension, on the position of actors will focus on the
status, membership and connection to a specific international arena. The defini-
tion by Chayes and Chayes also included the notion that an actor has not only to
have a certain status, but also the political ability to be an actor. This brings us to
the second dimension for observation: capacity.
3.6.2 Second Dimension: the Capacity to Act
Whereas the first dimension focussed on the position of actors, the second di-
mension will focus on the capacities of actors. Reading through some of the de-
bates it seemed that, in the confrontation between the territorial limitations of the
state (Begrenzung) on the one hand and the phenomenon of growing transna-
tional (Entgrenzung) social relations on the other hand, the capacities of nation-
state were seriously compromised, whereas multinationals and non-
governmental organisations seemed to have gained more capacities in the proc-
ess. 98 But is that correct?
Nation-states have been instrumental in the creation of the global free market.
The main question seems to be whether nation-states are, individually or collec-
tively, in control ofthe continuing growth ofthe global free market and its effects.
The control of the process and its effects seems to depend on the relative eco-
nomic strength of states: stronger states tend to be able to exercise better control
than economically weak ones. It furthermore depends on the willingness of politi-
cal leaders to address the issues intelligently. However, especially political oppor-
tunism plays here an important role. Overall, it seems that the economic institu-
tions set up by (richer) states, seem to favour all those who adopt the 'golden
straitjacket' of economic policies favouring the global free market. In this respect,
the capacities of many states to 'sovereignly' decide over the internal regulation of
their economies and the regulation of their foreign economic policies has been
extensively compromised by the spread of the global free market. Their position
and capacities depend on the economic success of their policies with regard to
the spread ofthe global free market.
Likewise, the information and communications revolution seems to have com-
promised the nation-state's position and capacities in International Economic Re-
lations. Given the sheer complexity of the issue, the state's capacities to regulate
the digitalised part of the global economy are very limited. This has placed corpo-
97 Chayes and Chayes quoted in Slaughter 2005, P· 267.
98  Grande 2004.
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rations in a stronger position vis-8-vis states, which results in strong economic
pressure on their behalf for more deregulatory measures and privatisation.  Fur-
thermore, the new technologies have caused a growing division between the ca-
pacities of rich and poor states. But perhaps the most important challenge to the
capacities of sovereign nation-states comes from two other developments. First,
the international mass media are capable of violating national borders by broad-
casting foreign news, entertainment, educational and advertising programs. Sec-
ondly, the micro-media of global communications are able to empower hitherto
forgotten groups and voices in the international community. Thus the informa-
tion and communications revolution has led to an empowerment of multination-
als and other non-state actors in International Relations.
In conclusion, the growth of the capacities of non-state actors has not necessarily
led to diminishing capacities of nation-states. Non-state involvement has led to
new roles in International Economic Relations. Multinationals and NGOs may
operate as agenda-setting 'norm-entrepreneurs' in International Economic Rela-
tions. Civil society organisations are often the first to identify international prob-
lems (or problems within national economies) that are not raised or resolved by
existing international agreements or through local governmental action. And they
can play a role too in the construction of international values and norms that
guide future international and national economic policies and practices.99 There-
fore, the second dimension will focus on the capacity of state and non-state ac-
tors to act upon perceived or changing regulatory needs in International Eco-
nomic Relations.
3.6.3 Third Dimension: the Accessibility of Political Arenas
Where are the debates over international regulation actually taking placeP Who
can enter these debates? Who controls the debates? Where are decisions being
made?
In International Law there are formal arenas, such as the United Nations, the ILO
or the World Trade Organisation, where debates over international regulation take
place. At the same time there are the informal arenas in the global public media,
or direct meetings between NGO representatives and representatives of states or
multinationals.
Some of these arenas have very strict and formalised rules of entry and participa-
tion for actors. For instance, the United Nations has a very detailed policy on de-
termining which NGOs might be permitted to work with the organisation or at-
tend official UN conferences.'°° These rules potentially could exclude legitimate
stakeholders which, given their own specific nature, do not fall within the defini-
tions of the UN and are therefore excluded from participation. Other political are-
nas may, initially, have no formal rules of entry and participation. These rules
might come into being later, or not at all.
99 See Brown, Khagram, Moore, and Frumkin in: Nye and Donahue 2000, p. 283.284
100 See chapter 5.
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The dimension of accessibility will be a very useful lens for observing change and
continuity in the regulatory patterns (both in International Law and in the emerg-
ing new arrangements) of International Economic Relations.
3.6.4 Fourth Dimension: the Legitimacy ofthe Regulatory Solution
What makes state and non-state actors obey an international regulatory solution?
According to Shaw, the acceptance of International Law may depend on the idea
of legitimacy. He introduces four specific properties of legitimacy: determinacy
(or readily ascertainable normative content or 'transparency'); symbolic validation
(authority approval); coherence (or consistency or general application) and ad-
herence (or falling within am organised hierarchy of rules). 101
Likewise, the question of legitimacy could be expanded to all international regula-
tory solutions, traditional International Law and emerging regulatory frameworks
alike. It seems that the legitimacy depends partially on the meaningful participa-
tion of the stakeholders involved.  Have all voices been heard, was everyone able
to plead their case, or to negotiate a fair deal? International Law and emerging
regulatory networks are more than simple sets of rules.
In conclusion, expanding an argument made by Shaw, we could say that Interna-
tional Law and emerging regulatory networks are cultures in the broadest sense in
that they constitute methods of communicating claims, counter-claims, expecta-
tions and anticipations as well as providing frameworks for assessing and priori-
tising such demands:02 Therefore, an important element to focus on when de-
termining the interaction between traditional International Law and emerging
regulatory mechanisms in International Economic Relations is precisely the issue
of legitimacy. Are emerging regulatory issues considered legitimate because they
are based on traditional International Law, or because they are based on mean-
ingful stakeholder involvement, or a combination of both?
3.6.5 Fifth Dimension: the Effectiveness ofthe Regulatory Solution
International Law and emerging regulatory frameworks function in particular,
concrete situations, involving a range of actors from states to international or-
ganisations, multinationals and individuals. Therefore, Shaw has argued, it needs
to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of such participants. Some have
called this 'outcome' legitimacy, others prefer the use of 'effectiveness' of the
regulatory solution.'°3
Effectiveness also invokes notions of accountability because someone has to
'evaluate' whether the regulatory solution is delivering the results aimed for by the
participants during its creation. Does the regulatory solution solve the problem,
m'  Shaw 2005, P· 60
102
Shaw 2005. P. 63
'03  See also: Van Bijsterveld 2002, p 302-304·
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are the participants happy with the results? And if not, which actor(s) can be held
responsible?
3.7 Conclusion
The transformative processes in the global political economy have led to a differ-
entiated and disaggregated picture ofthe interactions between International Law
and International Economic Relations. Two major forces in these processes have
been the growth of the global free market and a revolution in information and
communications technologies.
In this dynamic context we have seen how new policy networks have emerged
'alongside' existing state-networks in International Economic Relations. They ei-
ther consist of global coalitions of concerned constituencies (e.g. civil society or-
ganisations, multinationals, local governments). Or they consist of one type of ac-
tors such as financial institutions.
Within these new policy networks, occasionally alternative regulatory arrange-
ments have been developed. These new regulatory arrangements are not neces-
sarily being derived from existing International Law mechanisms, nor do they al-
ways seek recognition or cooperation with exiting international legal frameworks.
However, it is not very clear how these new arrangements that try to regulate In-
ternational Economic Relations interact with the traditional body of International
Law. Therefore, more empirical research is needed on change and continuity in
the regulation of International Economic Relations through International Law or
through other regulatory arrangements.
In chapter 2 we developed a tool to observe change and continuity in the interac-
tion between International Law and International Economic Relations: position,
capacity, accessibility, legitimacy and effectiveness. At the end of this chapter we
revisited the five dimensions of our 'graded lens' to determine how these might
be affected by the changes in the global political economy. In the next chapter, we
will determine how these five dimensions can become the building blocks for an
empirical framework to conduct case-studies. The data from these case.studies
might be able to offer us more of an insight into the kind of interaction(s) that ex-
ist between new arrangements for regulating International Economic Relations
and the traditional body of International Law.
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4.     Preparing the Empirical Research
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters provided an introduction to the historical development
of International Law and to current developments in the regulation of Interna-
tional Relations. This introduction offered some initial ideas about these new de-
velopments, which do not seem to belong automatically to the realm of Interna-
tional Law. The nature of the interaction between these new arrangements for
regulating International Relations and traditional International Law is complex
and only partially legible. We therefore need to find critical ways for interpreting
the growing complexity of international regulation and the often fuzzy relation-
ships that exist between emerging arrangements for regulating International Rela-
tions and the traditional body of International Law.
At the end of both chapters, five dimensions for observing change and continuity
in the interactions between International Law and International Relations were
discussed: position, capacity, accessibility, legitimacy and effectiveness. In chap-
ter 2, these dimensions remained closely related to the traditional body of Inter-
national Law. In chapter three, they were broadened to include some of the new
realities of International Relations in the context of socio-economic globalisation.
In this chapter we will address the third sub-question introduced in chapter i:
"How can dimensions to observe change and continuity in the nature of the in-
teraction between International Law and International Relations be used (opera-
tionalised) in order to create a framework for empirical analysis of change and
continuity in emerging arrangements regulating International Relations?" In other
words, we have to translate the abstract and sometimes vague notions of posi-
tion, capacity, accessibility, legitimacy and effectiveness into more specific and
concrete, and ultimately observable and therefore measurable, criteria for the in-
terpretation ofemerging arrangements regulating International Relations.
After the operationalisation of the five dimensions in the first part of this chapter,
the second part will pay attention to the research design and protocol that was
followed while conducting the empirical case studies. The third part of this chap-
ter will provide a brief introduction to each of the three cases.
4.2 Operationalisation ofthe Key Dimensions ofthe Empirical Framework
Knowledge about the multiple dynamics shaping actual regulatory transforma-
tions in International Relations helps us to understand the complex architectures
of policy-making and regulation in International Socio-Economic Relations and
the interaction with the traditional body of International Law. In order to decipher
these dynamics that have produced the highly complex structures, we need some
specific and concrete criteria to measure change and continuity in the regulation
of International Relations. In the previous chapters we identified five key dimen-
sions in International Relations: the perception and willingness of actors to act;
the capacity of actors to act; the accessibility of political arenas; the legitimacy of
regulatory solutions; and the effectiveness ofthe regulatory solution.
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In this section we will clarify and operationalise these dimensions. We want to
know how we can use these dimensions as observable and measurable criteria in
an exploratory framework for empirical research of emerging regulatory practices
in International Relations.
4.2.1   Position and Capacity ofGIobal Actors
In chapter 2 we have seen how the nation-state gained an important position in
International Law. Yet, this position was never gained at the exclusion of all other
actors. There were always some other aaors which operated in the political are-
nas of International Law. Furthermore, within the notion of position of nation-
states in International Law some further distinctions could be made. Some states
were always a 'more equal than others'. This category changed over the years,
from the seafaring nations in the 17th century, to the Christian empires of the igth
century, to the permanent members ofthe UN Security Council in the 2oth cen-
tury.
In chapter one we noticed the more than exponential growth of NGOs in Interna-
tional Relations during the last few decades. In chapter three, we encountered the
more than exponential growth of the number of transnational corporations. Both
trends have had an effect on the number of actors that are involved with global
governance networks.
Within a global governance network we encounter states and (international) or-
ganisations, but also NGOs and transnational corporations. Their position and
capacities are not equal. States may rely on (the threat to resort to) military
power, transnational corporations may rely on their economic impact and NGOs
may rely on their capacity to mobilise public opinion. Their relative influence
within a network is partially influenced by their formal position within a network
and partially by their factual capacities.
Within existing global governance networks this formal position is likely to be de-
termined by certain (legal) selection criteria. However, the importance of such cri-
teria may be less within new and emerging global governance networks. There-
fore, we need to make a distinction between the more or less 'formal' position of
an a aor in a specific global governance network and the actual position of the ac-





Is an actor acknowledged as an important stakeholder in a specific global
governance network2
Sources:
Existing Legal Rules, including:
National Laws
I nternational  Laws
Policy Documents containing:
- Definitions
General policies on actors applicable to wider context ofspecific arena
Specific policies on procedures. including on application, selecti6n,
accreditation, representation, affiliation, and consultation of actors;
Specific policies stating principles, such as the need for transparency,
accountability, practical willingness to engage
Policy papers on interpretation, including of policy rules and memo-
randa
Observations (based on available materials)
Position becomes clear from practical acceptance or back-up from other
actors
Position becomes clear from flnancial commitments of actor in specific
area
Important changes can be assumed when small, hitherto ignored, actors or net-
work actors (smart mobs) with no clear chain of command demonstrate the ca-
pacity to influence the interests of more-or-less clearly organised state and non-
state actors.'
Shaping the actor's perceptions and abilities to participate in the political arena
are: the position from which they enter the arena; the influence they have on prob-
lem definition; their own goals and interests; the stakes and stands taken in the
game in the perception of each actor; and the deadlines that force an actor to take
a stand.2 International Law is not only rationally chosen as a solution to a press-
ing international problem, but also results from compromise, conflict, and confu-
sion of actors with diverse interests and unequal influence.3 There will be power
' For this reason, Slaughter has argued that demonstrated capacities are becoming more im-
portant than the formal positions of actors. She has called this paradigm 'the new sover-
eignty.' The 'new sovereignty' is the capacity to participate in the international and trans-
governmental regimes, networks and institutions that are now necessary to allow
governments to accomplish through cooperation with another what they could only hope to
accomplish alone within a defined territory. (Slaughter 2004, P· 284)
2   Allison 1999. p. 298-299
3    Allison 1971, p. 162.
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differences among the actors, and the strategic choices they make will be based
on those differences.
International rules may play an important role in influencing the capacities of an
actor in global governance. More so than International Law, international rules
potentially provide the complete framework of global governance through the way
in which they regulate and constrain the behaviour of actors. They might offer a
system of substantive and procedural norms, thereby enabling the actors to make
decisions and adjust their behaviour to new developments in the political arena.4
Playing by those rules might help to strengthen the position of an actor, making
its actions seem 'more legitimate' to the other actors and to its own constituency.
Capacity ofthe Actor
Is an actor capable ofacting adequately in a specific arena ofglobal
governanceF Each actor may have more or less capacity (compared to others)
to influence events.
Sources:




rules on procedure, draft rules,
rules on making proposals and amendments
rules on communication
reports ofthe proceedings
Observations (based on available materials)
capacity to influence other stakeholders such as the (global) media,
legislature, politicians, consumer behaviour, students and universities
capacity to influence financial positions ofother actors
-    capacity to create new partnerships between actors
capacity to set the terms ofdebate and the agenda
capacity to negotiate and to implement agreements
Important changes might be assumed when state capacities are seriously affected
(restricted) by non-state capacities, or when powerful non-state capacities de-
velop without having any effect on existing state capacities.
4.2.2  Access to Global Arenas
By identifying global governance as consisting of various political arenas, the de-
marcation of specific arenas becomes important. On the other hand, the use of
4    Fisher 1978, P. 9
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the arena metaphor is a social construct. The decision of the demarcation of a
specific the boundaries for a policy game is therefore to a large extent subjective.5
But at the same time, the demarcation of an arena determines who is likely to
have access to it, and who is not.
Wendt, in Social Theory of International Politics, notes that social relations have
both an internal and external structure.6 The external structure of an arena is rela-
tional 'not in the sense of being caused by contingent interactions with other
kinds, but in the sense of being constituted by social relations';7 a specific arena,
for instance for the global reduction of greenhouse gases, stands in a certain rela-
tion to wider negotiations over international environmental policies. Wendt then
offers another way of looking at the problem of the boundaries, a way that under-
stands the core of an arena not in the material terms of a larger structure but spe-
cifically in terms of its self-organising capacities. He uses the example ofthe crea-
tion of a new state:
A state's ability to organize itself as a state creates resistance to those who
deny its existence... Over time such resistance should bring others' theories
about that state into line with its reality - i.e., resistance should lead to 'recog-
nition' of its existence. The fact that a state is constituted by shared ideas does
not make this resistance any less objective than the more strictly speaking ma-
terial resistance of natural kinds. 8
Applying Wendt's approach to arenas in global governance implies that the proc-
ess of determining the border of an arena receives much of its impetus from
forces 'inside' the space around which the boundary will be drawn. For example,
the peace agency of Pax Christi International is primarily the network and dis-
course of those participants and members inside the peace movement, and not
the agency and discourse ofoutsiders.9
Wendt has argued that the border of an arena is partially determined by the self-
organising capacities ofthe actors around an issue, and partially by its 'structural
embeddedness' within, and interactions with, the larger context of International
Relations. The consequence of this argument seems to be that the border of an
arena is not a strict border, but may be open to influences and actors from out-
side the self-organising core ofthe arena.
5    Mansbach 2000, p. 137
6    wendt 2001.
7    Wendt 2001, p. 71
8    Wendt 2001. p. 73-74
9 Compare Wendt 2001, p. 74, on state organisation.
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Access to Global Political Arenas
How accessible is the arena in which a regulatory solution is sought for a
global issueP At first the answer seems very simple: an actor has access or it
has no access. But there is more, especially when one explores the question
how far into the arena an new actor may enter? Is the new participant kept at





rules on representation in delegations ofactors
screening procedures
Reports on events discussing practical access of actors:
to ofFicial meetings
to the chair of meetings
to lobby-corridors
to high profile political leaders
non·institutionalised dialogue (backrooms)
Media coverage
Important changes can be assumed when the accessibility to certain arenas be-
comes easier, for instance because strict policy rules controlling access to an
arena are lifted, or when actors have been able to gain access through their dem-
onstrated capacities to influence another actor's interests (in other words, when
they can no longer be ignored). Finally, an important change can be assumed to
have occurred when actors which were kept at the sidelines of events suddenly
move to the core and start participating in full.
4.2.3     Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Emerging Global Governance Regimes
What is the legitimacy of emerging global governance regimes? And can a new
regime really be effective? In fact, the questions of legitimacy of the law and the
question ofeffectiveness ofthe law are intertwined. 10
To begin with, Raustiala and Slaughter, but also Van Bijsterveld," have noted the
growing importance of regime transparency in studies of the legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of global governance arrangements .12 Van Bijsterveld has noted that
within the alternative steering methods and constructs of self-regulation in Inter-
10 See Verdross and Simma 1984, P· 51-54, in this view effectiveness refers to a regular pro-
ceeding of the law: regelmaBige Wirksamkeit.
11
Bilsterveld 2002.
12 Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, p. 550·
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national Relations the static notion of legality seems to be overarched by the dy-
namic notion of'transparency'. The principle of transparency requires clarity with
regard to decision-making, actions and policies. Legality is but one particular ex-
pression ofthe principle oftransparency. '3
Thus it seems that,  if we want to understand the legitimacy of emerging global
governance regimes, we will have to look at various dimensions of transparency
with regard to the input of actors in a arena and their behaviour during a particu-
lar policy 'game'.
Legitimacy of Emerging Global Governance Regimes
The legitimacy of emerging global governance regimes depends on their trans-
parency. Is it clear which actors are involved in a process (input legitimacy)P
Can the actors that are involved in the development of regulatory answers to
international problems be held accountable? Is it possible to see which actor












-    Rules on access
Reviews:
Monitoring criteria and procedures
Statements on the Obligations ofparticipants
- Peer-based review systems
Control
Coverage on access to meetings
- Certification procedures
Complaints procedures
Closely related to the legitimacy of the regulatory answer created in a political
arena, is the question whether this 'regulatory answer' actually solves the prob-
'1   Bijsterveld 2002, chapter 2.
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lem. The legitimacy and effectiveness of a specific global governance regime does
not only depend on the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in a particular
issue, but also on the outcome process of this participatory process. In other
words, the effectiveness of global governance regimes is a sort of outcome le-
gitimacy.
Effectiveness ofEmerging Global Governance Regimes
The effectiveness of the global governance regime itself is the main focus of
this dimension for observation. Have the global actors been able to provide an
effective regulatory answer? As global governance networks may, especially
from the point of International Law, be considered to be inferior, gaining an
equal status to International Law in practice may be interpreted as a important
change.
Sources:













threat to use pressure
media pressure and 'smart.mob' actions
Sanctions
- public naming and shaming
reports
4.3 Research Design and Protocol
4·3.1   The Main Question
Much has been written about the history of International Law. Likewise, there is a
flood of publications about the effects of globalisation and the creation of global
governance networks. But little is yet known about the nature of the interaction
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between traditional International Law and emerging new regulatory networks.
Therefore, the main question ofthis study is:
What is  the  nature  of the  interaction  between  new  arrangements for  regulating  Inter-
national  Relations and the traditional body of International  Law?
The character of this part of the investigation remains largely explorative. There-
fore an approach of using case studies and additional examples has been chosen.
Case studies [Note: there is no hyphen in case study.] enable a more detailed fo-
cus on developments because they allow for various data-collections to be used
simultaneously.'4 The examples are distilled from work conducted by other re-
searchers and re-examine these works with regard to possible implications rele-
vant to the central thesis. The dynamic 'advantage' of this approach enables the
taking into account of new and or unexpected developments when seeking theo-
retical insights in a relatively new field of studies. 15
4.3.2 Case selection
How does an issue become a 'problem' on the global agenda? Today the answer
to this question seems largely determined by the role of the mass media en-
hanced by modern information and communication technologies. Goldstein has
called this the 'world news story':
To an increasing extent, everyone in the world follows the same story line of
world news from day to day...To some extent, there is now a single drama un-
folding at the global level...The fact that everyone is following the same story
reflects the globalizing influence ofworld communications.
16
According to Lomborg, the long and winding path between an event taking place
in the world and its possible appearance and placement in the media has had
three consequences on the conception of international problems. First, the inco-
herent information provided by the mass media provides the actors with too little
knowledge of concrete problems to enable them to take part in decision-making
processes. Secondly, the actors might feel sufficiently comfortable that they be-
lieve that they actually do have sufficient knowledge to partake in the debate and
to make valid decisions. Thirdly, Lomborg warns that the actors will often have a
far too negative and distorted impression of problems:7
We have seen in chapter 3 that the two major driving forces behind socio-
economic globalisation were the global spread of the free market and the infor-
mation and communications revolution. In the slipstream of these developments
many have raised voices of concern with regard to the protection  of the environ-
ment, the protection of human rights and the protection of labour rights:8 Espe-
14 Donk 1997, P· 33
15 Compare: Donk 1997. P· 33· See also Sassen 2006.
16 Goldstein 2001, p. 470.
17   Lomborg 2001, p. 39
18 Alston 2004. Graham 1997. Herz 2002, Heslam 2002, Klein Goldewijk 2005. Meijer 2002.
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cially in opposition to the spread of a global free market many publications have
been written and global coalitions ofconcerned constituents have been created.
The selection strategy behind the case studies aimed at finding cases that fell well
within the complex architectures of regulation that aimed to seek regulatory solu-
tions with regard the (perceived) effects ofthe spread ofthe global free market on
the environment, the protection of human rights and the protection of labour
rights
4.3.3 Data collection
Given the complexities of the interactions between a specific game and its larger
international context, and adding the (potentially) large number of possibly rele-
vant actors and the abundance, in some cases, of publications on the subject, the
largest part of the case descriptions rests on document analysis for obvious prac-
tical reasons. The documents came from a wide variety of sources. The variety of
documents studied consisted of:
- Official Documents. This refers to governmental reports, recorded discussions
in parliament, official press releases by the US President and the UN Secre-
tary-General, oflicial UN documents containing minutes ofthe meetings ofthe
UN General Assembly and the Security Council, official press releases and
publications from non-state actors like yearbooks and special reports;
-  News sources. This refers to news reports as posted on the websites of CN N
and the BBC;
- Books consisting ofgeneral publications that used a sociological approach to
look at globalisation, and specific books that came out after specific events in
a case.
- Articles published by participants at meetings or by journalists, whether in le-
gal journals, newspapers or foreign policy magazines.
-  Websites. In all the cases it has been possible to use websites that belong to
the specific policy networks described. In almost all cases these websites con-
tained up to date information on the developments of a case.
4·3.4  Within Case Design
Every case was studied in several phases. The first phase consisted of a brief ori-
entation in current debates on globalisation and International Relations using lit-
erature, Internet resources, and discussions in several leading foreign policy jour-
nals. From these conversations a list of about 50 Potential 'new' issues in
International Relations in need of international regulation was created. Based on
conversations with several International Relations experts, this list was then
brought down to three large cases in which concerns for human rights, labour
rights and/or the environment converged.
Porter 1991, Genugten e.a. 2004
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In the second phase, explorative conversations took place with academic experts
working within specific fields of International Relations and International Law:9
The aim of these conversations was to find out whether these cases had enough
potential with regard to determining change in International Law practice and in
the availability of resources.
In the third phase ofthe research project, data for each case was sought and stud-
ied. The data came from recent publications, leading journals, and official Internet
sources, such as the UN website. The study ofthe materials was structured by the
main questions of this  book. The empirical descriptions of the history of events
have, when possible, been discussed with academic experts to check whether they
contained all the necessary information and correct interpretations.
Based on the main questions of this book, the empirical data were used to write a
description  of the political context of a case. This description of the context spe-
cifically paid attention to the political and societal developments that influenced
the role and position of the main actors in the political arena. It gives an impres-
sion of the context and influence of the acceleration of globalisation in a specific
area of International Relations.
This description was followed by a closer reading ofthe available materials in or-
der to determine the content of the game: which rules of governance could be
identified? The protocol for the description ofthe case studies is based on the fol-
lowing outline:
19 The list of experts includes: Professor Dr W.J.M. van Genugten, Professor Dr P.C.M. van
Seters, Professor Dr J.M. Verschuuren, Professor K. Zoeteman, Professor emeritus Dr
F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, Professor emeritus Dr Th. Beckers, Dr. S.C. van Bijsterveld, Dr R.
Pierik and Dr A.H. Vedder (Tilburg University), Dr S.M. Thomas (University of Bath/Calvin
University), and, finally; Dr G. Sen. Dr R. Arabsheibani. Dr A. Mussorov for sharing their in-
sights during my stay at the London School of Economics in 2003
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TABLE
Protocol f6r the description ofthe Case Studies
Part Description
Introduction Contains a brief destription of the selection of
the case and its context and c6ntent
Case-description Description and analysis of the position of the
actors in the political arena ·
Description and analysis of the capacities ofthe
actors in the political arena
Description and analysis of the accessibility of
the political arena
Assessment and analysis of the potential legiti-
macy ofthe political events
- input legitimacy
- process legitimacy
Assessment and analysis of the potential effec-
tiveness ofthe regulatory outcome.
Analysis Discussion and interpretation of the main find-
ings ofthis case.
Conclusion The conclusion ofeach case description contains
a brief recapitulation of the main findings  in this
case.
4.3.5   Within Case Analysis and Between Case Analysis
The analysis within each case focussed on the five dimensions as set out in sec-
tion 4·2: sovereignty as position and capacity, accessibility of the arena and the
legitimacy and the effectiveness of the outcomes. Chapter 8 will compare the in-
dividual findings of the cases and examples. This is done in order to determine
whether certain patterns might be developing which could help to explain why in
some cases International Law is the basis, and in other cases it is not necessarily
the basis, for emerging global governance mechanisms.
4.4     An Introduction to the Cases
4.4.1 The Kyoto Protocol
The first case concerns the problem of global warming and the need for the re-
duction of the emission of greenhouse gases. Although states have not actively
sought to put this issue on the international agenda, it had become part and par-
cel of International Relations by the mid- 19905.
Interestingly, states have considered themselves to be the primary actors capable
of dealing with this issue.2° They coordinate their efforts through the United  Na-
tions, which has developed institutions, scientific research projects, and negotia-
20 For a critical assessment of that assumption see: Lomborg 2001.
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tion rounds to tackle this issue globally. The Kyoto negotiations took place within
this highly developed and highly integrated network of the United Nations sys-
tem. This arena (or network of arenas) is accessible for non-state actors, but un-
der strict rules and policy guidelines. They are not considered to have the same
status as state actors and their capacities are importantly restricted on paper,
when compared to state delegations.
The restriction on the access, position and capacities for non-state actors did not
mean that they could only play a minor role during the negotiations. Through
their presence they made important (informal) contributions to the debate, be-
cause, as stakeholders in the lobby corridors, they informed state delegations of
the implications of the proposals for the environment and for their constituen-
cies. Moreover, through their presence, and constant media-coverage, non-state
actors helped to make the negotiations more transparent to the general public.
The outcome of the negotiations, the Kyoto-protocol, has gained widespread
(public) support throughout the world, although the number of needed state rati-
fications to put the protocol into place was only reached in the autumn of 2004 by
means of a trade off between the European Union and Russia over the latter's ap-
plication to the World Trade Organisation. The United States has constantly ques-
tioned the legitimacy and effectiveness ofthe outcome ofthe negotiations, and al-
though its government signed the Treaty, the US Congress has made clear that it
has no intention whatsoever to ratify the protocol.
4.4.2   The Fair Labor Association
Not all problems start offimmediately at the international level. Sometimes an is-
sue is first recognised as a national problem and, after a while, the interconnect-
edness ofthe problem with larger international developments helps to place it on
the international agenda.
The political discussion leading to the formation of the Fair Labor Association be-
gan in the United States in 1996 through a public reaction to reports on child la-
bour employment by Nike. At first, the concern over working conditions in the
apparel industry were US consumer concerns, and when these consumers started
(boycotting) actions they subsequently became political concerns. This makes
Fair Labor Association almost a textbook example of the sub-politics of globalisa-
tion:' Sub-politics is the politics of interest groups, social movements, activism,
and advocacy groups whose interests radiate out beyond the sphere of institu-
tional politics and whose targets include power centres other than the state, in
this case American based multinationals.
21 Subpolitics was first mentioned by Beck in 1997 and it refers to the politicization of situa-
tions, practices, and processes that comes from below the formal political system (from
non-elites) and from outside it. It operates at both more localized and more globalized lev-
eis than official politics and institutional supports: Knight and Greenberg 2002, p. 554
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Although the US Government had the formal position and capacities to develop
policies for the domestic market regarding a ban on all 'sweatshop products',
there was little political willingness in the US Congress to do so. Therefore the US
President sought a different route, leading to a practical voluntary initiative. Fol-
lowing this strategic choice, NGOs gained access to a new arena, because they
were invited to participate in creating this new voluntary regulatory network from
scratch. American multinationals, however, needed a little more public (con-
sumer) persuasion before 'voluntarily' entering this new arena.
The input legitimacy ofthe FLA was ensured through the joint input of NGOs and
Multinationals in a Presidential Task Force, without the one being allowed more
power than the other, because both were individually and publicly held to account
by the US President. The FLA is a fairly transparent network. Its reports can be
found on a special website, and are debated in public. Finally, the work ofthe FLA
seems to have an effect on working conditions within the United States and in
other countries, through US owned or affiliated producers and domestic subcon-
tractors. This real change in working conditions in the apparel industry helps to
create an international outcome legitimacy for a national voluntary regulatory in-
strument.
4.4.3 The Global Compact
There has been a long debate within the UN over international regulation of cor-
porate social responsibility. But even without answering the question whether the
UN in practice would be able to develop such capacities, by the end of the 19905
the state delegations could not agree in principle on whether the UN did have the
position to do so. Industrialised countries denied this, while developing countries
advocated such a new position and new capacities for the UN. At the same time
the UN was in a fiscal deadlock over US contributions. Upon taking up his role as
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan realised that, among other things, he had to
deal with both questions. He did so by joining them together.
Although states would have to be considered to occupy the primary positions and
capacities to regulate corporate social responsibility (because a multinational op-
erates within their national borders), they have refrained from doing so in a coor-
dinated way. Bypassing this dead-lock, the UN Secretary-General proposed a
compact, asking multinationals and NGOs directly to cooperate in order to pro-
tea and ensure human rights and labour rights, and to protect the environment.
At the same time, Annan hoped to gain some independent financial support for
the UN (also bypassing the states) from the multinationals.
The accessibility for multinationals and NGOs to the Global Compact reflects a
practical approach. When the UN formulated the initiative, it fell in line with
emerging business trends in corporate citizenship - also referred to as "corporate
responsibility", "sustainable growth", and the "triple bottom line", among other
terms However there existed no international framework to assist companies in
the development and promotion of global, values-based management. And they
were certainly not looking for state-regulated regulatory frameworks.
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The input of stakeholders comes from the United Nations itself, multinationals
and non-governmental organisations. The transparency of the process is low. De-
tailed reports on practical effectiveness have been written and discussed but are
not available to the general public. Therefore the outcome effectiveness of the
Global Compact is also subject to debate.
4·5 Recapitulation
Under the influence of socio-economic globalisation, International Law and Inter-
national Relations are undergoing dynamic transformations which seem to de-
stabilise existing meanings and systems. The crucial frameworks of International
Law that sought to regulate International Relations are being questioned more
and more. Their future in the context of globalisation seems to be dubious or at
least fuzzy in view of newly created alternative regulatory arrangements in Interna-
tional Relations.
This exploratory study sets out to develop an understanding of the complex  net-
works and architectures that are being created in recent efforts to regulate Inter-
national Relations. The main question to which it seeks an answer is:
What is the  nature of the  interaction  between  new arrangements  regulating Interna-
tional  Economic Relations and the traditional body of International  Law?
Based on that question four sub-questions were formulated:
1. What dimensions of the relationship between International Economic Rela-
tions and International Law have been important in the past during the crea-
tion of regulatory responses to emerging regulatory needs, and how can these
dimensions help us to observe continuity and change? (Chapter 2)
2. What are the changing regulatory demands in International Economic Rela-
tions in the context of socio-economic globalisation, and how have these de-
mands affected important of the relationship between International Law and
International Economic Relations? (Chapter 3)
3.   How can the important dimensions of the interaction between International
Economic Relations and the traditional body of International Law be used to
develop a conceptual framework to explore the developments and changes be-
tween emerging arrangements for regulating International Economic Relations
and the traditional body of International Law in three specific case-studies?
(Chapter 4,5,6 and 7).
4. What conclusions with regard to the interaction between new arrangements
for regulating International Economic Relations and the traditional body of In-
ternational Law between can be drawn based on an evaluation of the out-
comes ofthe analysis ofthe three case-studies (Chapter 8)
Chapter 9 will present a summary ofthis study and its main conclusions on na-
ture of the interaction between new arrangements for regulating International
Economic Relations and the existing body of International Law
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The last of these questions will be answered in chapter 8, after a close study of
three cases in the following chapters, 5,6 and 7. We will begin by looking at the
negotiations over the Kyoto-Protocol in 1997.
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5.    The Kyoto Protocol Negotiations
5.1 Introduction
During the 19905 climate change became the overriding international environ-
mental concern: Within the political and scientific debates on climate change, the
main concern is global warming based on the greenhouse effect. This specific is-
sue reached the international political agenda through the workings of the UN's
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In 1990 this panel produced
the report Climate Change - The IPCC Scientific Assessment.2 This report claimed
that greenhouse gases (GHGs), resulting from human activities, were substan-
tially increasing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse CFS, which in their
turn cause the global warming effect. 1 Today, the IPPC reports are the foundation
for most public policy on climate change and the basis for most ofthe arguments
put forth in political debates:
One ofthe most significant effects ofthe IPCC report at national and international
political levels was the emergence, and subsequently rapid growth, of 'green'
NGOs and 'green' political parties. This led to a growing public awareness and
political pressure calling for the introduction of global and transnational environ-
mental institutions, laws conventions and protocols providing measures to com-
bat orto curb global warming.s
An important round of negotiations over a global governance mechanism was ini-
tiated within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which
itself had been created in 1992 during the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in Rio de Janeiro as a result ofthe IPCC reports and
growing public and political pressure. The main objective ofthe FCCC, which en-
tered into force in 1994, was to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations in or-
der to prevent dangerous irreversible interference with the global climate system.6
The new round of negotiations was called the Conference of Parties (COP) and
was created according to article 7 of the FCCC framework convention. The parties
met for the first time in 1995, in Berlin. This meeting gave a specific mandate (The
Berlin Mandate) to the negotiators, calling for a system of legally binding quanti-
fied emission limitation and reduction objectives (QUELROs).7 In order to estab-
lish this system, an ad hoc group was formed to begin negotiations on this new
' Lomborg 1998, p. 258
2    1 PCC 1990.
1    Breidenich 1998. p. 316. For a critical discussion of that specific claim. see: Lomborg 1998,
P. 55·
4    Lomborg 1998, p. 259· See, for example. the briefing of the minister of housing. public plan-
ning and environmental affairs to the Dutch parliament of October 17 1997: TK 24 785
5    Heywood 1998. p. 264
6   Breidenich 1998, p. 317.
7   After the Kyoto protocol the term became Quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitment (QELRC).
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legal instrument for the pOSt-2000 timeframe. This new legal instrument became
known as the Kyoto Protocol. The essence of the Kyoto Protocol boils down to
having 'industrial and transition economies cut emissions back to 5 per cent be-
low 1990 levels and to freeze them at that level, while allowing developing coun-
tries unlimited emissions.'8 Thus the 1997 Kyoto protocol became highly contro-
versial, taking until 2004 to be ratified (while it only covers policies until 2012),
with important economies, like the United States, opting out.
This case-study zooms in on the negotiations during the COP 111 meeting in
Kyoto, from December ist to December iith 1997, which led to the creation of the
Kyoto Protocol. The next section will introduce the important actors in the politi-
cal arena and their positions within the arena. Section 3 will look at the capacities
of each actor during the whole process leading up to the Kyoto protocol. Were the
actors able to influence the decision-making process, and if so, how? Section 4
will investigate the accessibility of the Kyoto negotiations. How did the actors en-
ter this arena? Section 5 will discuss the input and process legitimacy of the nego-
tiations, while section 6 will look at the effectiveness of the outcome of the Kyoto
negotiations. Section 7 will discuss some of the implications of the findings of
this case study. Finally, section 8 will draw the most important conclusions that
can be derived from this case-study with regard to the relationship between a new
regulatory arrangement for regulating international (environmental) relations and
the traditional body of International Law.
5.2 The Position ofthe Actors
As a result of its embeddedness within a larger UN framework, the negotiations
in Kyoto were first and foremost an affair between state representatives and state
delegations. In principle, all countries accredited with the UN could join the
FCCC, through signing and ratifying the framework.9 The third session of the Con-
ference of the Parties was attended by representatives of the 159 parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Within this category
a further distinction needs to be made between 'Annex-parties' and 'non-annex
parties'. According to article 4.2 of the FCCC, the developed countries and other
Parties commit themselves to more specific policies to take the lead in modifying
long-term trends.10 Furthermore, there were specific rules on the representation
ofthe states. Each delegation had to consist of a head of delegation and such ac-
credited representatives, alternate representatives, and advisers, as it required:,
8    Cline 2004. P. 28
9   The only non-state that became a party to the FCCC in 1992 was the European Economic
Community
10 Australia, Austria, Belarus a/, Belgium, Bulgaria a/, Canada, Czechoslovakia a/, Denmark,
European Economic Community, Estonia a/, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary
a/, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia a/. Lithuania a/, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland a/. Portugal, Romania a/, Russian Federation a/, Spain, Sweden.
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine a/, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America The "a/" refers to countries that are undergoing the process of
transition to a market economy.
"
Rule 17 of FCCC/CP/1996/2.
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The credentials ofthese representatives (issued by a head of state, or government
or  Minister of Foreign Affairs)  had to be accepted  by the Conference of the  Par-
ties.12
With regard to the representation of non-state entities, the draft rules, as adopted
at COP 11, were applied.'3 Article 6 and 7 of document FCCC/CP/199612 deal with
the status of (non) state entities. Rule 6 states that:
The United Nations, its specialized agencies, any international entity or entities
entrusted by the Conference of the Parties pursuant to Article 11 of the Conven-
tion with the operation of the financial mechanism, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers
thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the
Conference of the Parties as observers.
Such observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate without the
right to vote, in the proceedings of any session, unless at least one third of the
Parties present at the session object.14
Based on this rule, 15 intergovernmental organisations participated as observers
to the third session. They included the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Energy Agency and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development.'5 The session was also attended by six
states that were not parties to the convention: Belarus (which during the process
became a party), Brunei Darussalam, the Holy See, Libyan Arab J amahiriya, Palau
and Turkey. Furthermore, 23 UN offices, programs, and specialized agencies,
were represented.
16
NGO-representation within the COP 111 meeting in Kyoto was guided by article 7
ofthe FCCC/CP/1996/2:
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention and
which has informed the Secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of
the Conference of the Parties as an observer may be so admitted unless at
least one third ofthe parties object.
Such observers may, upon invitation by the President, participate without the
right to vote in the proceedings of any session in matters of direct concern to
the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third of the Parties pre-
sent at the session object.
12
Rule 19 and 21 of FCCC/CP/1996/2
13   FCCC/CP/1997/7, P· 7
34 FCCC/CP/1996/2.
4   FCCC/CP/1997/7. P· 47
'6   FCCC/CP/1997/7 P. 17-18.
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The interpretation of this article is guided by two other documents: ECOSOC
Resolution E/1996/31 on the consultative relationship between the United Na-
tions and non-governmental organizations (hereinafter: ECOSOC E/1996/31) and
UNEP policy based on Memorandum UNEP/PS/1996/5 (hereinafter
UNEP/PS/1996):7 The ECOSOC resolution provided in 1997 the main framework
of NGO participation at the COP 111 meeting.
ECOSOC E/1996/31 makes a distinction between NGO participation in ECOSOC
and all its member organizations (Part i and further) and NGO participation in
international conferences convened by the United Nations and their preparatory
process (part 7). If an NGO wants to apply for a consultative status with the UN,
and more specific ECOSOC, its aims and purposes must be in conformity with
the spirit, purpose, and principles, ofthe Charter of the United Nations (article 1
and 2). According to article 4, NGOs can operate at national, sub-regional, re-
gional and international levels. Furthermore an NGO should have a recognized
standing within the particular field of its competence (article 9). It must be insti-
tutionalized to a certain extent, having an established headquarters, an executive
officer, and a democratically adopted constitution, which has been deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (article 10). The representatives of
the organization must have been authorized by the members to speak on behalf
of the organization (article 11). And a system of accountability should be in place
(article 12). Finally, its financial structures must be clear (article 13). In the end,
the Member States, through ECOSOC, decide whether a consultative status will
be granted. At the COP 111 conference, 171 non-governmental organizations were
granted access to the negotiation lobby based on this procedure. 18
If an NGO had no status at ECOSOC, but wanted to participate in an interna-
tional conference convened by the United Nations, such as COP 111, part 7 of
ECOSOC E/1996/31 would apply. Such an NGO had to apply to the secretariat of
the conference in question (article 43)· The purpose of the  NGO had to be  rele-
vant to the activities of the conference (article 44 a,b). An organization had to be
able to prove that it has been active on this issue at national, regional or interna-
tional levels (article 44 c). It had to provide the secretariat with a list of the mem-
bers ofthe governing body and copies of annual reports with financial statements
(article 44 d,e). A description of the membership of the organization, indicating
the total number of members, the names of the organizations that are members,
and their geographical distribution had to be handed over (article 44 f), as well as
a copy of its constitution and/or by-laws (article 449. The decision whether an
NGO is admitted was made by the secretariat of that specific conference in close
cooperation with the committee of ECOSOC (article 43)· In recognition of the in-
tergovernmental nature of these conferences the NGOs were denied a negotiat-
17 ECOSOC Resolution E/1996/31 of July 25, 1996 on the Consultative relationship between
the United Nations and non-governmental organizations; and UNEP/PS/1996/5, memo-
randum by Executive Director Elizabeth Dowdeswell on UNEP Policy on NGOs and other
Major Groups 30.10.1996
'8   FCCC/CP/1997/7 P· 4753
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ing role (article 50). The policy lines set out in UNEP/PS/1996/5 made a further
distinction between NGOs, and 'other major groups'.
Other 'major groups' were, according to the objectives of this memorandum: sci-
entific and professional associations, service clubs, community-based organiza-
tions (CBOs), grassroots organizations (GROs), consumer unions, and Environ-
mental Citizen's Organizations (ECOs). A total of 62 'major groups' were
admitted to this conference. Continuation oftheir participation could only be en-
sured by a reapplication:9 In one case in particular, the International Chamber of
Commerce objected to the secretariat to a particular representative of a small
business NGO, but was rebuffed, because this NGO had met all the criteria ofthe
secretariat. The ICC then tried to put pressure on this representative to stay away
from the meetings, but to no avail.20
State and non-state actor participation was high, in total, the negotiations in
Kyoto were attended by more than 10.000 participants:, The American govern-
ment had been especially liberal in granting accreditation to the negotiation proc-
esses. One third ofthese tended to be scientific by nature, one third had business
origins, and one third consisted of environmental organizations.22 The Green-
peace delegation alone contained 45 members.23 A very powerful actor was the
Global Climate Coalition, funded by major US multinationals. Their 63 members
included representatives of the American Petroleum Institute, the American
Automobile Manufacturers Association, and the US National Coal Association.24
In the months preceding this conference, this NGO had launched a multi-million
dollar campaign to warn the American consumers against the possible negative
effects of internationally agreed-upon reduction measures.25 A Greenpeace report
showed that multinationals were also well represented by the politicians in the of-
ficial US delegation. This representation in the delegation was based on the
amounts of money that the multinationals had contributed to the domestic elec-
tion campaigns of the delegates.26 One sector of multinationals completely new
to the floor in 1997 was the insurance industry. Their involvement came as a re-
suit from an UNEP initiative in 1996 to set up the Insurance Industry Initiative.
The aim of this initiative was to get insurance companies to take climate change
seriously. It tried to achieve this by involving the companies in the negotiations
and by encouraging an effective code of practice. The financial, political, weight of
the represented companies at the conference was estimated at $ 2 trillion. How-
ever, only six UK companies were involved, and no American companies. Given
19   FCCCtCP/1997/7 P· 47-53·20 Leggett 1999, p. 298
21   Grubb 1999, p. 61
22 Arts 1998, p. 109
23   Leggett 1999, p. 292
24   Leggett 196 p. 290.
25 Breitmeier 2000, p. 155.
26 Greenpeace, Oiling the Machine, Fossil Fuel Dollars Funnelled into the U.S. Political Proc-
ess, 1997 Accessed on 22.01.03 at www.greenpeace.org. One of the conclusions of the re-
port was that in the 1995/1996 period alone $ 20.8 million had been donated of which 77%
went to the Republicans. Not surprisingly the Republicans were fiercely opposed to the
Kyoto protocol. These highest paid senators and representatives were the chairs of major
committees for instance the Energy and Natural Resources Senate Committee.
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their newness to the process, it was difficult for the insurance industry to influ-
ence the outcome of the process.27 The International Chamber of Commerce
formed the largest NGO representation. Its 100+ delegation, headed by Clem Ma-
lin ofTexaco, represented 7,500 members in 130 countries.28
In conclusion, although the key positions were held by the state representatives,
non-state representatives occupied important secondary positions within the po-
litical arena of Kyoto. The most remarkable position was taken by the interna-
tional business community who managed to occupy positions through creating
pro-business NGOs.
5.3 The Capacities ofthe Actors
With over 10.000 participants involved, in one way or another, in the negotiation
possesses, the rules and games of the negotiations were highly complex. This
section will look at the capacities of the actors to influence the events in this
arena. The official rules important to the game offer important insights into the
capacities of especially the state actors.
Initially, the state actors did not accept the rules of procedure that had been pro-
posed  by the secretariat of the FCCC specifically for the Kyoto conference.  In the
absence of a consensus on the rules of procedure, the President (the chairperson)
proposed, and the COP agreed, to apply the draft rules of procedure as contained
in document FCCC/CP/i 996/2, which had been applied before, with the excep-
tion of draft rule 42.29 Rule 42 was on the voting procedure. The oil exporting
countries objected to this draft. They maintained that all the decisions by the COP
should be taken unanimously, giving each party a 'de jure' veto power, a position
unacceptable to many other countries.10 In this section, a description of the pro-
cedure of decision-making will be given, based on the aforementioned document
with the specific articles in brackets.
The general meetings of the COP are held in public and the subsidiary meetings
are held in private unless the COP itself decides otherwise (rule 30). The quorum
of the meetings is one third of the parties; decisions can only be taken by two
thirds of the Parties (rule 31). The President decides on the speaking rights of rep-
resentatives (rule 32). On proposal of the President the COP decided that, during
the general debate, the time limit for statements was five minutes by representa-
tives ofthe Parties and four minutes for all other statements.11
States had the opportunity to introduce proposals and amendments to proposals.
These proposals had to be introduced in writing and handed over to the secre-
tariat that had the responsibility to circulate the copies to delegations (rule 36).
27  Salt 1998. P. 162.
28 Leggett 1999, p. 291
29   FCCC/CP/1997/7, P. 10.
3°  Grubb 1999, P. 64
p   FCCC/CP/1997/7 P. 15
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Four types of motions take precedence over all other proposals or motions, but
only in the order indicated (rule 38):
To suspend the meeting
To adjourn the meeting
To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion
To close the debate on the question under discussion
In case of amendments, annexes or protocols to the Convention, the parties had
to be notified at least six months before a meeting by the secretariat (rule 37)·
This implied that such large-scale proposals had to be brought to the attention of
the secretariat before that six months period. The conduct of the official commu-
nications between the parties during the conference was regulated in section XI of
the FCCC/CP/1996/2.
The parties can only introduce proposals and amendments to proposals in
writing; the secretariat shall circulate the copies to delegations (rule 36).
When a proposal has been adopted or rejected, it may not be reconsidered at the
same session, unless the COP decides otherwise with at least two-thirds of the
Parties present and voting (rule 40). Each Party has one vote (rule 41) Regional
organizations shall have the votes of their members; unless their members exer-
cise their voting rights themselves (rule 41). Voting is normally done by show of
hands, however on the basis of rule 48, a Party can ask for a secret ballot.
Amendments to proposals can be made and be brought in for voting (rule 45-47) ·
In order to prevent the number of amendments and proposals, the President
came up with another strategy: the combination of proposals.  But it was only after
a heated debate, notably with China, that the chairman gained authority to com-
bine the submitted proposals as a formal negotiation text. 32
In conclusion, all formal capacities of the actors were determined by official  UN
rules and draft rules which had not been formally adopted by the actors. But what
about the informal capacities? The following study ofthe accessibility ofthe Kyoto
arena will demonstrate some important changes occurring with regard to the in-
formal capacities of actors in the international political arena.
5.4 The Accessibility ofthe Arena
Two documents, that guided the selection of non-state actors, refer explicitly to
accountability as a criterion for access to the network. ECOSOC E/1996/31 de-
manded that NGOs joining the ECOSOC system would have an 'executive officer'
and a 'democratically adopted constitution', which could be understood as an in
12   Grubb 1999, p. 64·
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directive demand of accountability. This is also true for the demand that represen-
tatives should be able to speak on behalf of the organisation they represent. Arti-
C|e 12 of this resolution demands explicitly that NGOs must have a 'system of ac-
countability', leaving it up to ECOSOC to determine what a 'system of
accountability' is.
NGOs not having a status within ECOSOC, but wanting to join this particular
round of negotiations, faced less demanding criteria, but they too had to hand
over their constitution and names of organizations that participated. Particularly
worth mentioning here is the position of the delegates ofthe American Congres-
Sional delegation. Not only where they accountable to their own electorate, but, as
a Greenpeace report pointed out, a|so to the multinationals, donating to their
campaign funds.
But accessibility is not only important when it comes to access to the official
arena, but even more to the un-official arena, or corridors ofthe negotiations were
important decisions are being made outside the spotlight ofthe general public, or
even outside the spotlight from most participants.
At the end of the first week of negotiations there was a high sense of urgency
among (NGO) participants, but little progress. A short illustration from a Green-
peace press release illustrates the general feeling:
With only a few days left to reach agreements to protect the climate, the sense
of urgency and pressure within the Kyoto conference centre is intense. There
are literally thousands of lobbyists and negotiators and journalists milling
around. TV screens monitoring the actual talks, exhibition stalls, huddled lob-
bying in the coffee stands, tonnes of information leaflets, and side seminars
are part of creating the pressure cooker. 33
A small selection of non-state actors had access to the secret meetings between
state representatives taking place in the periphery ofthe official negotiations:
Like the day before, there was little for the majority of the 10,000 delegates to
do except to sit and wait, and gossip. Only those proxy ears and voices inside
the secret meetings, such as Don Pearlman on one side and Greenpeace policy
director Bill Hare on the other, were able to attempt to influence things at this
stage...34
Pearlman was the head ofthe Global Climate Coalition that included representa-
tives ofAmoco, Philips, Texaco, and Dupont.35
It seems that the high sense of urgency was not shared by the state representa-
tives. One reason might be the absence of a high profile political leader at the ne-
33 Greenpeace 08.12.1997
34 Leggett 1995 9 313
15   Leggett 1996 p. 10
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gotiations. Therefore, much was expected of the arrival of the representative of
the US Administration, Vice-President Al Gore. His arrival at the meeting changed
the mood among the states' delegations, according to US Under-Secretary Eizen-
stat:
First, the Vice President's trip was dramatic. It energized delegations, as well
as giving a very compelling speech. And I think he injected a sense of urgency.
Second, having participated in many negotiations, nothing concentrates the at-
tention like an end date. And that certainly was a second factor. Third, the sen-
ior ministerial level did not arrive until Sunday, and therefore a lot of negotiat-
ing which occurred in the first week was very important to clear away
underbrush, but the political decisions could only be made at the ministerial or
sub-ministerial level. And that occurred.36
When it occurred to the actors that it would be impossible to reach a consensus
of a joint implementation on the reduction of greenhouse gases, the United
States came up with the plan of Emissions-trading.37 However, during these nego-
tiations the developing countries had been largely ignored, and they therefore re-
sented this solution.38 It was this mood of resentment that made the Chair drop
the clause on the obligations for developing countries, something that would hin-
der future US ratification.39
Because of a lack of consensus on third world country reductions, the chairman
took this specific article out of the convention.40 On other occasions the chairman
simply said: 'there is no consensus, we will adopt the original'.4, Another account
recalls how Chairman Estrada read the sentences of a new article twice, very
slowly and then paused:
He asked if there were any objections and brought down his gavel as India -
some say jointly with the EU and China - raised their flags to object. He ig-
nored the flags and stormed ahead to the next paragraph.42
This might seem peculiar, but according to some reports the chairman knew that
almost every sentence would be opposed as a matter of principle, and that such a
complex debate would destroy the negotiations in the final hours.43 Under a cover
of mutual consensus, the protocol had now set out to institutionalise an agree-
ment to disagree on the obligatory nature of the protocol.
36
97/12/11 Eizenstat.
17   Grubb 1999. P. 89
18   Grubb 1999, p. 92
39 The US Congress maintains that the Kyoto protocol is an unfair deal because it is not
obligatory to all participants.
40   Leggett 1999, P· 319
41 Leggett 1999, p. 320.
*   Grubb 1999. p. 96.
41   Grubb 1999, p. 95·
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The lack of obligation was to become the main excuse for the United States Con-
gress not to ratify the protocol. Or, as the majority leader of the US senate wrote
in a letter to the head ofthe US senate delegation in Kyoto, senator Hagel; '1 have
made clear to the President [of the United States] personally that the Senate will
not ratify a flawed climate change treaty'.44 The reason for this being:
The Republican Senators today said quite point - blankedly that they're not go-
ing to ratify - that the Senate will never ratify a treaty that does not have man-
datory limits for third world nations, and the third world spokesman said quite
point-blank that that's not even open for discussion.45
This has remained the position of the United States to this day. Given this reality,
it was very remarkable when US Vice-President Al Gore gave a very different inter-
pretation ofthe mood in Congress when he arrived during the second week ofthe
negotiations:
Question: ...In the event a treaty of some accord is reached this week which
meets the expectations or is least acceptable to the government of the United
States, but which accord is later not ratified by the Senate, does the administra-
tion believe that, one way or another, it can or has the power to proceed-absent
Senate ratification-to implement the treaty?
Vice President Gore: Oh, I'm sure anything we submitted to the Senate they
would ratify. I don't want to be dismissive of your hypothetical, but that would
just be a terrible turn of events. It is hard for me to think about that.46
The final articles of the Kyoto Protocol deal with issues such as compliance pro-
cedures and mechanism and amendments. Article 18 reads:
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting ofthe Parties to this Pro-
tocol shall, at its first session, approve of appropriate and effective procedures
and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with
the provisions of this Protocol, including the development of an indicative list
of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of
non compliance. Any procedures and mechanism under this Article entailing
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of amendments to this Pro-
tocol.
The penalties for not complying first have to be negotiated, adding a 'protocol' to
the protocol. So why should the parties comply) According to Barrett:
One reason is that they are expected to by customary of International Law. And
it is obvious why custom demands compliance. If states could not be relied
44   Leggett 1999, p. 313
45   97/12/08 VP Gore briefing at COP, Kyoto.
46 97/12/08 VP Gore briefing at COP, Kyoto.
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upon to act as they said they would act, then what would be the point of enter-
ing into agreementsp47
Barret argues that therefore Kyoto's failure to enforce compliance, because the
Protocol does not contain such measures in itself, may be an irrelevance. But this
is not the whole story. According to Barrett there could be a different interpreta-
tion based on the work of Downs:
Both the high rate of compliance and relative absence of enforcement threats
are due not so much to the irrelevance of enforcement as to the fact that states
are avoiding deep cooperation - and the benefits it holds wherever a prisoners
dilemma situation exists - because they are unwilling to pay the costs of en-
6rcement.48
In the end the decision-making on the protocol almost became desperate as the
conference was running out of time. The issue of lack of time was so pressing
that at the end of the first week already some 30 delegates  had been admitted to
the hospital with dehydration and exhaustion.49 The reports on what happened at
the final meeting indicate a desperate attempt to adopt any form of protocol.
In conclusion, the weight of the conference came down to the meeting of the sen-
ior ministerial level, which took place at the beginning of the second week of ne-
gotiations. At this meeting the most important political decisions were made.50
Although non-state actors were closely circling the events, only a handful of them
were present when decisions were made at the highest levels. But the fact that
these actors were present at these high level meetings is telling of the changing
capacities of actors now entering meetings that had hitherto been closed to them.
5.5 Legitimacy ofthe Process
In this section the core dimension of legitimacy will be explored, first with regard
to the legitimacy with regard to the input to the political process, looking for ex-
amples of accountability and dialogue between the actors but also with the out-
side world. Secondly, with regard to the legitimacy of the process itself, it will fo-
cus on the transparency ofthe process.
5.5.1 Input legitimacy
The Kyoto-protocol is an initiative that originated in the vast body of UN policies.
Through scientific reports and growing public awareness, environmental con-
cerns came to occupy a place on the UN agenda. The dialogue between UN
member states was based on the interpretation of scientific findings. However,
from the Rio 1992 Conference onwards, more and more non-state actors, NGOs
47 Barrett 1998, p. 35·
48 Barrett 1998, p. 35
49 Leggett 1999, p. 306.
50 97/12/11 Eizenstat.
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and multinationals alike, wanted to join the negotiations on environmental con-
cerns. This sudden flow of new actors meant that the UN had to create rules on
how these actors could enter state dominated networks. Strict rules on entering
the arena meant that a certain selection of 'conversation' partners takes place at
the 'entry-point' to this particular arena.
The guidelines of ECOSOC E/1996/31 made particularly clear that non-state ac-
tors could only enter the dialogue, by way of a consultative status, when their
aims and purposes where in conformity with the spirit, purpose and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations. This sounds sympathetic to those actors in-
volved with human rights or the environment as they can easily show how their
work is in line with the Charter. Yet, it almost excludes point-blank multinationals
and other business associations. At first sight, that is, because US multinationals
created their own NGO, the Global Climate Coalition, which on paper could con-
firm with the purpose and principle of the Charter, but whose interests and repre-
sentatives mirrored the multinationals that created it.
Within the dialogue a certain informal hierarchy seems to be in place that deter-
mines which non-state actors will be consulted by state actors at critical times of
the process. The Global Climate Coalition and the International Chamber of
Commerce were seen to be accepted 'partners' on the one hand, and Greenpeace
occupied such a position on the other side, but only in the informal meetings, tak-
ing place between state parties. The logic of the hierarchy seems to be the mem-
bership of the organisation (either by numbers, or by economic power).
5·5·2 Process Legitimacy
Part of the legitimacy of the regulatory solution that the Kyoto protocol sought to
provide to global warming, is provided by the transparency of the process in
which and through which this regulatory answer has been created. Therefore, it is
important to study the official rules on communications and the role of the NGOs
and the media.
The official rules on communications can be found in the FCCC/CP/1996/2-
document. This document describes the responsibilities of the Secretariat with
regard to the communications prior, during, and after the conference of the  par-
ties. The first responsibility of the secretariat is to inform the Parties at least two
months before the session on the dates and the venue. The communication to
the observers mentioned in article 6 and 7 was less strict, because article 8 does
not have a timeframe attached. The only criterion is 'so that [the sessions] may be
represented by observers'. The secretariat was responsible for drafting the agenda
(rule 10). The agenda had to be distributed at least six weeks before the session
(article 11). During the conference (rule 29), the Secretariat should:
-   Arrange for interpretation at the session;
- Receive, translate, reproduce and distribute the documents ofthe session;
-   Publish and distribute the official documents ofthe session;
-   Make and arrange for keeping sound recordings ofthe session;
-   Arrange for the custody and preservation of the documents ofthe session; and
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-   Perform all the other work that the Conference ofthe Parties may require.
Much of the negotiations in Kyoto took place behind closed doors. But, with tele-
vision cameras inside, the non-state actors where able to follow the debates on
television screens. The lobbying was quite open and the journalists literally sat in
the middle of the action. When meetings were taking place without the cameras
present, official state delegation members occasionally slipped out to give the
non-state actors updates on the events taking place. Other forms of communica-
tion that nation states used included small unofficial meetings of key-
representativess'' press conferences, and direct contact between heads of state.'2
Although not present at the core negotiations between the parties, NGOs and
media played an important role according to contemporary reports, as can be il-
lustrated by the following quote from the Earth Negotiations Bulletin:
NGOs and members of the 'fourth estate' - the media - played a pivotal role
that paralleled the remote negotiations going on between presidents and
prime ministers. Their experts provided background information and analyses
to delegations ready to listen, their communication experts produced press re-
leases in Kyoto and at home within hours of developments, and their tradi-
tional activists staged colourful thought provoking actions ranging from a
Friends of the Earth award for the top dirty industries and penguins sculptured
in ice... 53
The media and the NGOs were mixed together in a large hall. The general nego-
tiations could be followed through large screens because inside the central nego-
tiating room there was not enough room for all NGOs and the media. The busi-
ness NGOs met on one side of the hall, and the all the other NGOs on the other
side. Each group had facilities to call closed meetings.54 The journalists worked at
long tables in the middle of this space amid 'the untidy sprawl of press releases
from the NGOs'.55
In the lobby rooms, NGOs were involved with the traditional lobbying of the dele-
gations and journalists before, during and after the official meetings. They did so
for instance by organizing workshops, issuing a 'negotiations bulletin'56, or catch-
51   Kyoto report.
52   During COP Ill, US president Bill Clinton telephoned presidents and prime-ministers from
Washington DC and 'asked them' to deal with positions that their negotiation teams were
taking in Kyoto that the US delegation was not finding 'helpful' (as stated by the head of the
US delegation Eizenstat in press conference 97/12/11 and by vice-president Al Gore in press
conference 97/12/08)
53   ENB 13/12/1997• P· 15
54 Leggett 1999, p. 303
55 Leggett 1999, p. 300.
56 For instance the 'Earth Negotiations Bulletin' issued by the International Institute for Sus-
tainable Development which came out every day, containing a short summary of the preced-
ing day, important meetings for the day and some background information. There was great
concern  of the parties to the convention  on the volume of the documentation.  One of the
ways to bring the volume down was through a restricted page on the Internet. Other restric-
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ing media attention. During the meetings behind closed doors members of na-
tional delegations occasionally slipped out of the meetings to update NGOs on
what was going on behind the closed doors.57
In conclusion, the question remains whether the NGOs and the media had any
significant effect on the outcome of the negotiations, but they seem to have con-
tributed to make the whole negotiating process more transparent and more open
than ever before. It might also very well be that their effect was substantially lim-
ited because these actors had great difficulty in grappling with and communicat-
ing the political and technical complexity of the agreement in the first place.S8
5.6 EfFectiveness ofthe Outcome
At the 12th plenary meeting, on December lith, the Conference of the Parties
adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC/CP/1997/L.7).59 The Kyoto protocol was opened for signa-
ture on March 16,1998, for a period of one year. It enters force when 55 nations
have ratified it, provided that these ratifications include Annex I Parties that ac-
count for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.w The Proto-
col shall enter into force on the nineteenth day after the day that these demands
have been met (article 25).
Five years later, on November 26th 2003, the UNFCC published a list of ratiflca-
tion and signatures. At that moment 120 countries had ratified the protocol, ac-
counting for a total of 44,2 % of the emissions in  1990. As major countries  like
Russia and the United States have not ratified the protocol, despite the US ad-
ministration signing it on March 16th, 1998, it means that the protocol, five years
later, had not entered into force:, Finally, in October 2004, Russia's cabinet for-
mally approved the protocol and then sent it to parliament for an untroubled rati-
fication. The trade offcame when the EU pledged to support Russia's application
for the WTO.62
With regard to the outcome of the whole negotiating process it is interesting to
note that no state party will be held accountable for not applying the Kyoto proto-
col demands after their ratification process, for as long as the protocol has not
been adopted. There are no incentives, nor means of pressure to start working
towards meeting the criteria, for as long as the protocol has not been 'activated'.
A system of peer pressure and peer review has not been introduced for the time
being. The signatories will perhaps feel a common responsibility for the fact that
tions were found in limiting the number of translations, limiting hard copy circulation,
avoiding repetition and keeping to tight schedules. See decision 18/CP.3 taken at the 2· pie-
nary meeting on December 1  1997
57 Leggett 1999, p. 305
58 See Grubb 1999, p. 64
59   FCCC/CP/1997/7, P· 2860
Article 24 and 25 ofthe Kyoto protocol.
61 http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf, accessed on January 26 2004
62 The Economist, October 7th 2004
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the criteria will not be met, but individual states will not be held accountable for
the failure ofthe Kyoto-protocol.
5·7 Analysis
One of the long standing roles of nation-state organisations has been to negotiate
the national interest within the wider framework of International Organisations
such as the United Nations. The negotiations over the Kyoto-protocol took place
at an intersection of the national interest of states and growing worldwide con-
cerns over global warming. In this section we will analyse the findings for each
dimension ofour empirical framework.
Firstly, we will look at the positions of the actors. The initial reports on the rela-
tionship between global warming and greenhouse gases were produced by a body
ofthe United Nations. Initially, nation-states seemed not too keen to actively pur-
sue policies countering the causes and effects of global warming as they were
concerned for potential negative effects of these policies on their national econo-
mies. However, the concern over Global Warming managed to capture attention
in the global public square. There, outside state and international structures, the
concern over Global Warming lead to the creation of global coalitions of con-
cerned constituencies which used their political and consumer leverage to make
their voices heard vis-a-vis official state representatives and (inter)national struc-
tures. These coalitions consisted of 'green' political parties, 'green' NGOs and the
media. Together they managed to put the issue on the international political
agenda as the most pressing international environmental problem ofthe 19905.
The fact that the United Nations has had a history with regard to raising concerns
over global warming, apparently made it the most natural platform for state-
actors to discuss the need for measures to counter the causes and effects of
Global Warming. In wake ofthe outside pressure of concerned constituencies, the
UN frameworks provided the state-actors with the relative safety of a political
arena where they could occupy the key-positions and have the strongest political
leverage.
The nature of non-state engagement with the negotiations in Kyoto varied for dif-
ferent types of non-state actors. The majority of NGOs had access to the UN-
network based on an accreditation with the UN. There were some innovations
though. Multinationals managed to enter this particular arena by organising their
interests in newly created pro-business NGOs which fell well within UN-
accreditation criteria. Furthermore, both NGOs and multinationals have some of
their national representatives inserted as part ofthe official state-delegations that
were conducting the negotiations. This gave them unique insights and potential
influence at crucial stages in the preparatory negotiations leading up to the Proto-
col. Finally, some state-representatives considered some particular coalitions of
concerned constituencies crucial enough to have them present through crucial
political deliberations at the highest political levels.
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Secondly, we will look at the capacities ofthe significant stakeholders in the nego-
tiations. Which actor has been capable of acting adequately during the creation of
a new regulatory regime in International RelationsP
Within the group of state actors the United States played a dominant role. The
strong position of the United States was reflected by the large US delegations
present in Kyoto. This did not come as a complete surprise, because the US
economy is the largest consumptive economy of the world. A profound change in
its ecological policies would have a measurable effect on the total emission of
greenhouse gases. However, the Republican-dominated US Congress was not
convinced of the benefits and success of the proposed protocol. The Republican
Congress representatives present in Kyoto made it clear that they would block any
agreement by the US Vice-President on binding rules and penalties for the emis-
sion of greenhouse-gases as long as some countries had to reduce their emis-
Sions while other, Third World, countries did not have to face up to these criteria.
Hereby US domestic politics had become international politics for the rest of the
world.
The American objections to the protocol were clear to all actors from the outset.
When the protocol was adopted at the final meeting without the obligations to the
Third World, the participants knew that the US would not rati& it, at that time
even signing had become questionable. A protocol on the reduction of the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases without the United States, could have meant that it
would not be taken seriously. This might explain why the number ofAnnex I coun-
tries needed for ratification was not met until 7 years later, and why the total
emission reductions still fall well bellow the target line for putting the Protocol
into action.
Thirdly, we will take a look at the accessibility of the arena. The fact that much of
the international political and legal development up to the point of the protocol
had been taking place in the context of the United Nations, and to be more pre-
cise within the FCCC, meant that other actors that entered the arena were doing
so within the margins set out by the FCCC-network. The strong position of states
made them almost independent of the NGOs and 'cloaked' multinationals pre-
sent. The dimension of the accessibility of the negotiations shows that the new
actors were barely able to enter the inner circle of the negotiations. During the
twelve days of negotiating, the state representatives met in special negotiation
rooms with little space or access to non-state actors. The non-state actors where
able to follow the talks on big screens, or (when they were behind 'closed-doors')
depended on state representatives sharing information upon leaving the negotia-
tion-sessions. Yet, some non-state actors managed to get into meetings were the
real decisions were being taken, but had no vote. The path ofthe negotiations was
to a large extent determined by the previous initiatives ofthe United Nations, and
the rules that came with those initiatives. Not surprisingly, the 'real' arena was the
meeting of senior ministers, which took place at the beginning of the second
week, and to which the majority of state delegations had no access. At that meet-
ing, the real decisions were being made, including instructions for the state dele-
gations to work towards the conclusion of the negotiations.
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When it came to the official decision-making, the 'end'-game, non-state actors did
have no official role. They had to wait outside the rooms where the meetings are
taking place, or sat on the few reserved 'observer' seats.63 In the end, the large
state delegations were only there to prepare the way for the real decision-making:
the ministers meeting at senior ministerial level. As the ministers arrived relatively
late to the process, there had hardly been any chance for the non-state actors to
lobby them before their round of negotiations started.
Fourthly, we have assumed in the previous chapters that the legitimacy of emerg-
ing global governance regimes for a substantial part depends on their transpar-
ency. The Kyoto-negotiations as such were transparent in many ways. On the one
hand, through the official channels of conferences, through press bulletins,
through the reporting of many journalists and other media, on the other hand,
through the unofficial channels, the members of delegations walking out of meet-
ings to talk with the press, the presence of significant NGO representatives at
'closed door meetings'. And during the whole event the world watched the live
coverage ofthe events. Subsequently, the missing details ofthe negotiations have
come out in later years, enabling a reconstruction that offers a fair impression of
what went on during those events in Kyoto. Holding actors, based on that infor-
mation, accountable for the outcome of the negotiations can only be done
through the political process ofeach state.
Finally, the effectiveness of the global governance regime itself is significant in
comparison to existing international legal frameworks. Have the actors been able
to come up with an effective regulatory answerP The answer to this question is
tricky. The results of the Kyoto negotiations are still controversial. It has taken un-
ti| 2004 before the Kyoto protocol became officially effective. Until that moment,
the willingness of state governments to implement the Kyoto protocol was limited
and it was a bargain over Russia's membership of the WTO in 2004 that finally
brought the Kyoto mechanism into place. Non-state actors had not been able to
speed up the procedures for implementation after their initial impact on placing
the issue on the global agenda. It was a trade off between states, membership of
the WTO vis-&-vis ratification ofthe Kyoto protocol, that made the protocol a legal
instrument. Although not having placed the issue on the international agenda,
state actors dominated the response to the issue of global warming. And from
that moment, non-state actors could affect events from the side-line. As soon as
the ink on the protocol had dried, the Kyoto arena became a specific state-
concern once again. Non-state actors were not directly involved in the follow-up
after Kyoto.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at the first case-study that might help us to develop a
better understanding ofthe relationship between emerging arrangements regulat-
ing International Relations and the traditional body of International Law. The ne-
63  ECOSOC E/1996/31, article 50 states that in recognition ofthe intergovernmental nature of
these conferences the NGOs will not be able to have a negotiating role.
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gotiations in Kyoto provided a complex case-study of the interaction between the
highly integrated and highly developed political networks ofthe UN and the new
architectures and networks of concerned constituencies that interacted with the
process. Some significant shifts seem to have occurred in the way this interaction
took place.
The first shift seems to have occurred with regard to non-state involvement within
the UN-network. Although no changes occurred in the official criteria regulating
non-state interactions with the UN, the changes occurred at a more practical
level. By creating NGOs that fell within the UN criteria for NGO-accreditation,
multinationals were able to make their voices heard during the negotiations in
places that had hitherto been inaccessible. The same can be said for some NGOs,
whose representatives had become part of some official state-delegations.
Thereby the distinctions between NGO-representatives, State-representatives,
and Business-representatives are becoming blurred. Furthermore, the nature of
the actors themselves is becoming fuzzy and blurred as well. If internationally op-
erating non-state representatives become embedded within national state-
delegations then this heightens the complexity of understanding whom or what is
creating a new regulatory framework and whether this is part of the traditional
body of International Law or not.
The second shift seems to have occurred with regard to the effectiveness of the
outcome. At first, the Kyoto-protocol seemed to become a dead-letter. As soon as
the ink had dried, national governments seemed to be very reluctant to ratify the
treaty or to bind themselves to practical policies that would enable them to com-
ply with the protocol should it become effective in the near future. This attitude
can be partially explained by the position of the United States. Although the
United States influenced almost every aspect of the protocol, including the idea of
trading emission rights, it refused to ratify the outcome which it had negotiated
for. Yet, initially, and based on historic experiences, any international agreement
on global warming without American approval or support looked, given the size
ofthe US economy, doomed to fail.
However, despite national opposition to ratification, we see a denationalisation of
international politics within the United States. A growing coalition of states and
major cities within the United States has now (2007) joined forces with con-
cerned NGOs, socially responsible multinationals and the media. Together they
have decided to implement local measures and policies to comply with the Kyoto
Protocol regardless of the opposition to the Protocol expressed by the federal
government. Finally, many US manufacturers have found that, with regard to the
export of goods and services,  they  have to comply with Kyoto-criteria  as they are
becoming used as part of import restrictions by other countries.
In this case we have seen how the creation of a new regulatory arrangement trying
to coordinate worldwide policies with regard to the emission of Greenhouse gas-
ses was firmly embedded within the institutions of International Law. But, even
within this embedded network, we have discovered new complexities of interac-
tion and policy-making that seem to develop in directions beyond the traditional
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body and structures of International Law. In Kyoto, the formalised institutions and
distinctions between state and non-state actors seem to have undergone some
foundational changes. States can be (partially) represented by NGOs, multina-
tionals can become NGOs, and local state-organisations can comply with interna-
tional agreements even when national state-representatives will not do so. Overall
the picture is one offuzziness, transformations, and growing complexities. But, in
the words of a Canadian minister for the Environment: 'it is a start, and at this
moment, it is the best we have .
, 64
64 Canadian minister for the Environment David Anderson speaking on the eve of the Cana-
dian ratification ofthe protocol. Duin 2002. P. 8.
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6.     The Fair Labor Association
6.1 Introduction
Bad working conditions in the apparel industry are often used by NGOs to raise
public awareness of the negative effects of globalisation: As such, sweatshops
have become to symbolise 'bad globalisation', and companies try to avoid work-
ing with them out of fear of consumer boycotts. Despite the high symbolic pres-
ence of sweatshops in anti-globalisation debates, the sectors in which sweatshops
are concentrated - clothing, shoes, sport goods and toys, account for less than 10
percent ofthe total world goods export:
One of the results of the raised public concern for the production of consumer
goods has been the labelling of consumer goods as being 'sweatshop-free'.
Among the early initiatives to introduce a labelling system was the White House
Apparel Industry Partnership (1996), which in turn led to the creation of the Fair
Labor Association (FLA). The FLA is the result of a public debate in the United
States over the need for some sort of regulation, and the subsequent work of a
Presidential Task Force. This chapter explores the relationship the Fair Labor As-
sociation and the existing body of International Law with regard to multinationals'
responsibilities for working conditions in sweatshops.
The FLA seems to contain some sort of international 'rules'. The FLA itself re-
sembles a pseudo-legal order. Pseudo, because it is not part of the domestic or
international legal order. It's status is more like a policy network, with a more
formalised system of peer pressure, public pressure and independent assess-
ments of practices to enforce rules. The reach of the FLA is global because many
US multinationals operate through subcontractors around the world. The working
conditions in the factories of these subcontractors are subject to the FLA control-
ling system.
This case study follows the framework set out in chapter 4. After having intro-
duced the actors and their positions, we will take a closer look at their capacities
during the creation, implementation and subsequent functioning ofthe FLA.
6.2 The Position ofthe Actors
The Fair Labor Association has been set up as non profit association under
American Law. It is made up of a Board of Directors, Participating Companies, Af-
filiated Colleges and Universities, and Independent External Monitors.
The Board of Directors consists of i 6 representatives, six from industry, six from
labour organisations and other NGOs, three university representatives and an in-
' Klein 2000-2, Friedman 1999, Knight and Greenberg 2002.
2   Legrain 2002,9 64·
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dependent chair. The chair is selected by a committee from the board of direc-
tors.1 The other representatives are chosen through peer selection by the groups:
The industry Board Members shall be selected by a majority of Participating
Companies...in the Association. The Labor/NGO Board Members shall be se-
lected  by a majority of then-serving Labor/NGO Board Members. The univer-
sity Board Members shall be chosen by the University Advisory Council.4
Companies can become members when they undertake 'in good faith' the follow-
ing:
1. To adopt, and cause its applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers to
adopt, the Workplace Code in the manufacture of its products;
2. to formally convey the Workplace Code (in the applicable local language) to
company factories, and applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers, and
communicate the company's commitment to comply with the Workplace
Code to senior officers, managers and employees of both the company and its
applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers;
3·   to implement a system of internal monitoring that complies with the Monitor-
ing Principles;
4. to submit its Applicable Facilities to unannounced monitoring visits con-
ducted by accredited independent external monitors assigned by the FLA
staff...; and
5. to pay annual assessments to the Association. Assessments shall be deter-
mined by the Board of Directors of the Association based on a formula related
to the annual revenues of each Participating Company. The minimal annual
assessment for each Participating Company shall be $ 5000.5
The  Board of Directors of the FLA determines whether a company is eligible to
participate. On March ist 2004 eleven companies had been found eligible to par-
ticipate.
Colleges and Universities face fewer demands when joining the FLA. They be-
come affiliated members through the University Advisory Council. There are five
categories within this group. The first two (A, B depending on consolidated reve-
nues) are required to undertake the same requirements associated with the Par-
ticipating Companies. The other categories (C, D) are "watered down" obligations
with lesser obligations and restrictions.7 On March ist 2004, more than 1100 col-
leges and universities were affiliated members:
The selection of independent external monitors is, understandably, very critical.
The main concern ofthe whole association is that the monitors are independent:
3 Charter Document FLA, P. 7.
4 Charter Document FLA, p. 6.
 Charter Document FLA, p. 11.www.fairlabor.org accessed at March ist 2004
; Charter Document FLA, p. 13www, fairlabor.org accessed at March i st 2004
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Neither the independent external monitor nor any of its employees personally
involved in the monitoring of a Participating Company or College or University
Licensee shall have any business or financial relationship with, including hold-
ing any equity or debt securities Of, the Company or Licensees, contractors or
suppliers that would conflict with or compromise its ability to conduct moni-
toring in a neutral, impartial manner; and
The independent external monitor shall not provide other services to the Par-
ticipating Company or College or University Licensee, or shall not have pro-
vided other services to the Company or Licensee in the twelve month period
prior to its consideration to be an external monitor...9
This position has to be maintained throughout the whole period of the involve-
ment of the external monitor with the FLA. Furthermore an independent monitor
should have the following qualifying characteristics for each country for which it
seeks accreditation:
Background knowledge (on the business and the local culture)
Demonstrated ability to monitor workplace conditions
· Demonstrated ability to analyse and report
•   Willingness to undergo a trail period with the FLA before accreditation
•   Willingness to accept accountability to the FLA for 'professional misconduct or
gross negligence in the conduct of its monitoring or the preparation or con-
tent of its monitoring reports'.'°
There are currently 12 leading brand-name companies participating in the FLA.
These are Adidas-Salomon, Eddie Bauer, GEAR for Sports, Gildan Activewear, Liz
Claiborne, New Era Cap. Nordstrom, Nike, Patagonia, Reebok, Philips-Van Heus-
den and Zephyr. Colleges and universities joined the FLA in order to promote fair
and decent conditions in the production of goods bearing their logo. By early
2004, there were over 175 colleges and universities affiliated with the FLA. 11
Through an NGO network, called the NGO Advisory Council, the FLA is trying to
cooperate with labour NGOs. This network aims to be both a resource for the FLA
and for the NGOs involved. The FLA encourages NGOs who are interested in col-
laborating with the FlA and its stakeholders to join the network. The NGO Advi-
sory Council currently has members in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, and the
United States."
9 Charter Document FLA, p. 15
10 Charter Document FLA, p. 16-18. There are 12 auditing organisations cooperating in this ini-
tiative, www.fairlabor. org accessed at March ist 2004.
11 www.fairlabor.org accessed at 10.02.2004.
12 www.fairlabor.org accessed at 10.02.2004.
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In conclusion, the FLA contains a whole range of non-state actors that tradition-
ally do not belong to the arenas of International Relations, most are the universi-
ties and colleges.
6.3 The Capacities ofthe Actors
In 1993, US Labor Secretary Reich announced initiatives to fight sweatshops. In
the subsequent years, the US Labor department organised some conferences and
roundtables on the issue. In December 1995, Reich announced a "Trendsetter"
list containing retailers and manufacturers that were working to end the practice
of sweatshops in the United States.'3 In that same year, the sweatshop issue hit
the American media with a scandal in El Monte, California, were 70 people were
working in a sweatshop behind barbed wire.14 Over the next few months, investi-
gative journalism linked companies, and products by Gap, Nike, and Kathie Lee
Gifford, to the sweatshop issue. A public reaction followed, consisting of con-
sumer boycotts, e-mail bombardments, and protest marches in the United States
and subsequently spreading to various place all over the world.15
By August 1996, the public reactions, consumer boycotts, and the subsequent po-
litical debates, had become strong enough to convince U.S. President Bill Clinton
to establish a presidential task force, the Apparel Partnership Initiative, in which
corporations and some representatives of labour and NGOs were 'invited' to de-
velop minimal standards at apparel factories in the U.S. and abroad:6 There was
a direct link between public reactions and the President's actions, according to
Assistant Attorney General, joel Klein, in 2000:
In response to publicity about...working conditions, President Clinton, in Au-
gust 1996, convened a meeting of United States apparel and footwear manu-
facturers, as well as labor unions, consumer, human rights, and religious or-
ganization representatives, and urged them to develop standards for working
conditions that would eliminate sweatshop working conditions, and to allow
adherents to those standards to convey the fact of such adherence to the con-
suming public. 17
During the press conference in the Rose Garden, the President set out the aim of
the presidential task force:
Our nation has always stood for human dignity and the fundamental rights of
working people. We believe everyone should work, but no one should have put
their lives into jeopardy to put food on the table for their families. That's why I
am pleased to announce that the companies gathered here today have agreed
to begin working together to put an end to this problem.
,3   AIPA, 14·04·1997
14  OPS, 12.09·1996.
1   Klein 2000-2, pp 366-379, Bullert 199916   Bullert 1999, p. 7.
17 K|ein 2000-1, p.1.
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They have agreed to do two things. First, they will take additional steps to en-
sure that the products they make are manufactured under decent and human
working conditions. Second, they will develop options to inform consumers
that the products they buy are not produced under those exploitative condi-
tions. They have agreed to report back to me within a maximum of six months
about their progress.
18
The Presidential task force consisted of 18 members from the business world (in-
cluding Nike) and civil society (including The Interfaith Center on Corporate Re-
sponsibility, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Robert F. Kennedy
Memorial Center for Human Rights).19 Within a year this task force would come
up with its first results.
At the same time, legislation was introduced in the US House of Representatives,
the Child Labor Free Consumer Information Act, which sought to introduce a vol-
untary labelling system for products that had not been produced through child la-
bour. The reasons for the 'voluntary' nature ofthe labelling system was, according
to the representative George Miller, that consumers liked this and it would not
hinder international trade obligations.20
On April 14th, 1997, the Presidential Task force presented the results of its delib-
erations to the President. President Clinton was satisfied with their results:
Now, here's what they agreed to do: first a workplace code of conduct that
companies will voluntarily adopt, and require their contractors to adopt, to
dramatically improve the conditions under which goods are made. The code
will establish a maximum work week, a cap of 12 hours on the amount of over-
time a company can require, require that employers pay at least the minimum
prevailing wage, respect basic labor rights. It will require safe and healthy work-
ing conditions and freedom from abuse and harassment. Most important, it
will crack down on child labor -prohibiting the employment of those under 15
years ofage in most countries.
It will also take steps to ensure that this code is enforce and the American con-
sumers will know that the tenets of the agreement are being honoured.
21
The Apparel Industry Partnership addressed the issues specifically with the aim of
eradicating sweatshops in the United States and abroad. In their view, the formu-
lations of the standards in the agreement defined decent and humane working
conditions. Its main concern, according to the text of the agreement (a Workplace
Code of Conduct), seems to have been consumer perceptions:
,8   OPS, 12.09,1996.
'9  AIPA, 14.04·1997
20 US House of Representatives 1996, p. E 1658 - E 1660. At the same time US Senator Tom
Harkin introduced a likewise proposal in the Senate (H.R. 4125 / S. 2094)· The measures
were referred to the subcommittees in Congress. They did not become law.
21   OPS 14·04·1997
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The partnership believes that consumers can have confidence that products
that are manufactured in compliance with these standards are not produced
under exploitative or inhumane conditions.22
These workplace standards were developed by multinationals and NGOs on the
invitation by the President, in a reaction to the public outcry over the sweatshop
issue. What the initiative now needed was an enforcement mechanism.
Agreement on the enforcement mechanism took significantly longer than the first
agreement on the standards. In November 1998, a sub-group ofthe partnership
comprising four of the companies (Liz Claiborne, Nike, Patagonia, and Reebok)
and four of the human rights groups (the International Labor Rights  Fund, the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center
for Human Rights and the National Consumers League) negotiated a preliminary
agreement on establishing the Fair Labor Association to oversee monitoring of
the Code.21 The Fair Labor Association was formally established in 1999 according
to American Law, and is based in Washington, D.C. The mission ofthe Fair Labor
Association is:
..to combine the efforts of industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
colleges and universities to promote adherence to international labor stan-
dards and improve working conditions worldwide.24
The FLA has seven purposes. First, it is to accredit independent monitors and en-
sure high professional standards in the conduct of independent external monitor-
ing. Secondly, it is to verify, evaluate and publicly account independently for the
internal compliance programs of each participating company so as to serve as a
source of information to consumers. Thirdly, it has to certify whether brands of a
participating company are produced in compliance with FLA standards. Fourthly,
it conducts programs to allow Colleges and Universities to become participating
companies. Fifthly, it works with agents and suppliers to facilitate programs that
lead to greater and sustainable commitment and capacity of individual factories
to respect labour rights and improve conditions at work. Sixthly, it will address
questions critical to the elimination of unfair labour practices. Finally, it will serve
as a source of information to the public about the Workplace Code and the Moni-
toring Principles. 25
In conclusion, a combination of state capacities and resources and newly discov-
ered capacities of public pressure groups and other NGOs helped to create a new
regulatory initiative to address working conditions in clothing manufacturing.
22   AIPA, 14.04.1997·
23 Connor 2001, p. 29 Three other NGOs decided that they would not continue this track be-
cause they found the proposed monitoring system 'unacceptably weak'.4 Charter Document FLA. p. 1
25 Charter Document FLA, p. iii.
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6.4 Accessibility while creating an Arena
The FLA started as a dialogue between representatives of companies and  NGOs
on the invitation of President Clinton. The rules of the founding charter reflect an
institutional concern to keep this dialogue going. There are strict criteria on who
can enter the dialogue; there are criteria on what the dialogue should be about.
And there are criteria that determine how a dialogue should be concluded (vot-
ing).
The FLA has to have certain flexibility to demands from outside the arena. The
monitors are independent and, as a result, will bring their own dynamic to the
process. There is a system for third party complaints, whereby the FLA has to re-
spond to allegations of non-compliance by others than those already in the arena.
This system could be seen as an independent controlling mechanism.
In April 2000, the FLA released a document containing the benchmarks and
guidelines. A year later, the organisation approved of seven companies to partici-
pate in its program and it accredited three NGOs to be "independent external
monitors".26 Nike, for example, was one ofthe companies accredited to the com-
pliance program. Nike's compliance staff, originally focusing on its own Code of
Conduct, doubled between august 2001 and august 2002 to 64 members. The
Vice President of Compliance was supported at Nike headquarters by a 10 person
staff, with other compliance officers operating from regional offices around the
world.27
The rules reflect a dialogue between business demands and broader concerns.
Businesses are particularly vulnerable when information of their production
methods reaches the streets. Their competitors are listening as well. So the FLA
contains certain safeguards that information will not be put out on the street eas-
ily. On the other hand the needs of the consumer public to know whether a com-
pany is acting according to FLA principles have been addressed by giving compa-
nies a relatively short period, 90 days, to remedy any wrongdoings. After that their
behaviour will be judged and communicated to the outside world.
In conclusion, the arena is very accessible to parties that directly have a stake at
play in the working conditions in the apparel industry, and are willing to engage in
a dialogue and actions over those issue, as well as third parties coming from out-
side the FLA network that want to raise an issue or make a specific point.
6.5 Legitimacy ofthe Process
The core dimension of legitimacy in this study consists of input legitimacy and
process legitimacy. Both elements ofthis dimension will be discussed in the next
two sections.
26
Connor 2001, p. 29
27   FLA 2003, p. 47·
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6.5.1 Input Legitimacy
All the reports and other information provided to the FLA by the Participating
Companies and accredited independent external monitors are accessed by the
FLA staff. Based on the confidential assessment of the staff the Executive Direc-
tors of the Association shall advise the Board of Directors whether the production
of Applicable Brands of a Participating Company shall be certified and what
measures a company should take the following year in order to stay certified. The
Director and the Board evaluate on the following factors:
• effective implementation by the Participating Company of an internal compli-
ance program and independent external monitoring system consistent with
the Monitoring Principles;
• timely remediation by the Participating Company of instances of non-
compliance with the Workplace Code or Monitoring Principles found by inter-
nal or accredited independent external monitors; and,
in situations where monitors have found a significant and/or persistent pat-
tern of non-compliance, or instances of serious non-compliance, with the
Workplace Code or Monitoring Principles, the taking of adequate steps by the
Participating Company to prevent recurrence in other Applicable Facilities
where such type of non-compliance may occur. 28
The decisions of the Board of Directors are the results of a voting procedure laid
out in the Charter:
•   The decision whether to certify initially that the Applicable Brands of a Partici-
pating Company are produced in Compliance with the Fair Labor Association
Standards, based on reports of the Association's accredited independent ex-
ternal monitors, and the approval of the initial Association Public Report re-
garding such Participating Company: Simple Majority Vote;
•   The decision whether to renew, for an additional one-year period, the certifica-
tion of a Participating Company's Applicable Brands and the approval of the
annual Association Public Report regarding such Participating Company: Sim-
pie Majority Vote.29
The rules on decision-making are very clear. There are rules with regard to the
motivation ofthe decision, and there are rules on the way the voting by the Board
should be taking place.
If a company is found to be in non-compliance with the FLA standards, then it will
be placed on a special review by the Board of Directors for a period of 90 days.
During this special review period no communications will be made externally - to
the public - that a company is in compliance with the FLA standards. This period
of review can be extended in order to a||ow a Company to remedy its activities to
28 Charter Document FLA, p. 25
29 Charter Document FLA, p. 8-9.
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be in compliance. During this period the company keeps its status as a Participat-
ing Company. 30
The Board of Directors may decide at the end of a special review period that a
company has not effectively addressed the issues that required the period of re-
view. It then may decide to terminate the participation of that Participating Com-
pa ny.31
In the event that the status of a Participating Company is placed on a special
review, the decision whether such a Company shall have its participation in the
Association terminated following the special review period: Supermajority
vote.32
A "supermajority" vote requires the approval of at least two-thirds of all the indus-
try members of the board and at least two-thirds of all Labor/NGO members of
the board, with the chair having no vote on the matter.13 The fact that a com-
pany's participation has been terminated will be made public by the FLA. 14
The FLA has also a third party compliant procedure that allows any person or or-
ganization to initiate a complaint to a multinational or university / college. Such a
third party should report 'any significant and/or persistent pattern of non-
compliance, or individual incident of serious non-compliance, with the Workplace
Code or Monitoring Principles with respect to any Facility of a Participating Com-
pany or any Facility or College or University Licensee that is subject to the FLA
Monitoring Process.15
6.5.2 Process Legitimacy
The Fair Labor Association is an instrument developed to combine the efforts of
industry, NGOs, colleges and universities to promote adherence to international
labour standards and improve working conditions world wide.
Multinationals can choose either to adopt their own code of conduct, or to adopt
the Work Place Code that has been developed by the Apparel Industry Partner-
ship's Agreement of 1997. The principles of monitoring contain obligations of
companies and ofthe independent external monitors. The obligations of compa-
nies are covered by the Apparel Industry Partnership's Agreement, and can be
summarized as follows:
(i) establish clear standards;
(ii)     create an informed workplace;
(iii)    develop an information database;
30 Charter Document FLA, p. 26.
p Charter Document FLA, p. 26.
32 Charter Document FLA. p. 9.
13 Charter Document FLA, p. 4.
14 Charter Document FLA, p. 26.
15 Charter Document FLA. p. 27-28.
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(iv)     establish a program to train company monitors;
(v) conduct periodic visits or audits;
(vi) provide employees with opportunity to report non-compliance;
(vii) establish relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other local
Institutions;
(viii)establish means of remediation. 36
The independent monitors will have to demonstrate satisfaction of the independ-
ence criteria ofthe FLA. The five obligations for independent monitors are:
(i) Maintain standards of independence,
(ii) Conduct independent external monitoring in accordance with FLA
Methodology and procedures,
(iii) Evaluate compliance with the FLA workplace Code of Conduct,
(iv) Report findings of non-compliance in a Timely fashion,
(v) Maintain accountability for the findings.37
The FLA's functioning depends on providing adequate and trustworthy informa-
tion on the adherence to international labour standards by multinationals and
improve working conditions world wide to the general public. Therefore it is not
surprising that the Charter Document contains rules on communications to the
public. Companies can only announce that they are participating in the FLA after
the Board of Directors has approved of this. Claims by companies on adherence
to the FLA standards are even more strongly regulated:
A Participating Company cannot make any public announcement or other
communication to the public that all or some of its Brands are produced in
compliance with the Fair Labor Association Standards and shall not have the
right to use the service mark of the Association unless:
a) such Brands have been certified by the Association to be produced in com-
pliance with the Fair Labor Association Standards; and,
b) the Company continues to satisfy the criteria set above for participation in
the Association. 38
Compliance is not a 'one off show, but should be a continuing commitment.
Only after both these requirements have been met; 'certified compliance' and
'continuing commitment', then a company may communicate with the general
public on this issue and use a service mark in product labelling, advertising and
other communications.
The Fair Labor Association is aware that disclosing information on companies
can be tricky, either because of market competition or for legal reasons. Therefore
a further set of rules was created:
36 Charter Document FLA, p. 8-1 and 8-2.
37 Charter Document FLA. p. 8-4
38 Charter Document FLA, p. 14·
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Neither the Board of Directors nor any member of the Association' staffshall
disclose to the public any information relating to any Participating Company
which is confidential or proprietary, including detailed information or as-
sessment regarding
i)   the overall status of such Participating Company in the Association; or,
ii) the status of a particular unresolved Complaint relating to a Participating
Company, if, in either case, any such information has not already been dis-
closed to the Public or by the Association.39
However, information with regard to the certification of applicable brands shall be
published:
... the status of such Participating Company in the Association, as well as the
identification of the Applicable Brands for which it is seeking certification and
whether such certification has been obtained shall be publicized by the Asso-
ciation and the Association shall issue public reports with respect to each Par-
ticipating Company...40
In the previous sections it was argued that it was precisely the execution of this
rule, through its first report in 2003, which gave the FLA and the companies'
credibility in the eyes ofthe public.
Finally, the Charter Document contains a whole range on rules with regard to the
auditing and monitoring process itself that regulate all the communications be-
tween the FLA, the companies and the independent auditors. These rules contain
specifications for the uniformity of the reports, time schedules and content re-
quirements.4,
6.6 Effectiveness ofthe Outcome
The Fair Labor Association was specifically designed to enforce compliance of
multinationals with fair labour standards. What does 'compliance' mean in this
network? According to the Charter document compliance means:
(i) effective implementation by a Participating Company of an internal compli-
ance program and independent external monitoring consistent with the
Monitoring Principles;
(ii) timely remediation by the Participating Company of non-compliance with
the Work Place Code or Monitoring Principles found by internal or accred-
ited independent external monitors; and,
(iii)in situations where monitors have found a significant and/or significant
persistent pattern of compliance, or instances of serious non-compliance,
with the Work Place Code or Monitoring Principles, the taking of adequate
19 Charter Document FLA, p. 14·
4° Charter Document FLA, p. 14·
42 Charter Document FLA, p. 19-25
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steps by the Participating Company to prevent recurrence in other Applica-
ble Facilities, where such type of non-compliance may occur.42
In the early stages, the actors were accountable to the President of the United
States through their involvement with the Presidential task force, and to the con-
sumers, who where angry over corporate policies involving child labour and
sweatshops. The FLA mechanism holds a very detailed system of corporate ac-
countability to FLA commitments. But not only corporations are being held ac-
countable; the independent monitors are being held accountable for their findings
as well. By ensuring that controllers and controlled are being held accountable in-
dividually, it can be said that the FLA represents a breakthrough in corporate ac-
countability to the public.
On June 4th, 2003, the Fair Labor Association made the findings from independ-
ent audits of seven major footwear and apparel companies public.43 This public
report provided information on the compliance programs that had been put in
place by the multinationals in their first year of full participation in the FLA. In to-
tal, 185 audits were carried out by accredited monitors. In 48 cases instances of
non-compliance were found. The report was unique, according to FLA executive
Director Van Heerden:
This marks a breakthrough in corporate accountability to the public. Working
together, companies and critics have taken a big step beyond talking about so-
cial responsibility and are starting to get the facts into public view.
This means that members of the public will be able to see for themselves ex-
actly what is being found in each factory and what is being done about it.44
The first results showed that all companies had room for improvement. This was
not always easy according to the report, as the Nike case illustrates:
While the company reported that this approach was far more time and re-
source intensive than an approach which focussed on "quick fixes", Nike con-
sidered such close mentoring to be beneficial in the long-term. With regard to
transparency, Nike endeavoured to issue public reports on its supply chain in a
systematic manner. The company published its collegiate producing facilities,
and also started to publish the findings of independent monitoring visits.
While this program stalled, due to legal complications, Nike reported its con-
tinued dedication to transparency in order to foster a balanced understanding
of realities on the factory floor.45
Michael Posner, speaking as an FLA Board Member on behalf of the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, said:
42 Charter Document FLA, p. 3.
43 The companies included were: Adidas-Salomon, Eddie Bauer. Levi-Strauss & Co, Liz Clai-
borne Inc., Nike Inc., Philips van Heusen and Reebok International Ltd.
44   FLA, june 4th, 2003.
45   FLA 2003. P· 48.
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The companies deserve a lot of credit for trusting the public with the grit as
well as the gloss, on an issue that will take persistence and struggle for many
years to come.46
In an interview with Business Week, Posner added:
When you put these reports in the public domain, it creates a huge incentive
for companies to remedy the problems...It's like the old Reagan line: Trust, but
verifi,.47
Magazines, like Business Week and the Financial Times, were positive about this
initiative, as can be illustrated by an article by Maitland in the Financial Times:
Imagine being suspended for five days because you are too ill to get to work.
Or having 30 percent of your day's pay deducted for arriving 32 minutes late.
Or being persistently insulted and humiliated by your supervisor.
These were three of as string of labour, health and safety violations uncovered
at a factory in the Philippines making clothes for Levi Strauss. The abuses
make shocking reading. But what is remarkable is that they have been docu-
mented and made public on the internet with the active cooperation ofthe US
jeans manufacturer.48
This first report went down well with the public and the multinationals involved.
Even after damaging findings, participating companies like Adidas reported that:
This is a precedent-setting report establishing the FLA's leadership role in veri-
fying factory workplace conditions. The report illustrates that monitoring,
remediation and transparent communication are integral elements of the FLA
methodology. This first FLA annual report gives a clearer understanding of the
issues, challenges, and trends that brands face when working with contracted
supply chains.
Adidas-Salomon is committed to continuously improve working conditions
throughout its supply chain, including standards for employment, health and
safety and workers rights.49
However, even the director of the Fair Labor Association, Van Heerden, seems to
be convinced that the best way to protect worker's rights in developing countries
is for the governments to write good legislation and enforce it:
In many ways we are a stopgap response to the lack of enforcement.50
46   FLA, June 4th 2003
47   Bernstein. June 23.2003
48 Maitland, June 10, 2003.
49  Adidas, June 12th. 2003.
5o Ford, June 13th, 2003.
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Although the US government was involved with the initiative, it no longer plays a
role in the issue of accountability. The rules of accountability itself are vague in so
far as that it is unclear whether they are referring to domestic or International
Law, or that they are law at all. The mission statement says that the FLA combines
efforts to "promote adherence to International Law" but then fails to identify what
- if any - International Law, treaties, and conventions this relates to.
The workings of the FLA are clear and can be followed by any one who is inter-
ested. Its operations, its procedures have all been made public and can be ac-
cessed through its website. The companies have to be transparent to the inde-
pendent external monitors, which, in their turn, have to be transparent as well. It
is only in the editing ofthe information that some ofthis transparency is lost in
order to protect companies from loosing vital business opportunities. However, if
a company is not responding adequately to allegations and does not try to make a
real change, than the whole nature of their failure to meet FLA standards will be
made transparent.
The FLA reports annually on the progress that its participating members have
made. The first of these reports was published  in June 2003 and gained  a  lot of
media attention because all the details on violations were there in black and
white. It can be assumed that this "in your face" approach ensures a high level of
credibility with the general public. The articles in the business' and other maga-
zines seem to indicate this reaction.
6.7 Analysis
The events that led to the creation of the FLA started with a limited number of ac-
tors. These actors began to interact with each other in the wake of media revela-
tions about working conditions in sweatshops in California. Through the interven-
tion ofthe American President, who created a special task force, this grew into an
American association with a global impact. In this specific case it seems that ex-
isting International Law practices with regard to the working conditions in manu-
facturing,  such as protected   by  the  I LO-conventions,  were not (automatically)
considered to provide adequate foundations upon which this new mechanism of
global governance in the context of accelerating globalisation was to be build.
First, we will look the significant stakeholders in this case. In the processes lead-
ing up to the creation of the FLA, various actors became involved at different
stages. First, there were the policy announcements and roundtable meetings by
the Clinton administration shortly after assuming office in 1993. But it took a con-
crete scandal in California, brought to light by the media, to raise public aware-
ness and public protest. These spontaneous protesting and self-organising
groups became very powerful. They demonstrated a serious capacity to organise
consumer boycotts, to create headlines, and to cause considerable financial dam-
age to the apparel industry. These initiatives, in turn, gave the American admini-
stration the political leverage, over and against a Republican Congress, to organ-
ise a presidential task force, which brought together representatives from
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corporations and NGOs. This task-force led to the creation of a new independent
actor: the FLA.
Secondly, in this case the capacities of the actors to influence the creation, im-
plementation and subsequent functioning of the FLA changed significantly. Non-
state capacities in a global governance network with regard to the working condi-
tions in the apparel industries around the world were developed without signifi-
cantly affecting state capacities. There are three factors that might help to explain
this development. First, the US government actively encouraged the creation of
the FLA, by giving it a Presidential seal of approval. But no concrete laws were
passed in Congress, partially because the Democratic Administration could not
convince a Republican dominated legislature, so, at least theoretically, all official
options for introducing future legislation remained open. Secondly, although
making a vague reference to International Law, this never materialised into con-
crete commitments to existing international standards. The result being that ILO-
conventions and the resulting state-obligations could not be invoked as being
part ofthe FLA, leaving the US government's responsibilities out of the equation.
Finally, the FLA is based on the voluntary participation ofthe actors, so technically
no actor could be forced by any legal means to co-operate. The only reason that
keeps the FLA together is the risk of public exposure of the multinationals. Any
signal that a multinational intends to pull out of the FLA could give rise to the
idea that they might not be caring about labour conditions at all, which in turn
could result into another financially damaging round of global consumer actions.
Thirdly, the accessibility to the political arena in which the FLA has been created
was based on the notion of dialogue between representatives of NGOs and  MuI-
tinationals brokered by the office of the President. The idea of dialogue has been
institutionalised in the FLA-charter, albeit with safeguards to protect "eavesdrop-
ping" of abstaining competitors of the companies participating in the FLA. The
accessibility of the wider public to the information about reports  has  been  safe-
guarded as well. Participating companies get the reports first, and a 90 day period
to make amendments. After that period, the information will be released in the
public domain. This gives multinationals time to make amendments, but keeps
them under pressure to do so, or face consumer condemnation, and thus loss of
trade. Finally, third parties have access to the arena through an independent third
party complaint procedure. In conclusion the accessibility of the arena depends
for stakeholders is straight forward and comes with safeguards to protect vital
business interests. The accessibility for third-parties has been regulated through a
special complaint procedure.
Fourthly, the legitimacy of the FLA depends to a large extend  on the public per-
ception of transparency. The rules of decision-making are clear and accessible.
Furthermore, the FLA produces year reports and maintains a website. On the
other hand, specific confidential information with regard to vital business inter-
ests or a particular unresolved complaint will not be made available. However, to
ensure the quality of information  (and thus of transparency) independent audits
Will be organised and reported.
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Fifth, the effectiveness of the FLA. Although not being rooted in International Law
or theories, the FLA started out on a good footing with (international) consumers.
The public seemed impressed by the fact that, for the first time, the details ofvio-
lations by participants of the FLA code were made available in black and white.
This 'in your face' policy helped to convince sceptics and forced multinationals to
change policies with regard to working conditions in the apparel industries. Al-
though not a perfect mechanism of global governance, it seems to function as 'a
stopgap response to the lack of enforcement' in developing countries. Apparently,
in the words of the director ofthe FLA, existing international legal frameworks had
not inspired developing countries to provide adequate legislation and enforce it.
6.8 Conclusion
This second case-study looked into the circumstances that led to the creation of a
new arrangement regulating International Relations with regard to labour condi-
tions during the production of clothes and shoes. In this case, no direct relation-
ship could be established between the traditional body of International Law, such
as international ILO standards, and the FLA. While there have been only vague
references to 'International Law', the FLA is firmly based upon, and rooted in,
American legal standards.
Building on, and enabled by, American law and the size and importance of the
American consumer market, the capacity of the  FLA to influence working condi-
tions has been felt in over more than 80 countries around the world. The growing
dependence of national producers on global consumer markets -and, as the larg-
est and most trend setting, the American consumer-market- have made American
legal norms and consumer attitudes de-facto international regulatory standards.
Any multinational hoping to operate on the American consumer market, or any
local company hoping to produce for the American consumer market, will have to
comply with FLA standards. In this case, a complex coalition of concerned con-
stituencies was able, through the use of modern information and communica-
tions technologies, to organise consumer boycotts and national political pressure
on American multinationals to change their behaviour or the behaviour of their
subcontractors, even when their actions were taking place well outside American
territories and under different national laws.
Although there exists a vast network of international regulatory arrangements in
International Law with regard to labour rights and labour conditions, this network
apparently seems to have been insufficiently adapted to ensure the enforcement
of these standards in developing countries. Or, in the words of FLA officials, these
international regulatory arrangements based upon International Law had failed to
'inspire nations to provide adequate legislation and protection measures'.
Through the FLA, American standards are now being 'exported' by a coalition of
social responsible multinationals, human right NGOs and concerned consumers
organisation as a stop-gap measure to protect the exploitation ofworkers.
The effect of this 'export' of American legal norms and consumer concerns has
been that there was a direct and measurable impact with regard to working condi-
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tions in developing nations. Thereby, the FLA is achieving a goal that the existing
body of International Law apparently, at least partially, had failed to achieve. Fur-
thermore, the FLA has created a working auditing mechanism that involves stake-
holding NGOs and stake-holding multinationals. In its first year it carried out 185
audits. In 48 cases misdemeanours were reported and amended under close con-
sumer scrutiny.
In conclusion, we have seen how in this case the particular capacity of states to
create and enforce international regulatory networks with regard to labour condi-
tions has become largely dislodged from state-institutions and/or international
regulatory networks, and has been transferred to a new coalition of non-state ac-
tors. This new coalition has developed international regulatory capacities that in-
fluence actual consumer and producer behaviour well beyond the territorial bor-
ders ofthe country were the FLA originally was created.
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7.    The Global Compact
7.1 Introduction
In 1977, the United Nations started a program to develop a code of conduct for
transnational corporations.' From that moment, the issue of corporate responsi-
bilities with regard to human rights regularly returned on the UN agenda. How-
ever, some states were against the idea that the UN should become involved with
the issue of corporate social responsibility. By 1992, pOlitiCal pressure by the US
government practically forced the UN decide that the project on corporate re-
sponsibility would be transferred from the UN headquarters in New York to the
UNCTAD in Geneva. Soon afterwards, the project was transformed into an advi-
sory body on corporate investment: This did not herald the end of the UN's ef-
forts to develop some sort of regulatory code for multinationals. In 1999 a new
initiative was launched: the Global Compact. In this chapter the relationship be-
tween the Global Compact and the traditional body of International Law with re-
gard to the protection of labour-rights, human rights and the environment will be
explored.
In 1999, the UN Secretary-General presented the Global Compact, a new initiative
engaging multinationals to work directly with the United Nations, in partnership
with labour organisations and other non-governmental organizations in an effort
to identify, disseminate and promote 'good' corporate practices with regard to
nine principles that are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Labour's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. These princi-
ples are:
·  To support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human
rights;
•   To avoid complicity in human rights abuses;
•    To uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining;
To eliminate all forms offorced and compulsory labour;
•   To abolish effectively child labour;
•   To eliminate discrimination with respect to employment and occupation;
•   To support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
•   To promote greater environmental responsibility, and
•    To encourage the development and diffusion of environmental friendly tech-
nologies.
The Global Compact began as a practical answer to a practical problem: how can
global corporate responsibility with regard to human rights, labour rights, and the
i
Malanczuk 1997
2    Yearbook of International Environmental Law 1994
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environment, be achieved when there is no chance of reaching an internationally
binding agreement between nation states? In this specific case it seems that prin-
ciples agreed upon by states, have become the foundations ofa new initiative that
could be seen as an expansion ofthe work ofthe UN - beyond working with states
- to including multinationals and NGOs in a new mechanism of global govern-
ance.
The official mission of the Global Compact seeks to contribute to more sustain-
able and inclusive global markets by embedding them in shared values:
It hopes to foster a more beneficial relationship between business and socie-
ties, paying particular attention to the world's poorest people. Accordingly, the
Compact pursues two complementary goals. The f rst involves efforts to inter-
nalise the Compact and its principles by making them part of business strategy
and operations. The second is to facilitate cooperation and collective problem
solving between different stakeholders. Four key engagement mechanisms are
used to accomplish these goals: Dialogue, Learning, Local Networks and Pro-
ject Partnerships.3
Although the content ofthe Global Compact was inspired by principles of Interna-
tional Law, the institutional legal foundations of the new organisation have re-
mained a bit unclear. It was only well after its creation, that the UN General As-
sembly recognised the importance of this initiative and voiced it's support. So
content-wise the compact contains rules that belong to the body of International
Law, but institutionally-wise the compact looks more like a informal policy net-
work.
Despite these mixed foundations, KelI and Ruggie have expressed their beliefthat
the compact could become an important instrument at the global rule making
level, which aims at closing a perceived governance gap between the social
sphere and the corporate sphere.4 In an important Global Compact publication
this was formulated as follows:
The Global Compact is a voluntary corporate citizenship initiative. As such the
Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument - it does not 'police' or enforce
the behaviour or actions of companies. Rather the Global Compact relies on
the enlightened self-interest of companies, labour and civil society to initiate
and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the Global
Compact is based.5
Ultimately the Global Compact aims to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to
enlist the corporate sector to help close the gap between the strictly economic
sphere and the broader social agendas that exist at the global level today. Or
again, in the words ofthe Guide:
3     UN/GCC january 2003
4 Ke|land Ruggie 1999, p. 111.
5    Guide 2003. P· 4
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The Global Compact seeks to provide a contextual framework to encourage in-
novation, creative solutions, and good practices among participants. The
Global Compact is not a substitute for regulatory structures or other codes. In-
deed, the Global Compact believes that voluntary initiatives and regulatory sys-
tems complement each other and, when combined, provide powerful impetus
in encouraging the wide adoption of responsible corporate citizenship.6
The second goal, according to KelI and Ruggie, is that the United Nations seeks
to establish a substantial level of corporate backing for a more robust UN role in
human rights, environment and labour standards, thereby responding to a grow-
ing imbalance in global governance structures.7 This second goal might have
come in response to financial problems and criticism from US politicians to the
organisation.
The next section will start with introducing the actors in the various networks that
make up the Global Compact mechanisms. Section 3 will describe the develop-
ment of the Global Compact mechanism in several stages. This enables us to see
the strengths and weaknesses of the various actors during the creation-phase,
and the initial implementation phases. Section 4 explores the accessibility of the
Global Compact network. Sections 5 and 6 will zoom in on the legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness of this emerging global governance regime. The final sections  (7 and
8) will discuss the findings and draw conclusions with regard to the relationship
between this new regulatory arrangement and the existing body of International
Law.
7.2 The Position ofthe Actors
The Global Compact is made up offour components: a learning forum, a policy
dialogue, a partnership project and local structures.8 The Learning Forum is a
platform that motivates companies into taking action through implementing the
GC principles. As such it will form a knowledge base to learn how companies can
and are implementing the universal principles. The Learning Forum reinforces the
Policy Dialogues. This second component encourages action networks between
labour and civil society organisations in order to exchange views and substantive
discourse on the contemporary challenges of globalization. Within these net-
works, innovative solutions to complex problems could be developed. More spe-
cific actions are undertaken in the Partnership Projects in which various initiatives
are taken like a project on discrimination at the work floor with the UN and six
companies. Finally, there are the Local Structures that are meant to build links be-
tween grassroots and global activities, facilitating the establishment of country
and regional networks working on Global Compact issues.9
6    Guide 2003, P· 4
7    KelI and Ruggie 1999, p. 105
8    Guide 2003. P. 11.
9    Guide 2003. P. 11.
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We can distinguish at least six categories of actors. In principle, States are not di-
rectly part of the Compact,  but they do provide the essential legitimacy and  uni-
versality to the principles of the Compact.'° The United Nations organisation itself
provides the practical platform for the existence of compact. The other four cate-
gories of actors are: business, labour, civil society organizations, and other actors
like academic networks.  For each of these four categories  it will be investigated
which rules and facts have determined their representation in the Global Compact
Network.
There are four criteria that determine whether a company (national or multina-
tional) can participate in the Global Compact. To participate in the Global Com-
pact, a company:
-  Sends a letter from the Chief Executive Officer (and, where possible, en-
dorsed by the board) to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressing sup-
port forthe Global Compact and its principles;
-  Sets in motions changes to business operations so that the Global Com-
pact and its principles become part of strategy, culture and day-to-day op-
erations;
-  Is expected to publicly advocate the Global Compact and its principles via
communications vehicles such as press releases, speeches etc.; and
-  Is expected to publish in its annual report (or similar corporate report) a
description of the ways in which it is supporting the Global Compact and
its nine principles.
11
In the early days ofthe Compact initiative, some NGOs were worried over the fact
that the UN 'boasted' many companies to be part of the Compact, while only
around forty appeared on the Website. According to UN officials, this was due to
the fact that companies had to fulfil all the requirements ofthe Compact before
they became accepted partners and thus legible for mentioning on the Global
Compact website.'2
The second category of organizations that are part of the Global Compact con-
tains organised Labour. Specific parts of the nine principles that guide the Com-
pact are specifically aimed at labour conditions. The Compact recognises labour
organisations as a part of both industry and society. Because ofthis distinct posi-
tion in relation to both business and civil society, they has been given a separate
position within the network.. Or, in the words ofthe office ofthe Global Compact:
The structures of the international trade union movement equip it to coher-
ently participate in the Compact in a way that covers sector and sectoral en-
gagement as well as general policy issues. Trade unions are representative or-
ganisations that bring to the table long traditions of internal democracy,
transparency, and accountability to members.'3
0   UN/GCC 2003, P. 211
Guide 2003, P· 7
12 UN 12.02.2002.
13    Handout 2003, P· 3
128
THEGLOBAL COMPACT
With regard to NGOs and the Global Compact, a further distinction should be
made between those like Amnesty International that are part of the network (and
are called Project partners), and others, like Corpwatch, who are not part ofthe
network but are still taken seriously by the compact members. The rules on NGO
participation seem to be less formal, less strict, and more functional:
•    A NGO should be willing to engage with all actors;
·  A NGO should have the proven ability to make a substantive contribution to
the network;
•   A NGO should have the ability to transcend a single-issue orientation;
•   The NGO should provide proof of a minimum level of transparency and ac-
countability in matters like membership and funding:4
The demands for NGOs seem to have a highly functional character. Their partici-
pation is only welcome when they in fact can contribute to the project. But as a
result, one can estimate that the valuation of NGO compliance with these rules
can entail a succinct arbitrary dimension. A statement of a multinational repre-
sentative helps to illustrate this:
We will probably select a number of NGOs to obtain their views on the Global
Compact and perhaps create partnerships which, among other things, will give
them more insights into our operations. 15
From this statement, one can deduce a further requirement for NGOs: they must
be acceptable for the multinationals. And even then, real partnerships are 'op-
tional'. This should come as no surprise given the origins ofthe initiative. Most
relationships between multinationals and NGOs are strained:6 As the bonds be-
tween multinationals and the UN were tightened, the NGOs were kept largely at
bay.
Finally, there is a category of'other actors', which is comprised of'relevant' insti-
tutions that might facilitate the efforts at internalising the Compact's principles.
This category includes academic and think tank organisations.'7 It is not exactly
clear what determines their participation, but it is not unlikely that the NGO
guidelines were followed.
7.3 The Capacities ofthe Actors
From 22 to 24 January 1997, then recently appointed, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan visited Washington, D.C. The first priority of the new Secretary-General af-
ter arriva| was to meet with the Republican leaders of the US Congress, who had
been very critical  of the UN  and had stopped US payments to the organization.
Annan met with Congressman Benjamin Gilman (Republican -New York), who
'4   Handout 2003, P. 4.
's   Representative Urs Baerlocher of Novartis quoted in the International Herald Tribune: IHT
25.01.2001.
16 See josselin 2001.
17   Handout 2003, P· 4
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issued a clear warning that the UN should take the US Congress seriously. The
press release on the occasion ofthis meeting states:
Congressman Gilman stated that the United States Congress was happy that
the Secretary-General had eliminated a layer of bureaucracy; the Congress was
trying to work out a formula for paying United States arrears, conditional on re-
form.
Congressman Gilman expressed concern over the suggestion that the United
Nations impose a global tax, and mentioned the possibility of the United
States reducing its contributions to both regular and peace-keeping budgets. 18
Two days later, in a lecture to the National Press Club, the UN Secretary-General
explained how he was cutting costs and streamlining the organisation according
to the demands of its US critics. He also expressed that, in meeting the chal-
lenges of globalization, there was a need for partnerships:
meeting these challenges requires trust, partnership and commitment from
us all: national governments, parliamentarians, regional and international or-
ganizations, non-governmental organizations, the media, the public - in short,
from all who make up the United Nations.'9
The next week, the UN Secretary-General, for the first time in history, attended the
World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland. At this meeting
Annan gave a speech in which he broadened the scope of his partnership policies,
as expressed in Washington, D.C., a week earlier, to include the private sector:
Strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the private
sector will be one of the priorities of my term as Secretary-General. Without
greater cooperation, the social and economic needs of the developing world
cannot be met.
We can only do this and create an effective organization you can be proud to
do business with, by urgently addressing the United Nation's ongoing financial
crisis.
For both the United Nations system and the private sector. our goal for the
twenty-first century is nothing less than creating a true global economy, genu-
inely open to all ofthe world's peoples.
..As Secretary-General, I am committed to doing just that. I am open to your
advice and I look forward to hearing from you.20
The reaction of the World Economic Forum did not take long. In March/April







tem.21 According to Ellen Paine of the Global Policy Forum (a New York-based
NGO), this was a direct result of Annan's speech in Davos.22 The new technology
connected the UN directly with the most important actors in the WEF, without
any interference (knowledge) by national government representatives or the gen-
eral public.
However, governments were not out of the picture. In June 1997, a roundtable on
"cooperation between governments, private sector and the UN meeting Sustain-
able Development objectives" was organised by the President of the UN General
Assembly and the director of the WBCSD (World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development). In total, thirty-seven participants were invited:
...The players in the meeting were 15 high level representatives of government,
including three heads of state, the Secretary-General of the UN, the Adminis-
trator of the UNDP, and the UN Under Secretary-General responsible for pre-
siding over the UN commission on Sustainable Development, the Secretary-
General of the International Chamber of Commerce, 10 CEOs of transnational
corporations. The CEOs were mostly members of the WBCSD, a council of
transnational corporations (TNCs) originally organized...to represent the inter-
ests of global corporations at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio in 1992.23
According to Korten (People-Centred Development Forum), who had been invited
as one ofthe two academics to the meeting:
..The meeting's outcome was preordained. It closed with Ambassador Razali,
President of the General Assembly, announcing that a framework for the in-
volvement ofthe corporate sector in UN decision making would be worked out
under the auspices of the Commission on Sustainable Development:4
This particular outcome was partially based on ideology and partly on the realities
ofglobalisation:
...Underlying the words of everyone who was allowed to speak, with the sole
exception ofthe NGO spokesperson..., was an embrace ofthe neo-liberal logic
of market deregulation and economic globalization. According to the prevailing
wisdom, economic globalization and the economic dominance of corporations
are irreversible realities to which we must simply adapt. Since global corpora-
21 Washington Times, March 5 1997
22 Soon after the Davos-speech. the leaders of the World Economic Forum offered to connect
the Secretary-General and a few of his top officials to the Forum's new private video-
conferencing system, enabling Annan and his team to converse with the Forum's CEO
members as well as a few select political leaders and chiefs of international institutions like
the World bank. While the new technology provided the cash-strapped UN with a state-of-
the-art communications tool, the system worked primarily to connect the Secretary-General
and other UN leaders with corporate executives, bypassing the intergovernmental process
(Paine 2002)
23   Korten 1997
24  Korten 1997
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tions have the money and the power, any viable approach to dealing with pov-
erty and the environment must center on providing market incentives...Thus it
follows, by the twisted official logic, that corporations need to be brought in as
partners in public decision process to assure that the resulting policies will be
responsive to their needs.25
Ifthe connections with business were meant to give the UN some financial space,
then September 1997 should mark the first success ofthis strategy. Media billion-
aire Ted Turner announced on CNN, on September 18th, that he was making a $
i billion contribution to the UN, spread out over ten years.
The new UN-business partnership was officially proposed in a speech ofthe Sec-
retary-General at the WEF meeting of January 3ist 1999. In this speech the Secre-
tary-General proposed that business leaders and the United Nations would initi-
ate a global compact of shared values and principles, in order to give a human
face to the global market:
Today, I am pleased to acknowledge that, in the past two years, our relation-
ship has taken great strides. We have shown through cooperative ventures -
both at the policy level  and on the ground - that the goals of the United  Na-
tions and those of business can, indeed, be mutually supportive.
...1 want to challenge you to join me in taking our relationship to still a higher
level. I propose that you, the business leaders gathered in Davos, and we, the
United Nations, initiate a global compact of shared values and principles,
which will give a human face to the global market.
[multinationall power brings with it great opportunities - and great responsi-
bilities. You can uphold human rights and decent labor and environmental
standards, directly, by your own conduct ofyour own business.
Don't wait for every country to introduce laws protecting freedom...You can
at least make sure that your own employees, and those ofyour subcontractors
enjoy those rights.
.you can encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly
technologies.
26
The Secretary-General proposes a world-wide network (hence: global) to imple-
ment human right, labour and environmental standards through a voluntary
agreement (hence: compact). The content ofthis voluntary network was based on
an idea of 'shared' values and not 'traditional' rules of International Law.
On June 26,2000 the Global Compact was officially launched at the UN head-
quarters in New York. That morning an article appeared in the International Her-
25  Koden,997
26   SG/SM/6881/Rev. 1.1. February 1999.
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aid Tribune in which the Secretary-General explained why he was creating "a new
coalition for universal values":
...The essence of the Compact is that, to help make markets sustainable at the
global level, enlightened corporate leaders of the new world economy will act
on these principles [the 9 principles see below] in their own corporate man-
agement practices.
At today's meeting, the corporate leaders who are prepared to take this step
will be joined by heads of international labor and civil society organizations ac-
tive in the fields of human rights, economic and social development, and pro-
tecting the global environment.
...Some may sat that business should stick to business, and leave wider con-
cerns to government. Certainly it is true that neither corporations nor voluntary
groups can replace the indispensable role of the state. But we cannot wait for
governments to do it all. Globalization operates on Internet time.27
Present were chief executives and managers of 50 multinationals. Missing from
this meeting were state representatives.28 Only a handful of NGOs had been in-
vited:
The Secretary-General also had invited a small number of sympathetic NGOs,
including Amnesty International, the Worldwide Fund for Nature and the In-
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions. But these NGO 'partners'
were clearly uneasy at the spectacle. Amnesty International Director Pierre
Sane said bluntly that he didn't think the Compact was credible in the absence
of formal rules. By contrast, the corporate participants made it clear that they
wanted no rules - and not even the mildest of monitoring. 29
Many NGOs opposed the idea of partnerships between the United Nations and
Multinationals. Organisations like Human Rights Watch reacted immediately to
the new initiative in a letter that is typical of the NGO criticism of the Global
Compact:
...Human Rights Watch believes that the Global Compact represents a positive
but limited first step. It could encourage corporations to act responsibly, but
only if it is implemented effectively. In our view three obstacles threaten to im-
pede the Compact's effectiveness: the lack of legally enforceable standards, the
lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanism, and a lack of clarity about the
meaning ofthe standards themselves.10
27 Annan. 26/07/2000.
28 No evidence has been found as to whether these representatives had been invited or not.
29 Paine 2000.
30 Human Rights Watch 2000.
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Other NGOs bonded together in the 'Coalition for a Corporate Free UN' and pub-
lished critical reports on like Tangled up in Blue and Greenwash +10.1,
An uncomfbrtable relationshipP
In 1997, one ofthe top priorities ofthe new secretary-general was to forge new
partnerships between the private sector and the United Nations. One of the
(positive) side.effects of this effort seems to have been extra financial re-
sources for the work ofthe UN.
On September 1997 media billionaire Ted Turner announced on CNN that he
was making a $1 billion contribution to the UN, spread out over 10 years
(www.cnn.com).
On February lith 1999 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donated $2.2
billion to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). This donation marks
the beginning of a  long and intensive cooperation between the Gates Founda-
tion and the UN (see: www. gatesfoundation.org).
In media reports about the launch  of the Global Compact, CNN mentioned
that multinationals were paying 'big money' to be able to say that they were
supporting the missions of the United Nations. A report by The Guardian un-
covered in 2000 that the UN Development program had received $ 50,000
each from 11 multinationals, including Nike, Rio Tinto, Shell and BP. This
scheme had started after the launch of the Global Compact at the WEF in
1999, but was later suspended under public pressure (The Guardian,
31.08.2000).
From the start,.NGOs like Corpwatch worried that through 'image transfer',
the UN's positive image would be used to 'bluewash' stained corporate images
in a positive way. In their reports Corpwatch explicitly linked the financial lever-
age power of the United States over the UN budget to the financial problems
of the UN and the attempts of the UN to find alternative financial means
through involvement with multinationals. (www.corpwatch.org).
The critical NGOs were not asked to, nor did they want to, join the Global Com-
pact. These NGOs saw the Global Compact as a media event, or an advertising
hype. This position can be illustrated by a comment for CNN television on that
day by John Cavanagh:
.1 think that these companies jumped at the opportunity because they realised
that it makes them look good. They will say publicly in front of a global audi-
ence that they are for rights, but they also knew that there is no enforcement.12
31 CorpWatch 2002-2.
p  CNN 27.07·2000
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A year later the Global Compact reached the agenda ofthe General Assembly. The
office of the secretary-general had produced a report on global partnerships that
had been submitted to the General Assembly.33 The debate was instigated by the
request to speak on this issue by the observer of Switzerland.34 The Swiss ob-
server argued that the Global Compact had to respect a number of 'simple and ef-
fective' rules:
First of all, it must fully safeguard the integrity and independence ofthe United
Nations. Then it has to function with the greatest possible transparency. Fi-
nally, its partners have to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the
Organization The establishment of guidelines for the partnerships between the
United Nations and the private sector, which are to be revised regularly in re-
sponse to developments in the global political and economic environment, is
therefore indispensable.35
During that same debate, the European Union, supported by other European
countries, announced its intention to introduce a draft resolution on the issue of
global partnerships. The European Union was highly in favour of the Global Com-
pact:
...the Global Compact is an excellent example of successful cooperation be-
tween the United Nations and the private sector. In particular, it establishes
that corporations bear a social responsibility based on the fundamental values
ofthe United Nations.36
The European Union was also quite clear on the nature ofthe Global Compact:
The European Union believes it would be wrong to set too formal a framework
and thus risk discouraging the most generous or innovative initiatives from the
private sector. The United Nations system must be open-minded towards pri-
vate-sector actors. For example, it is not desirable to make the accreditation
process too strict. The procedure should remain flexible and open.17
After five weeks of negotiating between the countries that supported the concept
a draft resolution was introduced to the General Assembly.18 These negotiations
had an informal character. All parties involved wanted to establish a consensus
on this issue. The Compact was sponsored by Western countries, but also by
many members ofthe Group of 77, a UN coalition of developing countries. In the
introduction ofthe draft resolution they were specifically mentioned:
33 A/56/323·
14 A/56/PV.37
15  A/56/PV.37, P. 21.
16  A/56/PV.37, p. 10.
37   A/56/PV.37. P. 10.
18 A/56/323
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...[Mr de Ruyt, representative of Belgium speaking] I wish to thank in particular
the Group of 77, for its unfailing support for consensus and for its positive
contribution throughout the negotiating process.39
In the end a total of 59 countries sponsored the resolution,40 which was adopted
without a vote by the General Assembly. The resolution named the Global Com-
pact as an example of multi-stakeholder initiatives that states could support. At
the same time that states made clear that they were affirming in this resolution
their central position in International Relations with regard to policy-making:
Recalling the central role and responsibility of Governments in national and in-
ternational policy making...41
Without imposing rigid partnership agreements, the resolution 'towards global
partnerships' called for a common approach to partnerships based on the follow-
ing principles:
..common purpose, transparency, bestowing no unfair advantages upon any
partner of the United Nations family, mutual benefit and mutual respect, ac-
countability, respect for the modalities of the United Nations, striving for bal-
anced presentation of relevant partners from developed and developing coun-
tries and countries with economies in transition, and not compromising the
independence and neutrality of the United Nations system in general and the
agencies in particular.42
The resolution was adopted unanimously during the 84th plenary meeting on De-
cember 11th 2001.41 The states had reclaimed, at least on paper, their primacy
overtheissue.
In the meantime, the compact attracted the attention of many multinationals and
local companies around the world. Soon some serious problems with regard to
transparency and effectiveness did occur as becomes clear from a policy note
dated January 4th 2002. New frameworks of operating were introduced, with
more academic support to ensure the transparency and effectiveness of the com-
pact. Demands were set for companies on how to present examples of imple-
menting the companies. Annual meetings were set to reflect on the strategy and
the responses in wake ofthe growth ofthe initiative,44 but with no clear results.
7.4 The Accessibility ofthe Arena
The Global Compact is an initiative which tries to fill a gap in International Rela-
tions between global concerns on the protection of human rights, labour rights
19  A/56/PV.84, P· 13·
40  A/56/PV.84 P· 13
4, A/RES/56/76.
* A/RES/56/76.




and the environment and the role and responsibility of non-state actors, in this
case multinationals. The Global Compact addresses the issue of corporate citi-
zenship. The main difference between this and earlier approaches is that in this
case the corporations have been involved in the deliberations from the beginning.
This involvement was brought about by the initiatives undertaken by the ICC and
the WBCSD towards the UN. Because of this active lobbying the multinationals
could be sure that they would be heard. Even more so, through this active ap-
proach, the multinationals were able to set large parts ofthe UN agenda on cor-
porate citizenship.
Non-institutionalised forms of dialogue between the MNCs and the UN were es-
sential in the run up to the Global Compact. The Global Compact can be seen as
a way of formalizing the forms of dialogue between the UN and MNCs. The rules
of the Global Compact make it easy for the MNCs to enter the arena. MNCs do
not have to change significantly in order to enter. The dialogue within the Global
Compact is primarily a dialogue between peers.
On the other hand, NGOs could not rely on established procedures enabling
them to function within the UN system, because they face quite different criteria
to enter the compact's dialogue. This was brought about by the fact that the
compact had been conceived of, and designed, outside the mainstream policy
lines involving the General Assembly and other institutions to which the NGOs
have access. UN official George KelI was very clear on how the compact should
deal with critical NGOs:
As for criticism from civil society organizations that are not participating in the
Global Compact, we must learn to distinguish more clearly between actors and
their motives. Many of them are genuinely concerned about the risks involved
to the image of the UN. In turn, we genuinely appreciate their concern...there
are a few activists who thrive on hostility and point scoring. We have to learn
that they are not interested in dialogue or bridge building.45
Dialogue has become the criterion for the selection of NGOs. NGOs have to be
willing to engage with all actors and they have to be able to transcend a single-
issue orientation. The latter is particularly interesting because one wonders
whether MNCs would accept the same demand if they were asked with the same
clarity to transcend their particular single issue, i.e. making profits. KelI remarks
also signify something else. He identifies the limits of the dialogue with NGOs.
NGOs that are hostile to the GC do not fit in the idea of dialogue and bridge
building. It seems that dialogue is only functional if the partners of the dialogue
are acceptable to the participating multinationals, if they are willing to act like
peers instead of acting as the 'the opposition'.
States have no direct role in the dialogue. State representatives were present at
some stages ofthe GC, but in the end they do not have a position within the GC.
45   Keli 2000.
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Communications between states and the GC takes places through reports by the
Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly.
7.5 Legitimacy ofthe Process
Following the empirical framework for observing change and continuity, pre-
sented in chapter 4, this section will explore the both the input legitimacy and the
process legitimacy ofthe Global Compact.
7.5.1 Input Legitimacy
Multinationals can start their cooperation with the Global Compact by sending a
|etter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This letter had to be signed
by the CEO of the company. There were not many additional demands on the
content of the letter. A sample letter that was published on the website in  2002
showed the following minimal requirement:
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,
I am pleased to confirm that our company ......supports the Global Compact
and its nine principles.
We undertake to make a clear statement of this support and once a year share
with the United Nations one example of an action taken or lessons learnt in
implementing one or more principles.
Yours truly,46
From this minimal requirement on the communications three demands can be
extracted. First, the CEO of a multinational has to sign the letter. In many compa-
nies this means that the board of executives must approve of joining the com-
pact. In the relations between the UN and multinationals only the CEO can le-
gitimately represent a company. The second demand is that a multinational must
make a clear statement of their support for the compact. This statement should
state that the company supports the Global Compact as such and the nine prin-
ciples. It entails that companies can not pick and choose from the principles. Fi-
nally, companies are required to communicate once a year with the UN on spe-
cific actions under taken. It was with regard to this issue that further rules on
communications were developed.
In October 2001 a conference was organised in London ofthe Learning Forum of
the Global Compact. Prior to this conference 30 case studies had been submitted
(followed by 14 more at the conference). But according to a review,  none of the
case studies conformed to the initial guidelines set out by the Global Compact of-
fice. Some case studies did  not even mention the principles of the compact.47
46  GC 04/02/ 2002.
47   GC 04/01/2002.
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That same month a guideline was developed on behalf of the Global Compact of-
fice by MIT Professor Locke. This guideline contained four rules on writing a
proper case-study:
• Cases should focus on an important issue. This means that the case should
address a problem central to the Global Compact.
Cases should be justified. Companies should clearly explain at the beginning
ofthe case why this particular case study was chosen.
Cases should be substantiated with significant data/evidence. This evidence
should not only show the changes, but also the causal link between the action
taken and the positive outcome reported.
· Cases should be transparent. They should be based on dilemmas/problems
companies experience when trying to tackle a difficult issue. 48
Two months after the London meeting further decisions were made with regard
to the communications. In order to simplify the procedure a two-pronged ap-
proach was adopted by the Global Compact office. This approach differentiated
between 'examples' and 'case-studies'. Examples are 'short submissions adhering
to a concise template focussed on the strictly factual elements of a company ex-
49perience'. Companies are obliged to provide one example on an annual basis.
This example had to state the following information:
•   Company name
• Company headquarters address and e-mail address
•   Date submitted
·   Author of submission
• Contact information ofcompany representative
Principles addressed in the example
• Involvement ofother partners, i.e. NGOs
•   Links to social impact, environmental, and/or annual reports
• Actions undertaken in support ofthe GC principles
• Outcome received on these actionss°
Case studies - more detailed and analytical submissions developed on concert
with the Global Compact office - would be solicited from companies capable and
willing to craft more rigorous submissions alongthe MIT guidelines.
7.5.2 Process Legitimacy
The gap in International Relations was identified through the question: 'who is to
be accountable for the violations by multinationals of human rights, labour rights
and the protection of the environment?'. The legitimacy of the Global Compact
process depends on the extend to which this instruments makes multinationals
accountable with regard to the Compact's 9 principles. Multinationals see the free
48 Locke 2001.
49   GC 01/12/2001.
5°   GC 04/01/2002.
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market as the engine for the protection of human rights and the environment. In-
deed, the dominant idea ofthe key-players in this arena is that progress in these
areas will only come through economic development. Governments do not al-
ways succeed in this. They are even tempted to let others do encourage sustain-
able economic development:
...governments are divesting responsibilities, and there is a temptation to use
the notion of corporate citizenship or social responsibility to justify this. But
governments continue to hold they key for unlocking economic opportunities;
leaders failing their own people continue to constitute the single biggest
source of human misery. True, the compact is premised on the real world,
where governance is imperfect. But this should not mean that we endorse or
support that imperfect world, or lose sight of the ideal world, where govern-
ments live fully to their responsibilities. In such a perfect world, indeed, the
role of business would simply be business, and the notion of corporate citizen-
ship would be reduced to complying with laws.51
The idea is that governments are primarily accountable, but are not always taking
their responsibility (the imperfect world). Therefore, others will have to act,
though they do this because of lacking government action (the law). If govern-
ments had taken their responsibility, than this whole initiative would not have
been necessary (corporate citizenship is: to comply with the law).
Much of the preparations towards the GC have been taking place behind closed
doors. Yet, transparency is important in the functioning ofthe Compact according
to its officials:
[Therel are divergent views about openness as a political and economic con-
cept. Here, we do not have a choice. Too much is at stake. Our overriding pri-
ority must be the interests of developing countries and all others who depend
on trade...multilateral cooperation, non-discrimination, reciprocity and trans-
parency are our best defence. We cannot compromise on this understanding. 52
Multinationals have felt that they cannot give too much openness because of the
competitive nature of global business. Yet a specific format was created with de-
mands on the content of case-studies, which even has the demand that cases
should be 'transparent'.
The Global Compact website is the main instrument of transparency. One can
find overviews of which actors are involved  in the initiative,  and one can access
important documents and reports and see the official agenda of the meetings.
However, it is a virtual transparency. The public and the media have no access to
the actual meetings of the Global Compact. And in order to view examples, one
needs a special code.
51   Keli 2000.
s2   KelI 2000.
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Thus, accountability within the Global Compact is predominantly peer based. The
multinationals had been in favour of this system all along. There also was no al-
ternative because other forms like monitoring did not fall within the mandate of
the Secretary-General.
Therefore, the Global Compact has been set up as a peer review system wherein
multinationals subject cases to the UN, which are judged in the meetings of the
UN and the multinationals. NGO advice may play a role but peer companies
make the final judgements. It remains yet to be seen whether there will be enough
peer pressure to change the behaviour of multinationals that have failed to reach
the obligations of the Global Compact. The institution of an advisory council did
not change this situation significantly.
The system of peer pressure and peer review might not be ideal from an out-
sider's perspective, but it is ideal to the multinationals themselves. When it be-
came clear that governments could not agree on corporate responsibilities, many
multinationals realised that if they did not take some ofthe responsibility in their
own hands now, they would be overrun by - in their eyes - non-practical regula-
tions afterwards. Keli's words illustrate this. He implies that corporations will
obey the law, and that they would not mind to be held accountable with regard to
how they obey the law. Yet, this issue is one that goes beyond obeying the law. It
seems a logical objection of multinationals that if they are held accountable be-
yond the demands of the law, they will not accept such a strict regime as if this
accountability was the same thing as being accounted to the law. Rather given the
vagueness of the accountability beyond the national law, they opted for a less
strict accountability for their own roles as well, judged by peers who understand
their positions.
7.6 Effectiveness ofthe Outcome
When a case has been deposited at the secretariat of the Global Compact, a dia-
logue is started among the relevant participants. They include the Office of the
High Commissioner of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, the
UN Environment Program and the UNDP for country-level programming, the In-
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions (IFCTU), an association of na-
tional and sectoral labour federations, and more than a dozen NGOs in the thee
areas covered by the GC, such as Amnesty International and the World Wildlife
Fund.51 The result of this dialogue will be evaluated within the company con-
cerned.
In general one can say that the Global Compact relies on transparency between
the 'enlightened' self-interest of companies, labour and civil society organisations
to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the
compact is based. One cannot expect pressure on the actors other than stake-
holder/peer-pressure. This does not mean that anything goes. The actors are well
53 Ruggie 2001.
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aware that at some point a decision must be taken with regard to multinationals
that fail to reach the compact's standard:
the main focus must be on getting companies in, not kicking them out.
However, the Global Compact has to be made credible and we have to be sure
companies are delivering. A company that persistently fails to publish, or says
nothing, or says it is opposed to child labour but is found to be using it, should
not continue to take part.54
In order to support the Global Compact office and the initiative itself, an Advisory
Council was created. It met for the first time in January 2002. It is composed of 17
senior business executives, international labour leaders, and heads of civil society
organisations, all acting in their individual capacities. The group convenes twice a
year. Its mandate is to assist the Secretary-General in forwarding the aims of the
Global Compact and to consider issues such as standards of participation to help
protect the integrity ofthe initiative.SS
The Global Compact is a voluntary network expanding into new territories of cor-
porate citizen initiatives. Typically, the focus is on a consultation network idea. In-
struments for closely monitoring and verifi'ing actions undertaken by the multina-
tionals, are lacking, nor are they expected to be implemented. The UN, on several
occasions, have made clear that instruments for monitoring and verifying actions
do not fall within the mandate of the Global Compact.S6 Much ofthe language on
the function of the Global Compact therefore reflects the 'consultation focus' of
the initiative. Multinationals are 'in dialogue', organise 'support networks' and
'share examples of good practices'.57
Given this approach and the strict criteria for entering this initiative, NGOs have
been wary to enter into consultations with the multinationals within this frame-
work. Amnesty International entered the compact, while Greenpeace and Friends
of the Earth stayed out. Another important NGO in this respect is Corpwatch, an
association of NGOs who are critical of the associations between the United Na-
tions and large corporations. But even NGOs that are participating in the network
have their doubts. They do not consider themselves to be 'partners'. They rather
see it as an opportunity to directly talk to the representatives of important multi-
nationals, who they otherwise would not have been able to address.58
This uneasy relationship might be explained from the way in which NGOs are re-
garded in Global Compact publications. The argument presented is that NGOs
have grown to fill an international governance void - left by nation states incapa-
ble to address human rights issues properly - and thereby are progressively influ-
54   Guide 2003, P· 8
55   Guide 2003. P· 5
56   Guide 2003. P· 4




encing both public policy and the market agenda.59 NGOs are now calling for
strong binding rules on multinationals:
First ...we would like to see companies who join the Global Compact make a
public statement that they will be open to independent monitoring...Secondly,
it has to reported publicly ...all the stakeholders are entitled to have the infor-
mation resulting from that independent monitoring. And thirdly ...a sanctions
system has to be envisaged ...so that companies who violate these principles
cannot continue to benefit from the partnership ...We think that those three
steps are absolutely essential if this initiative is to be effective, credible, and
win the trust of human rights organizations. 60
The tensions between NGOs and multinationals on the issue of binding rules on
corporate citizenship could explain the relative small number of NGOs participat-
ing at the highest levels of the Global Compact. However, the consultative role of
the NGOs seems to be more effective at the grassroots level were the NGO are
more involved with the compact than at the international level.6,
With regard to the compliance of the multinationals with the principles of the
compact it must be noted that basically the NGOs have three objections. These
can be illustrated by the position of Human Rights Watch. According to Human
Rights Watch there is, first of all, a lack of legally enforceable standards. Secondly,
according to the NGOs, there is a lack of a monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nism. Finally there is a lack of clarity about the meaning of the standards them-
selves.62 In order to overcome this critique a website was created by the global
Compact office on which specific cases were posted as examples.61 Furthermore,
in a guide to the Global Compact was published in order to ensure a practical un-
derstanding ofthe vision and the nine principles. In this guide 19 concrete exam-
ples were presented which included the following multinationals: Du Pont, SAP,
British Telecom and BAS F.64
Dupont, for example, explained how its concern for human rights had triggered
its concern for safe and healthy working conditions.65 It then set out how it had in-
troduced these measures in the organisation. Yet the example is odd, because
Du Pont explains how this was part of policies that had been developed in 1994,
well before the Compact started.66 Another example was provided by SAP who ran
a successful anti-corruption program in Africa. However corruption was not an is-
sue in the Global Compact.67
59 Guide 2003, P· 25·
60 Pierre Sane ofAmnesty International on july 26·, 2000, quoted in Corpwatch 2000, p. 5
61 ICC Secretary-General Maria Livanos Cattaui in IHT 25.01.2001.
62 Human Rights Watch 2000.
63 www.unglobalcompact.org.
64   Guide 2003
65 One wonders why the company apparently had not been bothered about these issues be-
fore.
66
Guide 2003, P· 21.
67 SAP argues that fighting corruption should be the 'tenth' principle, Guide 2003, P· 23
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When looking at the Guide to the Global Compact one finds a number of exam-
ples of NGOs operating with multinationals at grassroots level. These NGOs are
not big international NGOs, but local or national NGOs. They are deemed valu-
able as can be deducted from the following quote in the chapter on preventing
child labour:
...discovering if child labour is being used can be very difficult, for example in
the case where documents or records are absent, and companies may consider
using local non-governmental organisations, development organisations or
UN agencies to assist in this process.
68
It seems that, in the eyes ofthe UN and the multinationals that created the Global
Compact, local NGOs are more useful in providing networks of support and con-
sultation for the initiative than international NGOs. That is not to say that interna-
tional NGOs do not have a role, but this role seems to be more on the outside,
monitoring the Compact through what has been published on its website and re-
acting to the developments through their own websites and contacts. 69
In conclusion, the Global Compact focuses on voluntary compliance with its prin-
ciples. It is not very clear how compliance on paper relates to compliance in real-
ity. Furthermore, the early examples are unclear as to how they are the specific re-
suit of the start of the Global Compact. In order to ensure the integrity of
monitoring this voluntary NGOs are asked to help with the evaluation and a spe-
cial advisory council was created. Not all major global NGOs are directly involved.
Some have chosen to stay outside the initiative.
7.7 Analysis
This case-study looked closely at the creation and first stages ofthe implementa-
tion of a new global governance network on the subject of corporate social re-
sponsibility. The Global Compact is partially rooted in the already existing net-
works of International Law, i.e. the UN, and partially reaching out to new actors in
corporate and civil society sectors.
Firstly, the most significant stakeholders in this emerging global governance net-
work consisted of the (office of ) the UN Secretary General, the multinationals
and some large NGOs. In 1997, the new UN Secretary-General faced an organisa-
tion in a major financial crisis. This crisis was largely caused by anti-UN policies
in Washington. These policies resulted in a huge backlog in US contribution pay-
ments to the UN. Especially the American Congress was not willing to change its
policies without large scale 'reform' of the UN.70 The Secretary General had to
68
Guide 2003, P· 38
69 UN 12.02.2002.
70 According to David Halberstam there was a hardcore group within the Republican party
who from the early 19905 onwards favoured 'everything from non-payment of the UN dues
to further cuts in foreign aid to outright isolationism'.(p. 147)· The US dues contained much
ofthe money needed for peacekeeping operations. The failed US peacekeeping intervention,
backed by the UN in Somalia in 1994 made the relations even worse (Halberstam 2003)
144
THEGLOBALCOMPACT
find new partnerships that could provide support the work of the UN in one way
or another.
At the same time, multinationals faced more and more questions on corporate
responsibility. One of the results of the policies pursued by the new Secretary-
General has been that these issues became entangled. New bonds were forged
between the UN and multinational corporations and between multinational cor-
porations and some NGOs. States only became later involved with this initiative,
and even then at a secondary, supporting level, although US policies and pro
market-attitudes seem to have influenced the political and policy context within
the UN at the time when the first initiatives were being undertaken.
Secondly, within the three categories of stakeholders, the UN, the multinationals
and the NGOs, the first two had significant capacities to influence events. The
multinationals, 'owned the problem' and had financial means; the UN needed
'success stories' and (financial) support, preferable by other parties than nation-
states. In return oftheir cooperation with the Global Compact, the multinationals
gained a system that would be 'workable' and not too formal: a voluntary code.
The UN gained the much wanted 'powerful' international support, and, in some
cases, extra financial means. The NGOs played a role in this process, but were
not considered by the UN, nor by the multinationals, to be key-stakeholders
needed to make the system work. Thus, the non-state capacities of the multina-
tionals were significant with regard to influencing the UN, whereas the non-state
capacities of the NGOs were not very useful as these capacities did not address
the key interests of either the multinationals (who were looking for voluntary
codes)northe UN.
Thirdly, the accessibility procedures to the Global Compact for multinationals has
been quite straight forward: send a letter, start motions to change, publicly advo-
cate the compact and mention something in your annual report. NGOs faced a
more demanding set of criteria. This can be explained from the fact that the busi-
ness lobby (1CC and WBCSD) did not fancy critical NGOs coming in. The rules
determining the peer review system between the multinationals were not very
demanding and there were hardly any consequences when the participants would
fail to uphold the 9 principles. The fact that examples (best practices), having no
direct relation with the Compact itself, were provided by the multinationals in the
early stages of the compact is telling. This had to change, and new procedures
and criteria were determined. Now non-participants can follow some of the pro-
ceedings of the compact through the website, but detailed information on the in-
ner workings of this network are presented on a 'sealed off section of the website.
Fourthly, the legitimacy of this specific global governance mechanism depends
partially on its transparency. With regard to the actors involved in this process,
the initiative has been transparent. However, their accountability has been located
within the parameters of the compact, through peer-review.  It is not allowed to
report on these processes outside the proceedings of the compact. When reports
occur, they have been closely scrutinized as not to cause any harm or reveal im-
portant business insights. Thus, it is not possible for any organisation outside the
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Global Compact, or the general public, to hold companies accountable through
the Global Compact mechanisms.7, This is significantly different from the proce-
dure discussed in the previous chapter on the Fair Labor Association. In that
case, there was a third party complaint mechanism in place. Thus, the legitimacy
of the compact based on its transparency is problematic. This problem could,
theoretically, be overcome by pointing out that states, through the GA, have ap-
proved ofthe mechanism as an important initiative. Having gained, in retrospect,
state approval could be seen as a creating a form of legitimizing (or at least toler-
ating) the compact within the larger framework of UN regulatory arrangements.
Fifth, the legitimacy of a mechanism of global governance is also based on its ef-
fectiveness. Initially, the idea that the effectiveness of the compact could be
measured was doubted, until the Global Compact Summit of 2004. In prepara-
tion of this summit, McKinsey & Company had been asked to assess the Global
Compact's impact. The McKinsey report concluded that:
' ...the Global Compact has had noticeable, incremental impact on companies,
the UN, governments and other civil society actors and has built a strong base
for future results. The Compact has primarily accelerated policy change in
companies, while catalyzing a proliferation of 'partnership' projects, develop-
ment-oriented activities that companies undertake with UN agencies and other
partners. The Compact has also developed a solid participant base and local
network structure, establishing itself as the largest voluntary corporate citizen-
ship network of its kind. In addition, the mere existence of the Compact exerts
a surprisingly powerful influence on companies and within the UN, empower-
ing champions for reform'.72
There were also some areas ofthe Global Compact that needed extra attention:
'...inconsistent participation and divergent and unmet expectations limit the
impact on companies and continue to threaten the Compact's long-term
credibility with participants. As it transitions from its entrepreneurial, experi-
mentation phase to a phase of sustained growth focussed on impact, the
Global Compact will need to manage participants' expectations by increasing
the value of participation with more targeted business orientated management
mechanisms, robust local networks, and effective communication and collabo-
ration with participants and partners'.71
It seems that, despite the criticism that one might voice on the inclusiveness of
the compact and its transparency, things are changing for the better with regard
to implementing the 9 principles of the Global Compact in the day-to-day opera-
tions ofthe affiliated companies. In other words, the Global Compact seems to be
an effective regulatory arrangement that influences behaviour of non-state actors.
71 Contrary to for instance the FLA mechanisms, see: chapter 6.
72 McKinsey&Company 2004, P· 2




The Global Compact is an innovative way forward on a policy issue that seemed
unsolvable within the UN General Assembly. In order to overcome this problem,
the UN-Secretary decided to come up with an initiative that bypassed the policy-
realm ofthe General Assembly, but stayed within his own mandate.
The Global Compact was a pragmatic leap forward out of specific circumstances
which seemed to permanently obstruct real progress on these issues. It took the
responsibility for the protecting of human rights, labour rights and the environ-
ment into the business domains of international society. Until that time, most of
the global business sector had denied having any direct responsibility unless their
national governments would legally force them to do so. This raised the question
on the precise nature ofthe relationship between this new regulatory arrangement
and the traditional body of International Law with regard to the protection of hu-
man rights, labour rights and the protection of the environment. It seems that the
Global Compact is to achieve the goals of the International Law, while avoiding
the disagreements between state-actors over regulatory arrangements in Interna-
tional Economic Relations on this issue.
The Global Compact succeeded in making multinationals co-responsible stake-
holders in the protection of internationally accepted Human Rights, labour rights
and environmental concerns. NGOs might at times have felt left out of the most
important decisions, but it seems that the Compact is achieving results, actually
changing business attitudes and behaviour towards more corporate social re-
sponsibility and sustainable development.
In conclusion, content-wise there exists a close relationship between the princi-
ples that the Global Compact seeks to defend and the traditional body of Interna-
tional Law. However, when it comes to the execution of responsibilities with re-
gard to those principles, innovative ways have been developed that have
transformed multinationals and (some) NGOs from bystanders into responsible
stakeholders. At the same time, by creating a new regulatory arrangement this
strategy bypassed the trap of the initiative of getting bogged down in endless po-
litical debates in the General Assembly. In the end, the General Assembly formally
recognised the Compact after its creation and acknowledged its support to it.
These practical results and its future potential make the Global Compact more
than a symbolic gesture. In the words ofthe UN Secretary-General: 'symbolism is
good, but substance is even better. And I believe we have made important sub-
stantive progress...'.74
74 SG/SM/9387 ECO/71 24.06.2004
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Comparing the interactions between emerging arrangements regulating Interna-
tional Relations and the traditional body of International Law allows us to capture
something about the larger patterns and growing complexities in those areas of
International Relations that are influenced by the spread ofthe global free market
and the information and communications revolution. The fact of overlapping and
interacting national and international networks of concerned constituencies, both
of the NGO and corporate type, have made the new realities of International Rela-
tions highly complex and only partially understood The traditional set of building
blocks of International Relations and International Law seems to have gained new
additions through the growing importance and impact of the capacities of non-
state actors.
In the previous three chapters we explored three cases in particular detail. All
three displayed regulatory transformations either within the existing frameworks
of International Law or bypassing those frameworks in order to overcome political
deadlocks.
The use of case studies has been limited to three and has remained largely ex-
plorative. Given these limitations, this chapter will try to discern some of the lar-
ger patterns that might be emerging in the current dynamics of regulating Inter-
national Relations.  It will present a comparative analysis of the five dimensions
for observing change and continuity in the relationship between International Law
and International Relations using the materials from the case studies. The outline
of this chapter is based upon the empirical framework introduced in chapter 4.
Section 2 will analyse the patterns in the positions and capacities of the actors.
Section 3 will discuss the differences and similarities in the accessibility of the
governance regimes. Section 4 will analyse the issues of legitimacy and effective-
ness.
8.2     Position and Capacity ofGIobal Actors
International Law consists of rules and principles that are generally applicable in
the conduct of states and international organisations and in their mutual rela-
tions, as well as with some of their relations with other actors. On many occa-
sions, these state-based rules and principles have influenced the position and ca-
pacity of actors, but not only such state-based international rules have had
influence. In some cases national rules influenced actors' positions and capaci-
ties, in other cases (in)formal policy rules affected the positions and capacities of
the actors.
First, we will compare the positions of the various actors in the case studies and
examples. Did the recognition of actors as important stakeholders depend on
state-based International Law, or were there also other factors that determined
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the recognition of an actor as a important stakeholder? Secondly, we will look at
the capacities ofthe actors. Which factors determined the capacities ofthe actors
during the creation, implementation, and functioning of an emerging Interna-
tional Relations regime? Were state capacities affected by rising non-state capaci-
ties? Or did non-state capacities develop without significantly affecting state ca-
pacities 
8.2.1 Position ofGIobal Actors
Can the position of actors as important stakeholders in an emerging arrangement
regulating International Economic Relations be explained from state-based Inter-
national Law theories? In order to answer this question, we first have to recall
what those theories have said with regard to stakeholdership in International Law.
In chapter 2 we saw how the concept of sovereignty has developed into a theory
supporting the claim that the nation-state occupies the primary position in Inter-
national Relations and, therefore, in International Law. International Law was de-
veloped in response to the regulatory needs arising from problems and chal-
lenges that had been recognised and experienced by these stakeholders.
Although International Relations is still very much an state affair, new non-state
stakeholders have gradually become established within political arenas that hith-
erto had been inaccessible. The empirical data seems to suggest that today non-
state actors are able to position themselves in ways that enable them to become
involved in informal policy networks, and thereby with the creation of proto-laws.
Gradually, these proto-laws are becoming part of an alternative international rules
network.
In the run up to the Global Compact, the Fair Labor Association, and the Basel
Agreement, non-state actors even found themselves in key positions. In the case
of the Fair Labor Association, NGOs and multinationals were treated as equal
partners, and primary responsible partners and the encouraged by the state to
develop a new voluntary regulatory mechanism, which would be backed by the
state (although not adopted). In the case ofthe Global Compact, the UN general
secretary involved the NGOs and multinationals directly. States were in a position
to endorse the new initiative afterwards. And, finally, in the case of the Basel
agreement, the representatives ofthe national banks, united in the Basel Commit-
tee, practically forced their national policies to conform to the agreement, thereby
affecting the independent position of states in international financial affairs.
In general, it seems that the number of stakeholders in International Relations
has grown significantly. In some cases the states have actively encouraged this
growth (Kyoto). In other cases, the growth in the number of stakeholders oc-
curred in response to the lack of state engagement with a problem. It seems that
in such perceived vacuums the absence of states does not necessarily lead to an
absence of regulatory mechanisms.
In conclusion, the positions of non-state stakeholders in regulatory regimes of In-
ternational Relations are not always occupied to the detriment of state positions.
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In other words: the expansion of non-state actors in International Relations net-
works is not necessarily resulting in a zero-sum game with nation-states over
stakeholdership and formal positions. International Relations networks seem to
consist of more important (and relevant) stakeholders than more traditional
state-based International Law networks.
8.2.2 The capacity ofglobal actors
The cases and examples seem to suggest that the rules determining the capacity
of an  actor to operate in an International Relations network are made up of ele-
ments of state-based International Law and rules created by (informal) policy
networks. In this section we will first determine how this development has af-
fected the capacities of state actors. Then we will determine the impact of these
developments with regard to the non-state capacities.
8.2.2.1 The capacities of state-actors in emerging regulatory arrangements
For a long time, state actors seemed to be perfectly capable of adequately operat-
ing in response to global problems and challenges. In the context of globalisation
processes and their effects, however, this capacity is being questioned, not only
theoretically - see chapter 3 - but also practically.
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, states behaved as if they were in complete con-
trol of making the goals of the protocol work. Yet, the creation of the protocol and
the subsequent seven year process of ratification have raised serious doubts
about states' ability to respond quickly and adequately to the complex issue of
climate change.
In the case of the Fair Labor association, the state began to act only after a public
outcry against the working conditions in the apparel industry. While the President
of the United States provided the initiative with a high-profile background, the
stranding of legislation on these working conditions illustrates the internal hur-
dies that at times obstruct adequate and timely state responses to an interna-
tional problem. The state was sending out two messages, Congress vs. the Presi-
dent, at the same time.
The Global Compact resulted from two separate problems in International Rela-
tions. The first problem occurred with regard to state support for the United Na-
tions, forcing the UN secretary-general to look for new international supporters,
such as multinationals and NGOs. The second problem was the failure of states
to agree, within the political and legal framework ofthe United Nations, on crite-
ria for corporate social responsibility with regard to human rights, labour rights,
and the protection ofthe environment. In tackling both problems at once, the UN
Secretary-General devised a new strategy. This strategy bypassed the states by di-
rectly appealing to the multinationals and NGO communities. It was only in the
aftermath of the establishment of the Global Compact that states were asked to
agree with its outcomes.
151
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONALECONOMIC RELATIONS
This is not unique when we recall the prologue discussing the creation of the
Basel Committee. In that case there seemed not much leeway for nation-states to
influence the developments once the regulators of the American Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England had reached an agreement.
In conclusion, states are not always capable of responding adequately to the new
problems and challenges in the context of economic globalisation. In response to
many challenges, the old state reflex has been to come up with yet another inter-
national agreement. The limits of that response are becoming more obvious, as
complex agreements take a long time to materialise in practical policies and be-
haviour.
8.2.2.2 The capacities of non-state actors in  emerging regulatory arrangements
The case studies seem to suggest important changes with regard to the capacities
of non-state actors to operate adequately with regard to global problems and chal-
lenges.
Multinationals were able to influence the shape and content of international rules
in the policy networks of the Fair Labor Association and the Global Compact.
Likewise they have become involved in issues of enforcing (inter)national rules in
their own operations and in the operations of actors operating in the supply-side
chain.
An important development with regard to multinational behaviour occurred dur-
ing the Kyoto negotiations, when multinationals - by creating large NGOs - were
able to enter UN networks. Through the Fair Labor Association, multinationals
assumed responsibility for working conditions in sweatshops outside the United
States producing goods for the US domestic market. Multinationals became re-
sponsible through the Global Compact for implementing nine principles with re-
gard to human rights, international labour rights and the protection ofthe global
environment.
To a slightly lesser extent,  NGOs have become  part of the frameworks through
which International Law is being created. During the Kyoto negotiations they were
allowed to 'watch from the sideline', and were consulted, but did not have real
power. A similar position was occupied by the NGOs surrounding and participat-
ing in the policy dialogues of the Global Compact. They gained access to the
Global Compact at a point where all the important decisions had already been
taken. Contrary to these developments stands the process of creation of the Fair
Labor Association. There the capacities of NGOs equalled those of multination-
als. Both types of actors were accountable to the US President, and both could
contribute their suggestions equally.
In the case of the Kyoto negotiations, great care was taken by states to limit the
capacities of non-state actors directly to influence the negotiation processes.
There were only a limited number of observers present during the negotiations
themselves, and they had no right to be involved in the discussions at the negoti-
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ating tables. In the case of the FLA and the GC the capacities of NGOs were not
restricted straight away because of the relative lack of state involvement. But
some sort of restriction was present: participants in the FLA were restricted by US
domestic laws; those  in  the GC were restricted  by the mandate of the Secretary-
General of the UN which only allowed him to get involved in non-binding regula-
tory initiatives.
The example of the Basel Committee is different with regard to the capacities of
non-state actors. In this particular example it seemed that non-state actors were
completely in control of all capacities needed to enforce a new set of policies with
regard to the regulation ofthe international financial order.
In conclusion, NGOs and multinationals seem to have developed important ca-
pacities with regard to influencing the enforcement and control of international
rules. These capacities seem to be expanding through newly created international
initiatives. Occasionally non-state actors find that they have only been able to en-
ter the outer-ring of an international arena, and not the real playing field. Both the
FLA and the GC presuppose the active cooperation of NGOs in controlling the ac-
tions of other actors (multinationals) in International Relations. The Kyoto-
protocol, on the contrary, does not provide any role and/or capacities for NGOs
in the enforcement of the Kyoto-criteria. Finally, the operations of the Basel
Committee provide an early example of a policy network that bypassed some of
the individual state-capacities to regulate (parts of) the international financial or-
der.
8.2.3 Conclusions
This section has tried to answer two questions about the position and capacity of
global actors. The first question looked at the acknowledgement of non-actors as
important stakeholders in a particular network. The second question assessed the
capacities of those stakeholders during the creation, implementation, and subse-
quent functioning of a new international regulatory mechanism.
First, with regard to the recognition of non-state actors as important stakeholders
in a particular governance network, it can be concluded that non-state recognition
has not arrived at the expense of formal stakeholderships of state-actors. This
conclusion is in itself perhaps not so shocking. But what it helps to illustrate is
that new arrangements for regulating International Relations does not necessarily
occur at the expense of formal positions in International Law. They are still there.
Whether these actors are primary stakeholders is, first and foremost, a political
decision ("yes" in the case of global warming, "no" in the case ofthe UN General
Assembly with regard to corporate social responsibility).
It seems that part of the answer to the question of the relationship between new
arrangements for regulating International Relations and the traditional body of In-
ternational Law, is that it is primarily a state-actor decision. Either state-actors get
involved as primary stakeholders, and when that happens the whole mechanism
of International Law comes into play (Kyoto Protocol), or they do not get involved,
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or do only in a secondary role, and then International Law may (Global Compact)or may not (the Fair Labor Association) provide a foundation for the emerging
regulatory mechanism.
Secondly, with regard to the growing capacities of non-state actors, it seems that
their capacities have developed at little or no expense to the already established
capacities of state-actors. NGOs have been particularly successful in setting the
agenda on some of the new issues and problems. In some cases, they extended
their capacities by getting involved in a policy network that created and imple-
mented pseudo-laws, and addressing others through these pseudo-laws. In other
cases, multinationals are starting to be addressed on the basis of existing interna-
tional legal standards, and have also started participating in the making and en-
forcement ofthese.
In conclusion, the enhanced positions and capacities of non-state actors in
emerging International Relations regimes is at times ambiguous and confusing.
A certain expansion ofthese positions and capacities has taken place, but appar-
ently without great costs to the existing positions and capacities of state-actors,
the only exception being the Basle Committee. The addition of these new actors
has increased the capacity of global regulation, without necessarily ignoring the
developed state-based rules. The new stakeholders can create a regulatory bypass
system of International Law that takes the pressure off the state-actor system to
do so. And, occasionally, they might even have a position and the capacity to by-
pass the existing mechanisms altogether (FLA, Basel Committee) and 'export'
a domestic rule system (FLA).
8.3      Access to global arenas
The interactions between the stakeholders of a network constitute a literal and/orvirtual arena. The borders ofthis arena are determined by the distinction between
those stakeholders who are participating in the interactions, and those who
might, or might not, be part of the network, and who are not participating, or whowant to gain access to the interactions. This distinction is important. The ques-
tion of whether International Law functions as the basis of a new governance
mechanism is determined by those stakeholders who are 'in' the arena. Therefore,
the question of accessibility to the arena is crucial. There seems to be a correla-
tion between the number and sort of stakeholders in the arena, and the em-
beddedness of the new governance mechanism in existing state-based Interna-
tional Law mechanisms.
The Kyoto negotiations displayed a strong drive for institutionalisation of a state-
based International Law response to global warming. Being part of the larger
framework of UN arenas on the environment, this particular arena further speci-
fied the obligations of state actors already involved with regard to the specific
point of regulating the emission of greenhouse gases. The idea seems to have
been to further enhance the existing international legal frameworks in this field, by
filling specific gaps from within the existing system. However, at an informal level
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the negotiations have been relatively easily accessible, especially for multination-
als posing as NGOs.
The Fair Labor Association started as a regional response to working conditions
in the apparel industry. American NGOs and American multinationals, by invita-
tion of the American President, developed a framework of rules in response to
pressure by the American public to the working conditions in the factories of (for-
eign) apparel companies that cooperated with these multinationals. Although this
initiative started in the American public arena, its network reached out across the
globe through its application by the participating stakeholders. But it is a limited
initiative. The FLA works only through the American multinationals that are par-
ticipating. This number of actors is limited, and the impact with regard to FLA
standards on the conditions in the clothing and footwear industry can only come
from these actors. So, although the FLA was an initiative open to new actors, this
is in practice restricted by geographical restrictions (only American multinationals
and American NGOs under American law).
At a first glance, the Global Compact seems to be the most accessible network,
because it has remained open for new participants to enter. Yet, it is more diffi-
cult to enter the Compact now it has been created, than it was when the creation
process was started. The Compact is more readily accepting new multinationals
than new NGOs. Like the Kyoto-protocol, the fact that the Global Compact started
within the institutions ofthe United Nations, meant that at least part ofthe com-
pact, with regard to the content, has been based upon existing state-based
mechanisms for the protection of human rights, labour conditions and the pro-
tection ofthe environment.
The accessibility ofthe Basel Committee has been very restricted from its begin-
ning. It had no formal restrictions, but in practice it consisted of representatives
of the G-io countries plus Luxemburg. During the period discussed by the exam-
pie at the beginning of this study, no extensions of membership have taken place.
There were no international rules with regard to the issues the committee was
concerned about. As a consequence there was no possibility of embedding their
proposals in existing International Law.
In conclusion, we are left with mixed impressions. State initiated networks may
remain closed to non-state actors, or may accept non-state actors in a secondary
position. Non-state initiated networks, and those not primarily state-initiated
networks  have  been  more open to non-state actors.  But the relation of these ap-
parently obvious conclusions to the main question is harder to explain. State in-
volvement does not automatically ensure embeddedness in International Law as
the FLA demonstrates. On the other hand, non-state embeddedness does not
mean a turn away from International Law, as the Global Compact illustrates. And
in the case of the Basel Committee embeddedness was impossible even if the
stakeholders had wanted it, because there were no other mechanisms this initia-
tive could relate to.
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8.4        Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Emerging Regulatory Arrangements
We have looked at the actors and the accessibility of the arenas in which they op-
erate. But what makes their actions legitimate? And are these new arenas effective
in any way? In this section, both these questions will be discussed.
8.4.1 Legitimacy ofemerging governance regimes
It seems that there are at least two dimensions of legitimacy at play with regard to
the emerging regimes. On the one hand there is input legitimacy. On the other
hand there is process legitimacy.
First, with regard to input legitimacy, the main question is: is it possible to see
who made what argument and who spoke to whom during the creation of the
governance mechanism?
During the Kyoto negotiations, the input of NGOs was officially regulated and ac-
knowledged. They could lobby in the corridors during the negotiations, and some
were present during important informal meetings. The fact that multinationals
were also allowed to enter the arena, points to the concern on behalf of the
United Nations to have as many actors involved as possible. However, most non-
state input remained restricted, quite literally, to the corridors. No direct evidence
has been found that the non-state actors' input had any influence on the final text
ofthe Kyoto protocol.
By creating the FLA, the US President enabled the direct input of stakeholders in
devising a regulatory solution to domestic public concern over working conditions
in US-owned apparel industries outside the United States. The input of the stake-
holders seems to have enabled the creation of a workable system for all parties
involved, but also a system that all parties have been willing to accept when it
came to providing accountability for their own obligations.
Likewise, the success of the Global Compact depends on the direct input of
stakeholders and their involvement in building a new peer-review system from
scratch. It is highly unlikely that multinationals would have accepted proposals for
a regulatory system without their preparatory involvement. But this is also true for
the NGOs. Much of the criticism by NGOs with regard to the Compact could be
explained from the fact that they had not been involved in its creation.
Moving to the second dimension of legitimacy, this is based on the process
through which the new mechanism are being created. Part of this dimension
seems 'virtual', as events are not transparent during the actual process itself, but
only become transparent afterwards.
The element oftransparency seems to refer to a virtual transparency of the proc-
esses in the arenas. In Kyoto, the negotiations were in practical terms not trans-
parent because the most important decisions were made behind closed doors
(and even aside from the official negotiations). Outsiders were kept informed
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through the media present in the corridors. The Global Compact boasts its
'transparent' structures, but this refers mainly to its website where most, filtered,
information can be found. The detailed outcomes of meetings are presented in a
screened-off area of the website that is not accessible to non-participants.
The FLA is the exception to these developments, in so far as it dares to present
the 'dirty laundry' of participating actors in the reports presented on its website.
The main reason to abstain from participating in the FLA is that this kind of
transparency gives rise to the fear among subjects that speaking their minds
freely, and having this recorded, could spark a rush of legal claims.'
It seems that transparency of processes is not automatically 'given' in the emerg-
ing arrangements regulating International Law. Sometimes, transparency remains
locked behind external restrictions (such as restricted Internet access) that are
lifted only for those on the inside of the arena. However, this restriction seems to
have been crucial to win over important stakeholders to participate in the new
regulatory responses. It is inconceivable that a multinational would be willing to
participate in the Global Compact if there was any risk of having to hand over cru-
cial business information to the general public (and thereby also to competitors).
In conclusion, it is fair to say that a large part ofthe legitimacy of emerging ar-
rangements regulating International Law depends on the level oftransparency at
their creation, both with regard both to the input of actors and to their behaviour
during the process of creation. Transparency has not been helpful in all circum-
stances, however, and some regimes would not have been created ifthey had had
to be as transparent as the FLA for instance. Transparency has not been able to
replace older state-based notions of legitimacy completely.
8.4.2 Effectiveness ofemerging governance regimes
To a large extent the acceptance of state-based regulatory solutions to problems
and non-state based regulatory arrangements depends on whether the solutions
actually work. Have the stakeholders in an arena succeeded in creating a working
solution to a problem in need of regulation? In the case of the emerging ar-
rangements regulating International Law, this question becomes even more im-
portant. Are the new arrangements as effective as, or even better than, more tradi-
tional state-based mechanisms? Or would a stronger embeddedness in state-
based regulatory mechanisms have made for more effective arrangements?
The Kyoto Protocol is the typical outcome of a state-dominated process. It is a
typical agreement to disagree. Other stakeholders were denied responsibilities or
influence from the moment the ink had dried. It has taken many years before the
protocol had been ratified, and many countries abstained from taking measures
to implement the criteria of the protocol before they were sure that the mecha-
nism would come into being.
' In literature it has been asserted that this has been the major reason why US multinationals
abstained from participating in the Global Compact.
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The Global Compact seems at first glance to fall outside the range of International
Law although its contents refers to important statutes of Human Rights, Labour
Rights, and Environmental Laws. Furthermore, the compact has been effective in
protecting these rights. A 2004 McKinsey study confirmed that the compact has
had noticeable incremental impact on the subjects involved, accelerating changes
in multinationals and developing a strong network and a solid participatory base:
On the other hand, the FLA illustrates a development whereby domestic laws are
becoming international 'proto'-laws, creating an impact around the world. Instead
of adopting existing International Law standards, for which no support could be
mobilized in the US Congress, the American administration advocated the crea-
tion of an enforcement mechanism through which American laws would become
standards for companies co-operating with US-based multinationals. In fact, a
system of soft law was created with a global impact, while none ofthe subjects in-
volved advocated bringing this system under International Law. American eco-
nomic (consumer) power seems sufficient to provide for the implementation and
enforcement of its standards in different countries around the world.
The Basel Committee managed to organise the support for the Basel Accord, the
standards of which became general standards around the world through volun-
tary adaptation by non-committee members.
In conclusion, like transparency, effectiveness is an important dimension when
assessing the legitimacy of emerging arrangements regulating International  Eco-
nomic Relations. However effectiveness alone cannot provide the complete le-
gitimacy of a new regulatory arrangement in International Relations. As this
sounds much like the previous conclusions, it could be worth developing an un-
derstanding of legitimacy for emerging arrangements regulating International Law
that would be based upon at least two pillars, one being the relation to the exist-
ing state-based regimes; the other pillar containing the issue of legitimacy with
regard to both transparency and effectiveness.
8.5 Conclusion
Is the relationship between International Relations and International Law chang-
ing?The comparative analysis that was presented in this chapter seems to sup-
port that idea. Thus far, the general assumption has been that emerging state
based International Law practices were providing the foundations upon which the
mechanisms of emerging arrangements regulating International  Law were being
built. However based on the case studies and the examples presented in this em-
pirical part ofthe investigation, that assumption can be challenged.
Occasionally the context of International Law and the dominance of state-actors
secured an emerging framework within the already existing frameworks of Inter-
national Law. In those cases, exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol, state actors re-
2     See chapter 6.
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main the dominant actors and have ample capacities to influence the process.
But there have been other cases and examples that followed different patterns.
The first pattern, as presented by the Global Compact, introduced a situation
whereby the implementation of international legal norms with regard to Human
Rights, Labour Law and the protection of the environment became extended to
include non-state actors, especially to multinationals. This extension was created
by a state-based institution, the United Nations, but without explicit legal founda-
tions. Only after the creation of the compact did states recognise its importance.
In this way. the Global Compact can be understood as an extension ofthe existing
system: States gave their approval afterwards. This it is not a dramatic break from
the past, but it is a break nonetheless.
The second pattern is one in which a particular state takes the initiative to 'export'
specific ideas about regulating a specific social problem. This happened in the
case of the FLA, where the US government actively set out, for internal political
reasons, to promote worldwide corporate social responsibility for working condi-
tions in the apparel industry. In the US-dominated network to which this led nei-
ther International Law nor existing international state-conventions with regard to
working conditions in general played a role. The FLA provided a system of inter-
national rules, which in future might be recognised or incorporated by other
states, but which de-facto function as proto-laws affecting the international trade
order. A similar example with regard to International Accountancy Standards was
mentioned in chapter 3.
In the third pattern, non-state actors have taken the lead and either amend or by-
pass existing international legal practices.  In the example of the Basel Accord,  it
was the unregulated influence of representatives of the central banks of the G-10
plus Luxemburg, which helped to create a world wide standard for capital stan-
dards. This agreement was so strong that subsequent efforts to change it by the
US Congress, representing the largest participating economy, were to no avail.
In so far as the legitimacy of these emerging arrangements regulating Interna-
tional Economic Relations was not based on International Law theories and prac-
tices, serious questions had to be raised with regard to alternative resources pro-
viding legitimacy. This is partially provided by the transparency of the emerging
network, and partially by the effectiveness of the emerging network. Most emerg-
ing arrangements regulating International Law seem to contain a combination of
the older forms of legitimacy (state involvement or at least state consent) and
newer ones (representative non-state actors, openness and results).
In conclusion, foundational changes are occurring in the regulation of the al-
ready highly complex systems of International Relations. This chapter discussed
changes occurring in five important dimensions of the changing relationship
between International Law and International Relations. Together these dimen-
sions have helped us to understand the complex and often confusing character
of change. There is not one specific self-evident pattern that presents itselffrom
these transformations. The developments are multifaceted and multidirectional.
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The next, and final chapter, will set out to discuss tentatively the three patterns
that seem to occur in the ever growing complexity and increasing fuzziness of
the interaction between emerging arrangements regulating International Eco-
nomic Relations and the traditional body of International Law.
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9.    Evaluation and Conclusions
"When people set out to prove that nothing has changed, you can normally be
sure that something quite serious has. The very fact of feeling you need to
show that things are the same implies that there has been an unsettlement of
what was once taken for granted. When there is no awareness of things chang-
ing, certain questions are not asked; what exists seems obvious, natural. If you
have to prove that it's natural, you may succeed or you may not, but there has
been a sort of loss of innocence. It has become plain that you can no longer
„1take for granted that everyone really knows what is obvious or natural.
9.1 Introduction
This study set out to explore the interaction between emerging new arrangements
for regulating International Relations and the existing traditional body of Interna-
tional Law. The 13th century Italian jurist Accursius held that the function of (pub-
lic) law was to preserve the system it upheld 'ad statum (...) ne pereat'.2 Likewise,
St Thomas Aquinas wrote that law can only exist derivatively in the system it up-
holds. Can the same be true for the new arrangements regulating International
Relations?
It has become clear that the regulatory transformations in International Relations
and International Law can not be understood through a standard account of In-
ternational Law, globalisation, and growing interdependence. A critical analysis of
the changes that are taking place has to take account of the complexity, institu-
tionalisation, formalisation, and dissagregations that occur. Hence, the impact of
the change is often fuzzy, confusing, and only partly legible.1
In this final chapter, I will present three patterns in which the relationship be-
tween new arrangements for regulating International Relations and the existing
body of International Law might be developing. Each pattern seems to try to 'pre-
serve' economic, political, and cultural International Relations among nations, 'so
that they shall not perish'. The final question remains who or what is providing
the normative foundations ofthese emerging regulatory arrangements in Interna-
tional Relations?
9.2      Bypassing the State (1)
When a bypass is created, it is usually done to create a diversion round an impor-
tant but problematic area. In medical procedures, a bypass is a passage that is
created surgically between two blood vessels to divert blood from one part to an-
other. This is mostly done with regard to the blood vessels ofthe heart, when im-
portant blood vessels are clogged up and the heart is not getting enough oxygen
to function properly. A new surgically created bypass ensures the continuing flow
1 Williams 2005, P· 4
2    Quoted in: Van Bijsterveld 2002, p. 329.
3 Compare Sassen 2006.
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of oxygen rich blood directly to the heart, bypassing the clogged up blood vessels.
In some ways, the emerging arrangements regulating International Relations
could be compared to such artificially created bypasses to state-based Interna-
tional Law.    In this section  I will set out how some of the emerging regulatory,
arrangements although being founded in International Law theory and practices,
are functioning as diversions around important but problematic areas in Interna-
tional Law. These diversions help to keep the state-based International Law sys-
tem functioning in the context of the growing pressures of socio-economic global-
isation. And these diversions depend on extending part of the responsibility for
the creation, implementation, and maintenance of international regulation to
non-state actors.
The historical introduction to International Law't demonstrated how International
Law has developed in response to particular problems at particular moments in
history. At some point, symbolised by the Westphalian settlement of 1648, states
came to be regarded as the primary stakeholders in International Law. Although
this particular system of International Law has undergone many transformations
since that moment, the essence ofthe state-based international legal system can
still be recognised today.
One ofthe transformations ofthis international legal system was the recognition
of the role of non-state actors in International Relations. Of course, there have
been a few non-state actors involved from the very beginning ofthe Westphalian
law system, the Holy See and the Sovereign Order of Malta, but they had histori-
cal claims and roles that pre-dated the creation of the Westphalian system. In
general, the Convention ofthe International Committee ofthe Red Cross, is often
being named as the first non-state extension to the state-based system of Interna-
tional Law. After that first extension, more and more non-state actors have be-
come involved with many elements of the international legal system. In literature
this non-state involvement has been compared with a custodian role. Non-state
actors are expected to guard, protect and maintain International Law. This shift
seems to have had more advantageous effects for the position of multinationals
in International Relations than for the many NGOs operating in International Re-
lations. This shift has also been noted by Sassen:
Such shifts from geographic borders to embedded bordering capacities have
been far more common and formalized in the case of major corporate eco-
nomic actors than they have, for example, for citizens and migrants. Firms and
markets have seen their advantages shift towards new types of institutionalised
protections...The institutionalised human rights regime is a much weaker sys-
tem than the WTO provisions...As national states are directly and indirectly in-
volved in both human rights and these business regimes, one question it
raises is how much divergence in critical regimes a system can accommodate.5
4    See Chapter 2.
Sassen 2006, p. 417
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However, if we take the custodian metaphor seriously, then they can, by defini-
tion, never be responsible for the creation of International Law. They carry out
their role and duties with regard to something that will be, or has been, created
outside their direct sphere of influence. They may have indirect influence through
their involvement with the creative processes of International Law during interna-
tional conferences and meetings. At those occasions they exert influence through
lobbying, organising public protests and, through modern information and com-
munication technologies, raise general public awareness of a global issue in need
of regulation. Occasionally, this role might go further, when non-state actors help
to put an issue on the global agenda, thereby practically forcing state actors to re-
spond to these issues.
Most of these interactions take place within existing networks of International
Law. The network most commonly referred is to the United Nations system. The
UN system has its own 'rules of the game'. These rules determine the interac-
tions between state and non-state actors. The Kyoto negotiations-case offered an
almost classic example of such interaction. Non-state actors can improve their
relative position, for instance the multinationals creating a UN-recognised NGO,
whereas multinationals otherwise would not have had access. But both new and
old non-state actors seemed  not able to directly affect the content of the Kyoto
Protocol.
So far, the discussion ofthe custodian role ofthe non-state actors might not have
seemed very different from discussions held in the 19605 and 19705 of the role
and position of non-state actors. However, the Global Compact case displayed a
significant break-away from earlier practices.
The Global Compact was initiated from within the state-based structures of the
United Nations, but aimed to overcome a political impasse between the states
over the international regulation of corporate social responsibility with regard to
human rights, labour rights and the protection ofthe environment.
In order to overcome that impasse between states, the UN Secretary General cre-
ated a bypass to save the UN's commitment and concern with regard to human
rights, labour rights and the protection of the environment in the workplace. This
bypass respected the existing international legal structures, but brought in more
stakeholders to ensure real change in the workplace. This marked a significant
change in thinking. Theoretically states are responsible for implementing and
maintaining International Law. But they may not always do so, especially when
the national economy is at stake. By involving directly the important stakeholders,
the multinationals, the UN became less dependent on states. Furthermore, they
were now talking to the organisations that actually had to make the changes di-
rectly. And, through the involvement of the NGOs, the Global Compact also in-
volved organisations that could influence both national governments to ensure
implantation of the principles, as well as the general public. Multinationals bene-
fited as well, as they could finally discuss the practicalities of the protection of
human rights, labour rights, and environmental protection, and gain public sym-
pathy through the well respected image of the UN. Critics have described this ap-
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parent win-win situation as the 'blue-washing' (after the UN-flag) of corporations.
It remains to be seen how successful this new global governance mechanism will
be to the already existing international legal state-obligations to the protection of
human rights, labour rights, and the environment.
These findings are confirmed by others in different research programs, using dif-
ferent methods for research. A project by Cooper, English and Thakur on alterna-
tive leadership and new diplomacy within the United Nations and the effective-
ness, legitimacy and possibility of codes of conduct came to almost similar
findings:
Whatever view is taken concerning the extent and impact of "turbulence"
within the specific context of the United Nations, it seems clear that the emerg-
ing pattern of diffuse interaction and multiple forms of leadership matters.
Rather than discarding or avoiding the UN system, this activity aims to make it
more operational and more transparent. The need, then, is to look more
closely at these non-traditional sources of leadership and innovation so as to
be able to understand and deploy this multifaceted dynamic better. 6
Likewise, Grande has argued that the recent developments in International Law in
the context of globalisation or not diminishing the role of nation states, but creat-
ing practical new responses to new problems and challenges:
Ich werde gleichzeitig aber auch behaupten, daE diese transnationalen Politik-
regime die Bedeutung des Nationalstaats nicht verringert, sondern ganz im
Gegenteil vergrijgert haben. Transnationale Politikregime...ersetzen den Nati-
onalstaat nicht, ihre Funktionsfahigkeit htingt vielmehr entscheidend von der
Kooperations- und Handlungsfahigkeit der Nationalstaaten ab.7
In conclusion, the kind of bypasses discussed in this section have a long history
and have been noted before. What has been new is the scale and scope of these
emerging regulatory mechanisms, both in numbers ofactors and in countries and
organisations affected. Many emerging regulatory mechanisms are innovative ex-
tensions of state-based International Law theories and practices. As such these
bypasses help to implement and maintain existing International Law. However,
there have been other bypasses as well.
9.3      Bypassing the State (2)
Although bypassing might have a positive connotation in medical terms (but also
in traffic terms: the road that helps traffic to avoid a busy town centre), it can also
have a more negative connotation. To bypass can also mean intentional neglect
6   Cooper 2002, p. 16. In this study David Malone noted that "The new diplomacy, with gov-
ernments remaining the critical actors but with many other participants shaping the context
for negotiations and serving in advisory capacities, has proved better equipped to tackle
challenges of institutional reform and identify and promote important emergency issues
than the hidebound world ofestablished multilateral diplomacy." In: Cooper 2002, p. 51
7    Grande, 2004, P· 384
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of something or somebody. The case-studies and examples have also provided
examples of the intentional neglect of International  Law in favour of norm-export
or 'proto-laws', rules that have been created in informal policy networks, which
seem to resemble legal orders, and which have the potential to become endorsed
by states in the future, but nonetheless function as regulatory international rules
today.
The case of the FLA helps to illustrate the first type of intentional neglective by-
pass. As the Global Compact illustrated, by the mid 19905 there already existed a
wide range of international treaties with regard to working conditions in general.
And from 1919 onwards, the International Labour Organisation has been func-
tioning as the specific international policy network with regard to these issues.
Within the ILO both manufacturers and labour have been represented. Yet, these
existing frameworks were not part of the events and deliberations that led  up to
the creation  of the Fair Labor Association. The  FLA has been founded  upon  US
consumer attitudes towards labour conditions and made only a vague reference
to existing international legal standards. This would not have been problematic if
the impact of the FLA had remained within the borders of the United States.
However, as most US clothing multinationals operate through foreign affiliates,
the norms and standards of the FLA have been used in judging the foreign affili-
ates as well. In other words, through the FLA, US norms have been exported. In
response, foreign affiliates or trading partners abide by these norms, not because
of local legal obligations, but out offear of losing business.
Furthermore, there is a serious problem when these exported pseudo-laws are ig-
noring higher standards set out by International Law, such as the right to organ-
ise independent labour unions. One can also question the democratic legitimacy
of such a pseudo-legal order which interferes with the workings of local, democ-
ratically elected, governments. Have these local governments not the primary re-
sponsibility to enforce international norms?
However, I am not saying that this development is a bad thing per se. If labour
conditions in sweatshops can be improved and the exploitation of workers and
child labour can be stopped through rule exportation, then this could be consid-
ered in line with one of the basic tasks of International Law: the protection of hu-
man dignity.
In conclusion, the FLA-case helped to illustrate developments whereby an emerg-
ing global governance mechanism was not founded upon existing International
Law theories and practices. In this particular case, through the process of rule-
export the emerging global governance mechanism was founded upon domestic
American laws and policies.
9·4      Bypassing the State (3)
But what  if the International Law system is completely caught off guard  by  new
problems? The Basel Committee seems to have been created in an apparent vac-
uum of International Law.
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State actors and non-state actors seem to be willing to accept proto-laws as genu-
ine international rules when these proto-laws overcome a need for regulation that
is not currently being met within the existing state-based system and also is not
being met through an extension ofthe state-based system. Some problems seem
to demand, 'sui generis', for international regulatory responses, and thereby al-
ternative institutionalisation through proto-laws. Grande names at least three
benefits ofthis approach:
-    Erstens ihre transnationale Reichweite: Sie integrieren - auf die eine 0-
der andere Weise - unterschiedliche territoriale Ebenen politischen
Handelns ober - und unterhalb des Nationalstaats und unterschiedli-
che Typen von 8ffentlichen und privaten Akteuren. (...)
Zweitens ihre Policy-Orientierung: Transnationale Regime werden do-
miniert durch eine starke funktionale Problemorientierung, sei es in-
nerhalb einzelner Politikfelder, sei es politikfeldubergreifend. Entspre-
chend werden transnationale Politikregime nicht durch territoriale
Grenzen, sondern durch - wie auch immer geographisch gestaltete -
funktionale Problembezoge abgegrenzt.
Drittens ihren Regime-Charakter: Der Bereich der transnationale Bezie-
hungen ist trotz aller institutioneller Komplexitat gerade durch seine
Nicht-Systemhaftighkeit (... ) charakterisiert. Er la€t sich deshalb am
besten als Regime begreifen.8
The Basel Committee represented the important stakeholders responsible for,
and depending upon, a standardisation of capital standards in the international
banking world. They realised that matters of national prestige would make na-
tional politicians unwilling to pursue such a global standardisation. Yet, the rep-
resentatives of the national banks of the G-10 countries and Luxemburg were also
aware ofthe risks involved for the global economy if this standardisation was not
realised. In this case, the representatives used their national mandates (responsi-
bility for the welfare of domestic banking world) to agree upon and implement an
international informal policy, a pseudo-law, which had the practical effect of stan-
dardising capital standards and was soon followed by all other national banks in
the world. In this case, states could do little more than accept this situation, and
passively endorse it. The Basel Accord  is thus part of the body of international
rules that directly and intentionally affect the international financial order, without
being a part of International Law.
In conclusion, emerging new regulatory arrangements may have been created
outside existing networks of national or International Law. The decision to accept
these arrangements as 'proto-laws' is a political one. The option remains open to
states to create a new regulatory mechanism founded upon existing International
Law theory and practices, to rep|ace the 'alternative' arrangement. Whether they
will do so depends on the political urgency of the issue the alternative arrange-
ment set out to regulate.
8    Grande 2004 , PP· 394-395
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9.5      International Law and New Regulatory Arrangements
We have found in the case-studies and examples that traditional International Law
may provide a foundation for emerging regulatory mechanisms in International
Relations. But we have also found other foundations, such as national laws which
are being 'exported'. Furthermore, we have found emerging mechanisms that, al-
though they have no direct connection with state-based International Law, are be-
ing 'tolerated' because they are effective. It thus seems that there may be three
elements that make up the foundations of emerging regulatory mechanisms in
International Law:
1. State-based International Law;
2. 'Exported' national laws;
3. Effective practices.
This third category, of 'effective practices' needs some clarification. First of all it
refers to actual or real practices, not some mere 'paper tigers' or vague inten-
tions. Effective practices are practices that are actually having an effect, and are
actually changing matters. Secondly, effectiveness also introduces an element of
serving, or at least a readiness to serve, like the notion of 'effective manpower'.
However, there is a serious risk once we start accepting these effective regulatory
practices, which Sassen has called 'new assemblages.' She has noted the devel-
opment described above as well and writes:
At the heart of this foundational transformation  I  see a sharp proliferation of
subassemblages bringing together elements that used to be part of more dif-
fuse institutional domains within the nation-state or, at times, the institutional-
ized supranational system...These are partial and often highly specialized for-
mations centred in particular utilities and purposes...While these are for now
still mostly incipient formations, they are potentially profoundly unsettling
what are still the prevalent institutional arrangements - nation states and the
supranational system.9
Sassen is seriously worried that there is a possibility that the 'multiplying intersys-
temic segmentation' is posing a serious threat to today's ruling normative orders
of International Law, and constituting instead particularised novel normative or-
ders internal to each assemblage:
Herein lies a foundational difference with the medieval period, when there
were strong broadly encompassing normative orders (the church, the empire)
and the dissaggregations (the feuds, the cities) each contained within them a
fairly complete structure involving many if not most aspects of life...Today
these assemblages are not highly specialized, partial, and without much inter-
nal differentiation, but not even the state can quite counteract the particular-
ized normativities each contains. The norm-making power of the global capital
market...illustrates this well. Finally, these assemblages tend to have rules for
governance wired into their structures of their system in a way reminiscent of
9   Sassen 2006, P· 421.
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how free markets function in that these are not explicated rules and norms, as
distinct from formalised systems of governance, that are meant to be expli-
cated and outside the system itself.'°
Thus effective, serving, practices as a founding element of emerging arrange-
ments for regulating International Relations raise the question ofwhat or whom is
being served and to what end? What are the normative orders that these emerg-
ing arrangements are being founded upon?
These questions are not new. They have been asked for centuries by practitioners
and observers of International Law and International Relations in the East and the
West. Central in this processes of thoughts and practices, has been the idea that
governance by governments or others rests on relationships between people and
should be serving those relationships."
Therefore, both International Law and emerging regulatory arrangements in In-
ternational Relations should be considered a means to an end, not an end in it-
self. These means are not the result of abstract philosophies. On the contrary,
they are founded upon the moral reflections of individual actors on, and their
subsequent answers in response to, concrete problems and challenges, brought
about by conflicting interests:2 It is only by a return to man (De Visscher), by link-
ing the concepts of State, organisations and other means, to the Human Dignity
ofthe person, his or her interests, and his or her relationships with other persons,
that we can find the sole and moral justification of the obligatory character of the
International Law and emerging regulatory arrangements in International Rela-
tions enabling the common good. The study of International Law is therefore a
moral affair, serving, as St. Thomas Aquinas wrote, mankind and not the other
way around.11
9.6      A world made strange
This chapter started with the warning of the Anglican archbishop and philosopher
Rowan Williams that 'when people set out to prove that nothing has changed, you
can normally be sure that something quite serious has:14 It seems that some
changes have been taking place. Not all emerging arrangements regulating Inter-
national Relations have been automatically rooted in existing International Law
theories and practices. Sometimes emerging regulatory arrangements have inten-
tionally been founded on national laws or international informal policy networks.
Further more, it seems that an element of service, of real and effective practices,
10 Sassen 2006, p. 422.
11 Mulgan 2006, p. 7
12 Alting von Geusau 2000: p. 39
13 ST 90.2 where Aquinas writes that "Every law is ordained to the common good [of man-
kind", RS]. Whereas Aquinas held that the law should serve mankind, more recent theories
seem to replace mankind with the individual human being versus mankind (compare Ni-
iman 2004, P. 473)
14   Williams 2005· P 4
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is important. These new combinations and transformations have made the world
of International Law once so familiar, now a bit strange.
Many histories of International Law consist of systematic chronicles of its devel-
opment throughout the ages.'5 But when arguments are made on the nature of
law on the basis of its historical development, then the risk looms large that these
are no more than 'just the present in a fancy dress'. '6Secular International Law
has been a dominant theme for many decades in Western philosophy and prac-
tice, but was certainly not the foundational  idea of Grotius, who is often claimed
to be the father of modern International Law.
Indeed, there is a real danger to read ancient texts looking for questions the an-
cient lawyer is not asking.'7 Studying the history of International Law invites us in
a process of questioning and being questioned by the past.'8 According to Wil-
liams, the risk of not acknowledging the past is 'as great as that of threatening it
as purely and simply as a foreign country'.'9
However, it seems impossible to have a single 'grid' for understanding the his-
torical developments in the context of economic globalisation. Any narrative of
the development of International Law is but a sociological construct of multiple
grids that tries to understand the relationships between state-based International
Law and emerging regulatory mechanisms of International Relations.
Concluding, the very difficulty of making sense, producing a tidy and edifying
story, should become part of the whole enterprise of International Law, and not
remain limited to the historical study of International Relations.20 Making sense of
a world made strange and arguing for or against recognising emerging regulatory
mechanisms as being part of a transforming body of International Law should be
part of the future agenda of international legal studies.
9.7 Conclusion
The conclusion of this study is not that the old system has lost its value and
should be dispensed with. Rather, we have found that the emerging bypasses to
the state-system of International Law serve in a complementary21 role to this sys-
tem, enabling it to survive the difficulties and challenges posed by economic
globalisation. The current developments may add a new dimension to the picture
15   See introduction chapter 2.
16 Compare Williams 2005, P· 24
17 Compare Williams 2005, P. 7·
18 Recall the discussion in chapter 2 over modern interpretations of Grotius as being the
founding father of modern secular International Law, while his work is full of indications to
the contrary of that argument.
19  Williams 2005, P· 11.
20 Compare: Williams 2005. P· 10.
21 Lubbers and Koorevaar use the term 'complementary governance' to describe this role
(Lubbers and Koorevaar 2000. p. 24)
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of International Law, while respecting the already existing pictures, rather as C.S.
Lewis once put it:
A world of one dimension would be a straight line. In a two-dimensional world.
you still get straight lines, but many lines make one figure. In a three-
dimensional world, you still get figures but many figures make one solid body.
In other words, as you advance to more real and complicated levels, you do not
leave behind you the things you found on the simpler levels; you still have
them, but combined in new ways - in ways you could not imagine if you knew
only the simpler levels.22
Being aware of law's history and its present context of accelerating globalisation
enables an understanding of International Law today in a sense that what the law
is now, is subtle enough to encompass the things we do not yet fully under-
stand.23
nos sumus tempora: quales sumus, talia sunt ternpora.
St. Augustine, Sermo 80.
22 Lewis 2002, p. 162.





Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations.
-.un.org/reform/civilsociety/
Achterberg 1980
N. Achterberg, Theorie und Dogmatiek des Offentlichen Rechts. Ausgewahlte Ab-
handlungen, Berlin: Duncker& Humblot 1980.
Adams 1993
1. Adams, Political Ideology Today, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1993·
Allison 1971
G.T. Allison, Essence of decision, Explainingthe Cuban Missile Crisis, Harper Collins,
1971.
Allison 1999
G.T. Allison, P. Zelikow, Essence of decision. Explaining the Cuban Missle Crisis, sec-
ond edition, Harper Collins Publishers 1999.
Alston 2004
P. Alston, 'Core Labour Standards' and the Transformation ofthe International La-
bour Rights Regime, in: European journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No 3, P.
457-521.
Alting von Geusau 1964
F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, European Organizations and Foreign Relations of States. A
comparative analysis of decision-making, Leyden: A.W. Sythoff 1964
Alting von Geusau 1992
F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, Beyond Containment and Division, Western Cooperation
From A Post-Totalitarian Perspective, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1992.
Alting von Geusau 2000
F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, Sporen van de Twintigste Eeuw, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Pu-
blishers 2000.
AIV 2006
Advisory Council on International Affairs, The Role of NGOs and the Private Sector in
International Relations, No. 51, The Hague: October 2006.
Aquinas 1975
R.J· Batten O. P. (ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae, volume 34 Charity
(2a2ae. 23-33), Blackfriars/Eyre and Spottiswoode Limited 1975·
Aquinas 1991
St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. A concise translation, edited by T. McDer-
mott, Alan, Texas: Christian ClaSSiCS 1991.
171
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS
Aquinas 1999
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, partially reprinted in: 0. O'Donovan, J. Lock-
wood O'Donovan (eds.), From Irenaeus to Grotius. A sourcebook in Christian Po-
litical Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999
Augustine 413
St. Augustine, The City of God. Introduction by Thomas Merton, New York: Random
House 2000.
Arts 1998
B. Arts, The Political Influence of NGOs.Case studies on the climate and biodiversity
conventions, Utrecht : International Books 1998
Auth 2001
Auth, G.J·. Bookreview of 'Voos, Sandra. Die Schule von New Haven. Darstellung und
Kritik einer amerikanischen V6lkerrechtslehre',in: European Journal of Internatio-
na| Law (2001), vo| 12, no 5.
Beauchamp 2001
T.L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics. An introduction to Moral philosophy, Boston:
McGraw Hill, third edition 2001.
Bijsterveld 2002
S. van Bijsterveld, The Empty Throne. Democracy and the Rule of Law in Transition,
Utrecht: Lemma Publishers 2002.
Brands 1996
M. Brands, The Obsolence of almost all Theories concerning International Relations,
Wassenaar: NIAS published in 1997
Brandsen, Van de Donk and Kenis 2006
T. Brandsen, W. van de Donk & P. Kenis (eds.), Meervoudig Bestuur. Publieke Dinest-
verlenening door hybride organisaties, Den Haag: Lemma 2006.
Brandt 1967
R.B. Brandt, 'Some Merits ofOne Form of Rule Utilitarism', partially reprinted in: T.L.
Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics. An introduction to Moral philosophy, Boston:
McGraw Hill, third edition 2001.
Brierly 1963
J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations. An introduction to the International Law of Peace, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, sixth edition 1963, fourth printing 1968
Brown, Khagram, Moore and Frumkin 2000.
L. D. Brown, S. Khagram, M.H. Moore, P. Frumkin, Globalization, NGOs and Mui-
tisectoral relations, in: J.S. Nye and J.D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globaliz-
ing World, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2000.
Brugman and Prahalad 2007
J. Brugman, C. K. Prahalad, Cocreating Business's New Social Compact, in: Harvard
Business Review, february 2007.
Bull 1994
H. Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', reprinted in: M.
Wight, International Theory. The three traditions, London: Leicester University




P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace and the Course of History, London:
Penguin 2002.
Cannonist 1159
R. the Cannonist, Summa Decretorum, Preface. reprinted in: O'Donovan 1999.
Caenegem 1995
R.C. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to western consitutional law, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 1995
Cassese 2001
A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001.
Cassese 2005
A. Cassese, International Law, second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005·
CO|AS 2002
A. Colds, International Civil Society, London: Polity Press 2002.
Coglianese 2000
C. Coglianese, 'Globalisation and the Design of International Institutions', in: J.N.
Nye, J.D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press 2000.
Coll 1996
A. Coll, 'The Ambiguities of the Search for International Justice: A Response to lustin
Cooper' in L. E. Lugo (edt.), Sovereignity at the Crossroads? Morality and Interna-
tional Politics in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.
Cooper 1996
J. cooper, 'The State, Transnational Relations, and justice: A critical Assessment of
Competing Paradigms of World Order' in L.E. Lugo (edt.), Sovereignity at the
Crossroads? Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.
Cooper 2002
A.F. Cooper, J. English and R. Thakur (eds.), Enhangcing Global Governance. Towards
a new diplomacy?, Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2002.
Cooper 2004
R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century,
London: Atlantic Books 2004
Dauvergene 2003
C. Dauvergene (edt.), Jurisprudence for an Interconnected Globe, Aldershot: Ashgate
2003.
Davies 1997
N. Davies, Europe. A history, London: Pimlico 1997·
Davies 2002
B. Davies, Aquinas. An introduction, London: Continuum 2002.
De Visscher 1968
C. De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, revised edition, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press 1968.
173
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Donk,997
W.B.H.J. v.d. Donk, De arena in schema. Een verkenning van de betekenis van infor-
matisering voor beleid en politiek inzake de verdeling van middelen onder verzor-
gingshuizen, Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande 1997
Donk 2001-A
W.B.H.J. v.d. Donk, B. Foederer, 'E-Movements or Emotions? ICTs and Social Move-
ments: Some Preliminary Observations', np. 2001.
Donk 2001-8
W. B.H.J. v.d. Donk, De gedragen gemeenschap, oratie, Den Haag: Sdu 2001.
Donk, Hirsch Ballin & Steenvoorde 2001
W. v.d. Donk, E. Hirsch Ballin, R. Steenvoorde, 'Navigating through uncharted waters.
Global Communities & Our Common Futures' in: H. Tam (edt.), Progressive Poli-
tics in the Global Age, London: Polity Press 2001.
Dupuy 2000
P-M Dupuy, The European tradition in international law: Charels de Visscher. By way
of an introduction, European Journal of International Law 2000 (4), PP· 871-875
Dwyer 1994
I.A. Dwyer (edt.), The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, Collegeville: The Li-
turgica| Press 1994
Edwards 2000
M. Edwards, Future Positive. International Co-operation in the 2ist century, London:
Earthscan 2000.
Etzioni 2004
A. Etzioni, From Empire to Community, New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2004.
Eyfinger 1991
A.C.G.M. Eyfinger (red.), Compendium Volkenrechtsgeschiedenis, Deventer: Kluwer
1991 (2e druk)
Falk and Straus 2001
R. Falk and A. Strauss, 'Toward Global Parliament', in: Foreign Affairs Janu-
ary/February 2001, pA 212-220.
Finnis 1980
J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980
Fisher 196 
R. Fisher, 'Fractionating Conflict' in: R. Fisher (edt.), International Conflict and behav-
ioral science: The Graigville Papers, New York: Basic Books 1964.
Fisher 1969
R. Fisher, International Conflict for beginners, London: Harper & Row Publishers
1969
Fisher 1978
R. Fisher, Points of Choice. International crises and the role of law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1978
Fisher 1997
R. Fisher, Coping with International Conflict. A systematic approach to influence in In-




T. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Three, London: Harper Collins 2000.
Friedman 2005
E.J. Friedamn, K. Hochstetler and A.M. Clark, Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global
Civil Society, State-Society Relations at UN World Conferences, New York: State
University of New York Press 2005
Gaius 533
E. Poste, E.A. Whittuck (eds.), Gai Institiones or Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904·
Genugten and Lubbers 2002
W. van Genugten, R. Lubbers (eds.), Division of Roles in the International Economic
and Legal Order. Enterprises, governments, trade unions, NGOs and human
rights. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2002.
Genugten, e.a. 2004
W.J.M. van Genugten, R.A.J. van Gestel, J.E.J Prins, A.H. Vedder, NGOs als 'nieuwe
toezichthouders op de nalveing van mensenrechten door multinationale onder-
nemingen. Een beschouwing vanuit internationaalrechtelijk, bestuursrechtelijk en
ethisch perspectief. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2004
George 1996
R.P. George (edt.), Natural Law Theory. Contemporary Essays, Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1996.
Graham 1997
G. Graham, Ethics and International Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997·
Grande 2004
E. Grande, 'Vom Nationalstaat zum transnationalen Politikregime - Staatliche Steu-
rungsf:ihigkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung' in: U. Beck, C. Lau, Entgrenzung
und Entscheidung: Was ist neu an der Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung?, Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp 2004·
Green 1992
L.C. Green, Georg Schwarzenberger (1908-1991), American Journal of International
Law, Vol, 86,1992.
Goldman 2003
D.B. Goldman, 'Historical Aspects ofGIobalization and Law' in: C. Dauvergene (edt.),
jurisprudence for an Interconnected Globe, Aldershot: Ashgate 2003
Goldstein 2001
J.S. Goldstein, International Relations, fourth edition,New York: Longman 2001.
Gorringe 1999
T. Gorringe, Fair Shares: Ethics and the Global Economy, London, Thames & Hudson
1999
Grotius 1625
H. Grotius, 'The Right ofWar and Peace, Prolegomena', reprinted in: 0. O'Donovan,
J. Lockwood O'Donovan (eds.), From Irenaeus to Grotius. A sourcebook in Chris-
tian Political Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999.
175
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Haas 1964
E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization,
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964·
Haas 1969
E.B. Haas, Tangle of Hopes, American Commitments and World Order, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1969
Halberstam 2003
D. Halberstam, War in a time of Peace. Bush, Clinton and the Generals, New York:
Bloomsburry 2003
Held 1999
D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton, Global transformations: politcs, eco-
nomics and culture, Cambridge: Polity Press 1999
Held 2002
D. Held, A. McGrew, Governing Globalization, Power, Authority and Global Govern-
ance, Cambridge: Po|ity PreSS 2002.
Held 2004
D. Held, 'Becoming Cosmopolitan: The Dimensions and Challenges of Globalization'
in: P. Heslam (edt.), Globalization and the Good, London: SPCK 2004.
Held 2007
D. Held, A. McGrew (eds.), Globalization Theory. Approaches and Controversies,
London: Polity Press 2007.
Herz 2002
N. Herz, The Silent Takeover. Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy, Lon-
don: Arrow Books 2002.
HeS|am 2002
P. Heslam, Globalization. Unraveling the New Capitalism, Cambridge: Grove Books
Limited 2002.
Heywood 1998
A. Heywood, Political Ideologies, An Introduction, 2ND edition, Basingstoke: Macmil.
|an 1998.
Higgins 1995
R. Higgins, Problems & Process. International Law and How We Use it, Oxford, Clar-
endon Press 1995·
Hirsch Ballin 1995
E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, Wereldburgers: personen in het international recht, Zwolle:
Tjeenk Willink 1995·
Hirsch Ballin 1998
E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, 'Recht voorbij de staat - over de actuele betekenis van Thomas
van Aquino' in: H.J.M. Schoot (ed.), laarboek 1998, Utrecht: Thomas Instituut
1998.
Hirsch Ballin 2000
E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, Good governance. Internationaal recht en Internationale
Samenwerking, Tilburg: Globus: Institute for Globalization and Sustainable Devel-
opment, Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, 2000, later published as: E.M.H. Hirsch
176
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ballin, 'Good governance, internationaal recht en internationale samenwerking.
Over mogelijkheden voor het van buitenaf verbeteren van binnenlands bestuur',
in: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Ontwikkelingsbeleid en
goed bestuur, Rapporten aan de Regering, nr. 58, Sdu Uitgevers, 's-Gravenhage
2001 , pp. 219-239
Hobbes 1651
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, Meridian Books 1966.
Huntington 1996
S. P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking ofworld order, London:
Touchstone Books 1996, edition used paperback 1998
Hurrell 1995
A. Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in: L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell
(eds.), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Or-
der, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995·
Hurrell and Fawcett 1995
L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization
and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995
ILO 2004
The World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globaliza-
tion: Creating Opportunities for All. w,NW.ilo.org 2004-
jackson 2003
J.H.Jackson, 'Sovereignty-Modern: A new approach to an outdated concept', in:
American journal of International Law, Vol. 97:782, pp. 782-802.
lenks 1958
C.W. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind, London: Stevens & Sons Limited 1958
lessup 1949
P.C. Jessup, A modern law of Nations, An Introduction, New York: The MacMillan
Company,949·
Josselin and Wallace 2001
D. josselin, W. Wallace, Non-state Actors in World Politics, Houndmills, Basingstoke
2001.
Khanna 2004
P. Khanna, The Metrosexual Superpower, in: Foreign Policy, july/august 2004, P·67·
Kaser,993
M. Kaser, lus Gentium, Forschungen zum Ramischen Recht, Kaln. Verslag Behlau
1993
Kaul 1999
1. Kaul, 1. Grunberg, M. Stern, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the
Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999
Keane 2003
J. Keane, Global Civil Society?, Cambridge: Cambridige University Press 2003
Kegley 1995
C.W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International Relations. Realism and the Neo-
liberal Challenge, New York: St. Martin's Press 1995·
177
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS
Kelly 1999
I.M. Kelly, A short history ofWestern Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press
1999
Keohane and Nye 1998
R.0. Keohane, J.S. Nye, jr., 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', For-
eign Affairs, Volume 77, no.5. PP· 81 - 94
King Gamble 1997
J. King Gamble, 'New Electronic Technologies and the Sources of International Law:
Convergence, Divergence, Obsolence and/or Transformation' in: W.P. Heere
(edt.), Contemporary International Law Issues: New Forms, New Applications,
Proceedings ofthe Fourth ANSIL/NVIR Hague joint Conference,July 2-51997, The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut 1998.
Kissinger 1994
H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone 1994
Klein Goldewijk 2005
B. Klein Goldewijk, Waardering en vernedering. Over de ondergrens bij globalisering,
contribution to the conference 'Globalisation and Human Dignity', The Hague:
March ist 2005, accessed at www.tempora.nu.
Klijn 1996
E.H. Klijn, Regels en sturing in netwerken. De invloed van netwerkregels op de her-
structurering van naoorlogse wijken, Eburon 1996.
Knutsen 1997
T. L. Knutsen, A history of International Relations theory, Manchester: Manchester
University Press 1997, 2nd edition.
Landes,998
P. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, London: Little & Brown Company
1998
Landheer 1966
Landheer, On the sociology of international law and international society, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoffig66.
Lauterpacht 1966
H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, Hamden (CN):
Archon Books, 1966. Unaltered reproduction ofthe 1933 edition.
Lesaffer 2002
R. Lesaffer, 'The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the History of
International Law', 73 BYbIL (2002) 103
Lesaffer 2005
R. Lesaffer, 'Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and
Acquisitve Prescription' in: The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, no
1.
LesafFer 2006
R. Lesaffer, 'Defensive Warfare, Prevention and Hegemony. The Justifications for the
Franco-Spanish War of 1635, part I and part 1, Journal of the History of Interna-




C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Collected Letters of C.S. Lewis), Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House 2001.
Lomborg 2001
B. Lomborg, The skeptical environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the World,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001 (this edition 13th imprint 2004)
Lubbers and Koorevaar 2000
R. Lubbers and J. Koorevaar, Primary Globalisation, Secondary Globalisation, and the
sustainable development paradigm - opposing forces in the 2ist century, in: W.
Derkse, J. van der Lans en S. Waanders, In Quest of Humanity in a globalising
world, Leende: Damon 2000.
Mackay 2000
H. Mackay, 'The globalization of culture?', in: D. Held (edt.), A globalizing worldP Cul-
ture, economics and politics, New York: Routledge 2000.
Malanzuck 1997
P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, seventh revised
edition, London/New York: Routhledge 1997·
Mansbach 2000
R.W. Mansbach, The global puzzle. Issues and actors in world politics, Boston/New
York: Houghton Mifflin Company, third edition, 2000.
Mansbach and Rhodes 2000
R.W. Mansbach, E. Rhodes, Global Politics in a changing world. A reader, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin 2000.
Maritain  1951
J. Maritain, Man and the State, Washington, D.C., Catholic University ofAmerica
Press 1951, edition used: 1998.
Maritain 2001
J. Maritain, Natural Law Reflections on Theory & Practice, edited by W. Sweet, South
Bend: St. Augustine's Press 2001
Mayer-Schonbergen and Hurley 2000
V. Mayer-Schonbergen and D. Hurley, 'Globalization of Communication' in: J.N. Nye,
J.D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press 2000.
Meijer 2002,
M. Meijer, 'We are all custodians of Human Rights', in: W. van Genugten, R. Lubbers
(eds.), Division of Roles in the International Economic and Legal Order. Enter-
prises, governments, trade unions, NGOs and human rights. Nijmegen: Wolf Le-
gal Publishers 2002.
Miller 1994
L.H. Miller, Global order. Values and Power in International Politics, Boulder: West-
view Press 1994, third edition.
Miller 2000
D. Miller (edt.). The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers 2000.
179
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Mosley 2007
L. Mosley, The Political Economy of Globalization, in: D. Held & A. McGrew, Global-
ization Theory. Approaches and Controversies, Cambridge: Polity Press 2007
Mulgan 1997
G. Mulgan, Connexity. How to live in a Connected World, London: Chatto & Windus
1997
Mulgan 2006
G. Mulgan, Good Power and Bad Power, the Ideals and Betrayels of Government,
London: Allen Lane 2006.
Niebuhr 1932
R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York: Scribner 1932.
Nijman 2004
1. Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality. An Inquiry Into the History
and Theory of International Law, The Hague: T.C.M. Asser Press 2004·
Nye 2000
J.S. Nye, J.D Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press 2000.
Nye 2004
I.S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs
2004.
O'Donovan 1999
0.0'Donovan, i. Lockwood O'Donovan (eds.), From Irenaeus to Grotius. A source-
book in Christian Political Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999.
Paine 1776
T. Paine, Common Sense, 1776. This edition: London: Penguin 2004
Poderi991
G. Porter, J. Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics. Dilemmas in world politics,
Boulder: Westview Press 1991
Preez 1991
A. du Preez Louw, The concept of 'lus Gentium', thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, april
iith 1991.
Raustriala and Slaughter 2000
K. Raustralia and A.M. Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in: Carlsnaes, et. al. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations,
London: Sage Publications 2002, p 538-558.
Reinicke 1998
W.H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy. Governing without Government? Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1998
Restament 1987
The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, The Foreign Relations





B.V.A. R8ling, 'Volkenrecht in stroomversnelling', in: J.M. Polak (ed.), Vooruitzichten
van de Rechtswetenschap, Deventer: Kluwer 1964·
Rtlyling 1983
B.V.A. R6ling, 'Volkenrecht in stroomversnelling?'. in: J.M. Polak (edt.), Vooruizichten
in de Rechtswetenschap/2, Deventer: Kluwer 1983·
Roseyneau 1995
J.N. Rosenau, M. Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly. Coherent Approaches to an In-
coherent world, Boulder: Westview Press 1995·
Roseynau 1997
J. N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring governance in a Turbu-
lent World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997
Rosenthal 1995
J.H. Rosenthal, 'Private Convictions and Public Commitments: Moral Man and Im-
moral Society revisited', World Policy journal, 12,2 (Summer 1995),
pA 89-96.
Russel2OO6
B. Russel, Geschiedenis van de Westerse Filosofie, vanuit de politieke en sociale om-
standigheden van de Griekse Oudheid tot in de twintigste eeuw, Utrecht: 2006
(23rd edt.).
Sassen 1999
S. Sassen, Globalisering. Over mobiliteit van geld, mensen en informatie, Amsterdam:
Van Gennip 1999.
Sassen 2000
S. Sassen, 'The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications for International
Law?' in: Chicago journal of International Law (2000). VO|. 1, no. 1,
pp. 109-116.
Sassen 2007
S. Sassen, Territory-Authority-Rights, From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press 2007·
Seville 630
1. of Seville, Etymologies, Book 5. reprinted in: O'Donovan 1999
Schepel 2003
H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regula-
tion of Integrating Markets, Thesis submitted with a view of obtaining the title of
Doctor of Laws of the European University Institute, Florence, June 2003.
SchiffBerman 2005
P. Schiff Berman, 'From International Law to Law and Globalization', in: Columbia
Journal ofTransnational Law, 2005, vol. 43, no. 2, pp 485-556.
Schwarzenberger 1951
G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, A Study of International Society,  New York: Fre-
derick A. Praeger Inc, 1951.
181
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
SCOtt 2004
S.V. Scott, International law in world politics. An introduction, Colorado: Lynne Rien-
ner Publishers Inc., 2004.
Shaw 1991
M.N. Shaw, International Law,Cambridge: Grotius Puplications Ltd. 1991
(3rd edition).
Shaw 2002
M.N. Shaw, International Law, Fourth Edition, Cambridge: Grotius Publications 2002.
Shaw 2003
M.N. Shaw, International Law, Fifth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2003.
Skillen 1981
J. Skillen, 'Christian Principle and Political Reality' from International Politics and the
demand for Global Justice, Dordt College Press, 1981.
Skogly 2003
S.I. Skogly, 'The Human Rights Obligations ofthe World Bank and the IMF' in: W. van
Genugten, P. Hunt and S. Mathews, World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, Ni-
jmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2003·
Slaughter 2000
A.M. Slaughter, 'A Liberal Theory of International Law', American Society of Interna-
tional Law. Proceedings ofthe Annual Meeting; 2000; ABI/INFORM Global pg.
240.
Slaughter 2004
A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004
Starke 1972
J.G. Starke, An introduction to international law, London: Butterworth 1972,7th re-
vised edition.
Starr 2000
A. Starr, Naming the enemy: anti-corporate social movements confront globalization,
London: Zed Books 2000.
StileS 2000
K.W. Stiles, 'Grassroots empowerment: states, non-state actors and global policy for-
mulation', in: R.A. Higgott, G.R.D. Underhill, A. Bieler(eds.), Non-state actors and
authority in the Global System, Routledge/Warwick studies in Globalization, Lon-
don: Routledge 2000.
Suarez 1612
F. Suarez, Laws and God the Lawgiver, Book2 and 3, reprinted in: O'Donovan 1999.
Tehranian 1999
M. Tehranian, Global Communication and World Politics. Domination, Development,
and Discourse, Colorado: Reinner Iseas 1999
Thomas 1999




S.M. Thomas, International Relations, module reader Faith, Politics & Policy, Salis-
bury: Sarum College, May 2001.
Thomas 2005
S.M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Interna-
tional Relations. The Struggle for the soul of the Twenty-First Century, Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan 2005
Toutsos  1967
A. Toutsos, Politique et droit dans les relations internationales, Paris: Librarie
gdndrale de droit et jurisprudence 1967
Twinning 1996
W. Twinning, 'Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications', in: Current
Legal Problems, 1996, no. 49
Twinning 2003
W. Twinning, 'The Province ofJurisprudence Re-examined', in: C. Dauvergene (edt.),
Jurisprudence for an Interconnected Globe, Aldershot: Ashgate 2003.
Townsend 2001
N. Townsend, The New Critique of Capitalism, paper presented at Westhil College,
Birmingham, July 2001, pOSitiOn paper C46 Series five.
UN A/58/817
Report ofthe Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We
the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance, A/58/817· ii
June 2004.
Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001
K. van Kersbergen and F. van Waarden, 'Shifts in Governance: Problems of Legtimacy
and Accountability' rapport voor het NWO onderzoeksgebied Maatschappij- en
Gedragswetenschappen, onderzoeksthema "Multilevel Governance", Utrecht
2001.
Verdross and Simma 1984
A. Verdross, B. Simma, Universelles V6lkerrecht, Theorie und Praxis, Berlin: Duncker
& Hemblot 1984
VOOS 2000
Voos, S., Die Schule von New Haven. Darstellung und Kritik einer amerikanischen
Valkerrechtslehre. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000.
Wallace 1999
W. Wallace, 'The sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox?', in: Political Studies
(47) 3, special issue.
Weber 2004
M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe in: The Essential Weber, London: Routledge
2004.
Wight 1987
M. Wight, 'An anatomy of international thought', Review of International Studies
(1987), no. 13, PP· 221-227 reprint of 1960 lecture.
183
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS
Wight 1994
M. Wight, International Theory. The three traditions, London: Leicester University
Press 1994, edited by G. Wight and B. Porter.
Williams
R. Williams, Why Study the Past? The quest for the Historical Church. Sarum Theo-
logical Lectures, London: Darton, Longman + Todd 2005
WilSOn 2001
P. Wilson, The English School and the Sociology of Internal Law, paper presented to
the European Consortium on Political Research 4th Pan-European International
Relations Conference, University of Kent, 8-10 September 2001.
WRR 2002
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Reports to the Government, The
Future ofthe National Constitutional State, The Hague 2002.
WRR 2006
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Klimaatstrategie tussen ambitie en
realisme, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2006.
Wolf2001
M. Wolf, 'Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?', in: Foreign Afflars, Janu-
ary/february 2001, pp. 178-190
Woodward 2003
B. Woodward, Bush in oorlog, Amsterdam: Balans 2003·
YOUng 1999
O.R. Young, Governance in World Affairs, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
1999
Ziegler 1994
K. H. Ziegler, Valkerrechtsgeschichte, Munchen: Verslag C.H. Beck 1994.
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
10.2 Bibliography ofthe Case Studies
10.2.1 The Kyoto Protocol Negotiations
US Government
97/11/26 Eizenstat
S. Eizenstat, Interview on Kyoto Climate Change Conference, Washington, DC, No-
vember 261997, wMM.state.gov, accessed at 20.01.03.
97/12/08 Gore
Vice President Al Gore, Press Conference at the United Nations Committee on Cli-
mate Change Conference ofthe Parties, December Bth, 1997, Kyoto, Japan,
www.state.gov, accessed at 20.01.03.
97/12/11 Eizenstat
S. Eizenstat, Press Conference, Kyoto, Japan, December 11,1997 as released by the




Ecosoc Resolution E/1996/31 OF July 25th 1996 on the consultative relationship be-
tween the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.
FCCC/CP/1996/2
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Conference of the Parties, Organizational
matters adoption ofthe rules of procedure, 22 May 1996.
FCCCICP1199717
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Conference ofthe Parties, report ofthe
Conference of the Parties on its third session, held at Kyoto from 1 to 11 December
1997, dated 18 March 1998.
IPCC 1990
IPCC, Climate Change - The IPCC Scientific Asessment. Report of IPCC Working
Group I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.
UNEP/PS/1996/5
UNEP Policy on NGOs and other Major groups. Memorandum by Elisabeth Dowd-
eswell, executive director, 30 October 1996.
NGOs
ANWB 1997
Klimaatconferentie in Kyoto, Verontruste ANWB leden, at
www.antenna.nl/vanwbl/kyoto accessed on 29.01.03
Kyoto report
n.n., Kyoto report, Sovereignty International, www.sovereignty.net accessed at
22.01.03.
185
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Secondary Sources
Arts 1998
B. Arts, The political influence of Global NGOs. Cases studies on the climate and Bio-
diversity Conventions, Utrecht: International Books 1998.
Barrett 1998
S. Barrett, 'Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol', in: Oxford Review of Economic
POliCy, VOI. 14, no. 4, PP. 20-39.
Breidenich 1998
C. Breidenich, D. Magraw, A. Rowley, J.W. Rubin, 'The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Convention on Climate Change', in: American Journal of International
Law, volume 92, issue 2 (apr. 1998) p. 315-331.
Chasek 2000
P.S. Chasek (edt.), The Global Environment in the Twenty-first Century: prospects for
International Cooperation.Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2000.
Duin 2002
F. Duin, 'Gesprek met Canadese minister van Milieu: oneerlijk Kyoto is het beste wat
we hebben'. NRC, 09.12.2002, p. 8.
Grubbl999
M. Grubb, C. Vrolijk, D. Brack, The Kyoto Protocol A guide and Assessment, London,
The Royal Institute of International Affairs 1999.
||eS 2002
A. lies, 'Political Culture in the United States' Treaty Making: A new century, Familiar
Behavior So Far', in: Leiden Journal of International Law, 2002, p. 207-223
Legett 1999
1. Legett, The Carbon War. Dispatches from the end ofthe oil century, London: Alan
Lane/The Penguin Press 1999
Lomborg 1998
B. Lomborg, The Skeptical environmentalist. Measuring the Real State ofthe World,
Camridge: Cambridge University Press 1998 (edition used: 2004)
Newell 1997
P. Newell, 'Who 'CoPed' out in Kyoto? An assessment of the Third Conference ofthe
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change', in: Environmental Poli-
tics, Vol. 7, No 2, pp. 153-159
Pronk 2003
J.P. Pronk, Achtergronden van het Kyoto-protocol en de politieke ontwikkelingen in de
internationale onderhandelingen, seminar report, Nauta Dutilh, 11.02.2003.
Salt 1997
J.E. Salt, Kyoto and the Insurance Industry: An insider's perspective, in: Environmental
Politics, Vol. 7, No 2, pp. 160-165·
Yandle 2001
B. Yandle, S. Buck, 'Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle' via SSSN
service accessed at 29.01.2003.
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
10.2.2 The Fair Labor Association
Adidas 2003
Adidas - Salomon, Statement on the annual report published by the Fair Labor Asso-
ciation, June 12th 2003, accessed at www.adidas-salomon on 12.02.2004
AIPA 14.04,997
United States Department of Labor, Apparel Industry Partnership's Agreement, 14th
april 1997, accessed at www.itcilo.it on 10.02.2004.
Bernstein 2003
A. Bernstein, 'Social Issues', Business Week, June 23,2003
Bullert 1999
B.J. Bullert, Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops and the Making of a Global Gov-
ernment, Working Paper #2000-14, Boston: The Joan Shorenstein Center on the
Press, Politics and Public Policy,1999.
Charter Document FLA
Charter Document Fair Labor Association, Amended Agreement, January 2003,
downloaded at 10.02.2004 at www.fairlabor.org.
Connor 2001
T. Connor, Still waiting for Nike to do it, San Francisco: Global Exchange, May 2001.
FLA 2003-1
Fair Labor Association, Transparency Project. First Report, august ist 2001-July 3ist
2002, Washington, D.C., June 4th 2003
FLA 2003-2
Fair Labor Association, Fair Labor Association issues first public report; global com-
panies go public with independent audits of labor practices in factories around the
world, press release, Washington, D.C., June 4th 2003
Ford 2003
P. Ford, 'Redefining social responsibility', Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 2003.
House of Representatives 1996
House of Representatives, 'The introduction of the child labor free consumer act of
1996 - Hon. George Miller, Extension of Remarks- September 19,1996, p. E1658
- E 1660.
Klein 2000-1
Letter by Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Kenneth A.Letzler and Richard M.
Lucas on behalf ofthe Apparel Industry Partnership, Department of Justice, Anti-
trust Division, April 7th, 2000.
Klein 2000-2
N. Klein, No Logo: no space, no choice, no jobs: taking aim at the brand bullies, Lon-
don: Flamingo 2000.
Knight and Greenberg 2002
G. Knight, J. Greenberg, 'Promotionalism and Subpolitics. Nike and Its Labor critics',
in: Management Communication Quarterly, Vol 15, no. 4, May 2002,
541-570·
187
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN |NTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS
I LO  2002
International Labour Organisation / Inter-Parliamentary Union, Eliminating the worst
forms of Chil Labour. A practical guide to ILO Convention No. 182, Geneva:
ILO/Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2002.
Maitland 2003
A. Maitland, 'Big brands come clean on sweatshop labour', The Financial Times, June
10, 2003.
OPS
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary
-   August 2,1996, Remarks by the President in apparel industry partnership state-
ment, The Rose Garden
-   April 14th, 1997, Remarks by the President at apparel industry partnership event,
The East Room.
10.2.3 The Global Compact
ACF UN 2000
Coalition for a Corporate-Free UN, 'Letters to Kofi Annan Blasting the Global Corpora-
tions', www.corpwatch.org/campaigns/PRT.jspParticleid=96i, accessed on
05.02.2002.
ACF UN 2001
Corpwatch, 'What is the alliance for a Corporate-Free UNP,
-.corpwatch.org/campaigns/PCD.jsp?/articleid=617.
ACF UN 2002
Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN, 'Letter to Kofi Annan Recommending Redesign of
Global Compact', www.corpwatch.org/campaigns/PRT.jspParticleid=1428, ac-
cessed on 04·02.2002.
Amnesty 2001
Amnesty, Statute ofAmnesty International, www.webamnesty.org, accessed on
19.02.2002.
Amnesty 2002-1




Amnesty, 'Facts and Figures: The work of Amnesty International' at:
www.webamnesty.org, accessed On 19.02.2002.
Annani9991
K.A. Annan, 'A compact for a new century', SG/SM/6881/Rev.1, 31.01.1999
Bhagwati 2001
J. Bhagwati, 'Q&A: Part of a Tapestry ofActions', International Herald
Tribune, 25 january 2001, sponsored section.
CorpWatch 2002
CorpWatch, Greenwash+ 10. The UN's Global Compact, Corporate Accountability and




Refers to the complete basic text of the Global Compaa as can be found at the web-
site www.unglobalcompact.org
GC 12.2001

















F. Halliday, 'The Romance of Non-State Actors', in: D. Josslin, W. Wallace (eds.), Non-
State Actors in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001.
Human Rights Watch 2000
K. Roth, 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (28.07.2000 letter to Secretary-General An-
nan), www.hrw.org/advocacy/corporations/index.htm, accessed on 05.02.2002.
Keli and Ruggie 1999
G. KelI„ J.G. Ruggie, 'Global Markets and social legitimacy: the case for the 'Global
Compact', Transnational Corporations, December 1999, pp. 101-120.
Keli 2000





M. Livanos Cattaui, 'Q&A: Compact Must Avoid 'Command and Control', Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 25 january 2001, sponsored section.
Locke 2001




P.M. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, London:
Routledge 1997, seventh revised edition.
189
REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
McKinsey&Company 2004
McKinsey&Company, Assessing the Global Compact's Impact, May 11, 2004 ac-
cessed at www.unglobalcompact at 18.06.2004.
Paine 2000
E. Paine, 'The road to the Global Compact: Corporate Power and the Battle over
Global Public Policy and the United Nations',
-.globalpolicy.org/reform/papers/2000/road.htm, accessed on 06.02.2002.
Pike 2001
A. Pike, 'Survey Davos: Sensitive to ethical Concerns: Corporate Responsibility', Fi-
nancial Times 25.01.2001.
Ruggie 2001
J.G. Ruggie, 'The Global Compact as Learning Network', in: Global Governance, vol. 7,
no. 4, 2001, pp. 371-378
SG/SM/9387
Press Release SG/SM/9387 ECO/71, Addressing business leaders at the Global Com-
pact Summit, secretary-general says experience shows that voluntary initiatives
'can and do work', 24/06/2004 accessed at www.un.org/News at 18.08.2004
TRAC 2000
TRAC, Tangled Up In Blue. Corporate Partnerships at the United Nations, published
by the Transnational Resource & Action Centre, September 2000.
UN 26.06.2000
UN, 'Executive Summary and Conclusion High-Level Meeting on the Global Compact
held on July 26,2000, United Nations Headquarter,
-.un.org/partners/business/gcevent/press/summary, accessed on 11.09.00.
UN  11.09.2000
United Nations, 'The Global Compact',
www.un.org/partners/gcevent/press.whatis_hd.htm, accessed on 11.09.00.
UN 12.02.2002





25.09.01, House Approves $ 582 Million Back Dues Payment to U.N.,
-.usembassy.org.uk/forp0467.html, accessed on 06.02.02.
Weis 1994
T.G. Weiss, D.P. Forsythe, R.A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Poli-
tics, Boulder: Westview Press 1994·
190
10·3    Summary in Dutch
Hoe verhouden de nieuwe arrangementen waarin internationale economische be-
trekkingen worden gereguleerd zich tot het bestaande internationale recht?
Naast het bestaande internationale recht, zijn er, mede onder invloed van globali-
seringsprocessen, alternatieve arrangementen ontstaan die pogen de internatio-
nale economische betrekkingen te reguleren. Deze nieuwe arrangementen zijn
een antwoord op nieuwe, ofveranderende, reguleringsbehoeften in de internatio-
nale economische betrekkingen.
In sommige gevallen is er sprake van een hernieuwde vraag naar regulering die
veroorzaakt wordt door veranderingen in de feitelijke omstandigheden waardoor
een bestaand regulerend arrangement niet langer als adequaat wordt ervaren.
Deze situatie doet zich bijvoorbeeld voor in discussies over de maatschappelijke
verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven voor het beschermen van de mensenrechten.
Oorspronkelijk beoogden de mensenrechten het beschermen van de menselijke
waardigheid ten opzichte van de staat. Maar geleidelijk aan zijn er verschuivingen
opgetreden. De vraag naar respect voor mensenrechten stelt zichzelf ook in de
context van nieuwe relaties tussen andere (nieuwe) actoren die internationale
contacten onderhouden in een geglobaliseerde context. Deze actoren, waaronder
ook bedrijven, worden thans medeverantwoordelijk gehouden voor het respecte-
ren en het actief handhaven van de mensenrechten. Dit is op zich geen nieuwe
ontwikkeling, alleen de reikwijdte en intensiteit van de betrokkenheid van niet-
statelijke actoren bij de bescherming van menselijke waardigheid zijn de laatste
drie decennia meer dan exponentieel gegroeid. Die schaalvergroting heeft ook ge-
resulteerd in een geheel eigen dynamiek in de internationale economische betrek-
kingen rondom de regulering van vraagstukken over de bescherming van men-
senrechten en niet-statelijke verantwoordelijkheden.
In andere gevallen is er sprake van de identificatie van een totaal nieuwe behoefte
tot regulering van een situatie die als een internationaal probleem wordt ervaren.
Dit doet zich bijvoorbeeld voor rond het mondiale vraagstuk van de opwarming
van de aarde, a|s gevo|g van een toenamevan C02 uitstoot, en de regulerende
maatregelen waarmee gepoogd wordt deze uitstoot terug te dringen.
De eerste verkennende fase van deze studie die beoogt een beter begrip te krijgen
van de verhouding tussen de nieuwe reguleringsarrangementen en het bestaande
internationaal recht, bestond uit de bestudering van de historische ontwikkeling
van het internationale recht. Hoe heeft men in verschillende historische periodes
geprobeerd door middel van internationaal recht een antwoord te geven op nieu-
we en/of veranderende reguleringsbehoeften? Daarna werd er gekeken naar be-
schrijvingen van de ontwikkeling van het internationaal recht in de context van
toenemende sociaal-economische globalisering. Doel van de bestudering van de-
ze ontwikkelingsfasen was om mogelijk relevante dimensies van het internatio-
naal recht te identificeren die bepalend zijn voor een reactie van het recht op ver-
anderde omstandigheden of nieuwe reguleringsbehoeften.
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Uit deze verkenning van de historische ontwikkeling van het internationale recht
komt een vijftal relevante dimensies waarmee we verandering en continuiteit in
de verhouding tussen het Internationaal Recht en de Internationale economische
betrekkingen kunnen waarnemen: de positie van de actoren; de capaciteiten van
actoren om te handelen; de toegang van actoren tot de arena's waarin men tracht
het probleem tot een oplossing te brengen; en de mate van legitimiteit van de
door de door de betrokken actoren ontwikkelde oplossing; en tenslotte de effecti-
viteit van de door de betrokken actoren ontwikkelde oplossing.
De tweede, empirische, fase van het onderzoek richtte zich vervolgens op de
vraag of met behulp van de in de eerste fase van het onderzoek als relevant gel-
dentificeerde dimensies een beter inzicht kon worden verkregen in de dynamiek
en de veranderende patronen van regulering van internationale economische be-
trekkingen. Welke ontwikkelingspatronen zijn hierin te herkennen en te beschrij-
ven?
Om deze dynamiek en patronen in kaart te kunnen brengen werd gekozen voor
een methode die zich richtte op de uitgebreide bestudering van drie cases, het
Kyoto protocol, het de Fair Labor Association en het Global Compact, welke zich
alledrie bevinden in het hart van de sociaal-economische globaliserings-dynamiek.
Het doel van de bestudering van deze cases en voorbeelden was vooral om een
betere beschrijving te kunnen geven van de veranderingen in de vijf relevante di-
mensies van het Internationaal Recht en de, als gevolg daarvan, mogelijk daarbij
behorende verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen.
Hoewel een deel van de verschillen tussen de cases zijn ingegeven door de onder-
linge inherente verschillen in de problematiek die men tracht te reguleren, blijkt
een belangrijk deel van de uitkomsten te worden bepaald door veranderingen op
de relevante dimensies die in het eerste deel werden geidentificeerd. Op grond
van deze dimensies blijken, naast de traditionele internationaal rechtelijke aanpak
van nieuwe vragen (Kyoto Protocol), andere ontwikkelingspatronen mogelijk te
zijn in de interactie tussen de nieuwe arrangementen van internationale regule-
ring en het bestaande internationale recht. Maar ook de nauwkeurige bestudering
van het Kyoto protocol bracht een aantal innovaties aan het licht in de handels-
wijze en invloed van de niet-statelijke actoren (NGOs en multinaltionals) bij het
tot stand komen van nieuwe reguleringsarrangementen in de internationale eco-
nomische betrekkingen.
Allereerst zijn er patronen mogelijk waarin er sprake is van de creatie van weder-
zijdse complementaire en hybride structuren. Deze structuren bestaan uit ele-
menten van bestaand internationaal recht en nieuwe niet-internationaalrechtelijke
elementen. Deze ontwikkeling zagen we in het geval van het Global Compact. Het
idee achter het Global Compact is dat statelijke en niet statelijke actoren allemaal
hoeders zijn (custodians) van mensenrechten, arbeidsrechten en de zorg om het
milieu. Op zich was deze ontwikkeling al eerder gesignaleerd. Wat het Global
Compact anders maakt is dat we hier een initiatief aantroffen waarin de secreta-
ris-generaal van de VN besluit om actiefeen sprong vooruit te maken om een po-
litieke impasse - over internationale regelgeving met betrekking tot de maat-
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schappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van het bedrijfsleven - tussen staten te door-
breken. Hij neemt een initiatiefwaarin de belangrijkste stakeholders zelf direct be-
trokken worden bij het werken aan een oplossing. Ook vergeet hij niet om een kri-
tische massa te organiseren van maatschappelijke organisaties die het initiatief
van binnen uit zullen bewaken. Een belangrijke zorg is nu wei hoe transparant dit
netwerk kan zijn. Er bestaat een risico dat, omwille van bedrijfseconomische be-
langen, het Global Compact alsnog een gesloten systeem wordt
Ten tweede zijn er patronen mogelijk waarin het nieuwe reguleringsarrangement
een 'concurrentiestrijd' lijkt te voeren met het bestaande internationale recht.
Hiervan is bijvoorbeeld sprake bij de export van Amerikaanse regulering door
middel van de Fair Labor Association (FLA). In het geval van de FLA kwamen be-
staande internationale regelingen met betrekking tot de rechten van arbeiders en
hun arbeidsomstandigheden niet ter sprake. Hoewel die internationale regelingen
hoger waarborgen geven voor de daadwerkelijke bescherming van deze rechten,
blijkt in de praktijk de normering door de FLA beter nageleefd te worden door de
betrokken actoren. De reden waarom ook niet-Amerikaanse actoren met deze ex-
port van Amerikaanse regels en opvattingen akkoord gaan is economisch van
aard. Men is bang anders de toegang tot de Amerikaanse consumentenmarkt te
verliezen.
Ten derde lijken er zich mogelijkheden te kunnen voordoen waarin niet-statelijke
actoren het internationale recht v66r zijn, het recht wordt dan voor een voldongen
feit dat er al een alternatieve arrangement is gecreeerd waarmee zaak internatio-
naal gereguleerd wordt, zoals in het geval van het Basel akkoord waarmee deze
studie opende.
Conclusies
Er zijn dus tenminste drie verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen te ontdekken in
het antwoord op de vraag hoe de nieuwe arrangementen waarin internationale
economische betrekkingen worden gereguleerd zich verhouden tot het traditione-
le internationale recht. Wat alle patronen gemeen lijken te hebben is dat ze in de
praktijk als legitiem geaccepteerd lijken te worden zolang ze maar een effectief
antwoord weten te geven op de nieuw gerezen, of juist veranderende, regule-
ringsbehoeften van statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren in de internationale eco-
nomische betrekkingen.
Die nadruk op effectiviteit heeft ook een keerzijde. Er is namelijk een risico dat
een effectief mechanisme zich gaat ontrekken aan hogere standaarden van het In-
ternationaal Recht. In zo'n geval wordt er een alternatief systeem gecreeerd waar-
in regels gebaseerd zijn op grotendeels impliciete waarden en normen of een zui-
vere afgeleide zijn van de functie van het netwerk. Daarmee roepen de nieuwe
mechanismen voor de regulering van de internationale economische betrekkin-
gen de morele vraag op wat zij uiteindelijk dienen: het systeem omwille van het
systeem of de menselijke waardigheid?
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Deze studie heeft laten zien hoe zich nieuwe patronen kunnen ontwikkelen in de
interactie tussen Internationale Economische Betrekkingen en het Internationale
Recht. Het blijft belangrijk om, in het licht van haar geschiedenis en de context
van globaliseringsprocessen, ons begrip van het Internationaal Recht iedere keer
zodanig bij te stellen dat het adequaat genoeg is om de huidige ontwikkelingen te
beschrijven, en subtiel genoeg om ontwikkelingen die we nog niet helemaal be-
grijpen te kunnen bevatten.
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